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Abstract 
An increasing number of systems operate over a number of consecutive time periods, in which their reliability 
structure and the consequences of failure differ, in order to perform some overall operation. Each distinct time 
period is known as a phase and the overall operation is known as a phased mission. Generally, a phased mission 
fails immediately if the system fails at any point and is considered a success only if all phases are completed 
without failure. The work presented in this thesis provides efficient methods for the prediction and optimisation 
of phased mission reliability.  
A number of techniques and methods for the analysis of phased mission reliability have been previously 
developed. Due to the component and system failure time dependencies introduced by the phases, the 
computational expense of these methods is high and this limits the size of the systems that can be analysed in 
reasonable time frames on modern computers. Two importance measures, which provide an index of the 
influence of each component on the system reliability, have also been previously developed. This is useful for 
the optimisation of the reliability of a phased mission, however a much larger number have been developed for 
non-phased missions and the different perspectives and functions they provide are advantageous. 
This thesis introduces new methods as well as improvements and extensions to existing methods for the analysis 
of both non-repairable and repairable systems with an emphasis on improved efficiency in the derivation of 
phase and mission reliability. New importance measures for phased missions are also presented, including 
interpretations of those currently available for non-phased missions. These provide a number of interpretations 
of component importance, allowing those most suitable in a given context to be employed and thus aiding in the 
optimisation of mission reliability. In addition, an extensive computer code has been produced that implements 
and tests the majority of the newly developed techniques and methods.  
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1 Introduction 
A system that performs a series of tasks that are carried out over consecutive time periods to meet some overall 
goal is known as a phased mission system, where each period is known as a phase. Ensuring that they perform 
with high reliability is often critical due to the importance of achieving their mission goals and avoiding the 
consequences of failure, but is often difficult to achieve since the system must perform without failure in every 
phase. 
To design a phased mission system with a desired reliability level requires the ability to: 
1. Predict the reliability of a particular system design. 
2. Identify the areas of a system design that should be modified to approach the desired reliability. 
If those two requirements are fulfilled then the design of a highly reliable phased mission system can be 
accomplished, given the availability of sufficient resources, by following the strategy shown in Figure 1.1. 
Current system 
design
Analyse system to 
determine predicted 
reliability
Meets desired 
reliability?
Identify areas of the 
system to target for 
reliability 
improvement
Modify identified 
areas of system
NoYes
Start
End
 
Figure 1.1 – Strategy for designing a high reliability phased mission system. 
 
However, it is well known that the analysis of phased mission system reliability is far more complex than the 
non-phased mission case due to the system reliability structure variation between phases and the presence of 
dependencies between component failures in different phases [1]. The overall complexity of a reliability 
analysis of a phased mission system is dependent on a number of factors such as the dependencies present, e.g. 
those due to repair and components with multiple failure modes, the complexity of the reliability structure of the 
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system, e.g. number of components and presence of redundancy, and the complexity of the phased mission 
itself, e.g. the number of phases involved. This is illustrated by Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2 - Factors influencing the complexity of analysing phased mission system reliability. 
 
The ability to analyse the reliability of a phased mission depends not only on the complexity of the analysis but 
also on the computational resources and time that are available and the efficiency of the analysis method used, 
as shown in Figure 1.3.   
 
Figure 1.3 - Factors affecting ability to analyse the reliability of a phased mission system. 
 
Unfortunately, the phased mission systems encountered in the real world are usually of the high complexity type 
and simplifying assumptions cannot usually be made without adversely affecting the accuracy of the results. The 
computational resources and time available are also usually limited due to the constraints on budgets and short 
design timeframes that are commonly present in industry. Thus, the practical analysis of the reliability of real 
world phased mission systems is dependent on the development of efficient methods. 
For identification of areas of a system that should be targeted for reliability improvement in order to reach some 
system reliability goal, the use of importance measures are widely used in the analysis of non-phased mission 
systems. These show the most important components in the system, for example those currently contributing to 
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a large proportion of system failures or those for which a given reliability improvement has the greatest affect 
on the reliability of the system. However, those developed for non-phased mission systems cannot be used for 
the analysis of those operating in phased missions and only recently have importance measures specific to 
phased missions been developed [2]. The systematic and convenient optimisation of the reliability of phased 
mission systems relies on the further development of these and new importance measures. 
This thesis presents methods for the prediction of phased mission system reliability with greater efficiency and 
the precise identification of areas of a system to be targeted for reliability improvement to reach various system 
reliability goals. They therefore provide improved means to perform both of the important analysis steps from 
the strategy for designing highly reliable real world phased mission systems that was outlined in Figure 1.1. 
1.1 Common Properties of Real World Phased Mission Systems 
The work has been developed with the aim of improving the methods available for the reliability analysis of the 
types of real world phased mission system that have the following in common: 
 They are constructed from the integration of large numbers of components to form a complex system. 
 The combinations of component failures that cause system failure vary between phases. 
 The failure of the system during any phase results in immediate failure of the mission. 
 There are consequences if the system is unable to carry out the mission and these may depend on the 
phase in which failure occurs. 
A typical example of such a system is a retractable aircraft landing gear system, such as that fitted to the Boeing 
777-300 aircraft and shown in Figure 1.4, for which each flight can be considered a mission consisting of the 
following phases: 
1. Taxi 
2. Take-Off 
3. Climb 
4. Cruise 
5. Descent 
6. Landing 
7. Taxi 
This type of landing gear system is extremely complex and consists of a huge array of different parts, ranging 
from mechanical actuators to electronic sensors. 
4 
 
Figure 1.4 – Photo of a retractable landing gear system from a Boeing 777-300 aircraft. 
It performs different roles in each phase resulting in a variation in the combinations of component failures that 
cause system failure. During taxi it supports the weight of the aircraft, during climb it stows itself away within 
the fuselage and during landing it absorbs the force of the impact with the runway. For example, a failure of the 
hydraulic system that powers the retraction and extraction of the landing gear would only cause mission failure 
during climb and descent, the phases in which that subsystem is used. The failure of the system in any phase 
would lead to the ending of the mission, the flight may have to be aborted, an emergency landing may need to 
be made, such as in the case of the JetBlue Airways aircraft (Flight 292) that is shown in Figure 1.5, and at the 
very least, the aircraft will not be able to fly again until an investigation into the cause of the failure and a repair 
of the system has been made.  
 
Figure 1.5 – Photo of a JetBlue Airways aircraft making an emergency landing after the front landing 
gear malfunctioned during take-off. 
 
Finally, there are consequences to the system not completing a mission successfully. The precise consequences 
may depend on the phase in which the failure occurs, for example the consequences of failure during taxi will 
generally be mild in comparison to a failure during landing, and range from the catastrophic loss of the aircraft 
to economic losses due to flight cancellations and delays. 
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1.2 Reliability Analysis of Phased Missions 
Due to the need to meet the mission goals and avoid the consequences of failure, the ability of these real world 
systems to carry out their missions with high reliably, where reliability is defined as the probability that it is 
completed successfully, is often critical. Creating systems that attain high reliability is nonetheless difficult due 
to the sophistication of modern engineering systems and the complexity of the phased missions that they 
undertake. The designers, manufacturers and operators therefore need to understand how to achieve high 
reliability with new systems and require assurance and insight into the improvement of the reliability for those 
that already exist. One solution is to over-engineer such systems, perhaps by incorporating great levels of 
redundancy or extremely robust components, in the hope of gaining high reliability. However this approach can 
be detrimental to other aspects of the design such as leading to higher costs and is also still not guaranteed to 
result in the desired reliability. A better approach is to apply methods from reliability engineering to create a 
model of the system from the known logical connections between the failed status of the system and its 
components, together with the probabilistic models for failure and repair of the latter, so that the reliability of 
the system design can be accurately predicted and optimised in a rigorous manner. Some of the fundamental 
definitions, theories and methods from reliability engineering are presented in chapter 2 of this thesis, many of 
which form the foundation for the methods presented in later chapters. 
1.2.1 Reliability Measurement 
The measurement of the mission reliability and phase failure probability for a system operating in a phased 
mission is an important metric. However, the introduction of statistical time dependencies between components 
in different phases complicates the analysis significantly compared to the non-phased case. In the 35 years since 
Esary and Ziehms [3] first addressed this problem there have been two main approaches to the analysis of 
phased mission reliability: 
 Combinatorial such as the fault tree and Binary Decision Diagram. 
 State space such as the Markov method and Petri-nets. 
The combinatorial methods are generally far more efficient computationally but are unable to deal with the 
statistical dependencies introduced by repair and are therefore used in the analysis of non-repairable systems. 
State space methods are able to deal with these dependencies but suffer from what is known as the state-space 
explosion problem, meaning that the analysis of large systems or those that operate over many phases becomes 
intractable.  
Due to the complexity of phased mission reliability analysis and the large number of components contained 
within modern systems, any real analysis will need to be performed by computer. Despite the advancements 
made, the sizes of the phased mission problems that can be analysed on a modern commodity computer are still 
very limited, particularly for repairable systems. In addition, certain use cases require the performance of 
repeated reliability analysis in less time and with less memory, such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) 
optimising the phase configuration of their mission based on real time reliability predictions. There is therefore a 
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compelling need for the development of phased mission reliability measurement methods that have improved 
computational efficiency. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis discusses the existing methods available for the analysis of phased mission reliability of 
non-repairable systems that were found in the literature. Many of these utilise some form of Boolean algebra to 
deal with the phase dependencies between component failures and the methods presented include both the early 
fault tree based approaches and the more recent, and much improved, analysis methods that use the Binary 
Decision Diagram (BDD) technique. Chapter 4 highlights some of the problems and areas for improvement that 
were discovered during the study of these methods. These include the inaccuracies found in the method for 
analysing systems that contain multiple failure mode components and the lack of a method optimised for the 
repeat reliability analysis of a system design that occurs when performing a reliability improvement exercise or 
real time analysis. A newly developed method that addresses both of these problems is then presented and 
shown to be an improvement. Moving to repairable phased missions systems, chapter 5 presents the methods 
found in the literature for their reliability analysis and these include methods utilising the Markov, BDD and 
Petri net techniques. Each of these methods has its own weaknesses, for example the Markov methods are 
unable to analyse the reliability of very large or complex phased mission systems due to the state space 
explosion problem and the BDD technique is limited to the case where repaired components are only integrated 
back into the system at the end of the phase in which they are repaired. Five new methods for the analysis of 
repairable phased mission systems are presented in chapter 6, some of which are extensions to the existing 
methods and others which are entirely new. These include extending an existing Markov method to allow it to 
analyse systems containing components with multiple failure modes, a new BDD method for identifying which 
system states represent system failure, and two new methods that are more efficient in the analysis of systems 
that contain both repairable and non-repairable components – a common case in real world systems. 
1.2.2 Reliability Improvement 
There are two ways in which the reliability of a phased mission system can be improved. The first is to alter its 
phase reliability structure, for example by adding additional redundancy. The second is to alter the reliability of 
the components used, perhaps by using more robust alternatives or increasing preventive maintenance. In either 
case, assuming a limited budget, a choice must be made as to which part of the system and which components 
should be targeted. This is a demanding task if the system is complicated, contains many components or the 
phased mission is large. Importance measures, which give an index of the influence or contribution of a 
component or group of components on the system reliability, can be used to help with this type of decision and 
also to predict the magnitude of improvement that can be obtained. For non-phased mission systems there are 
six commonly used importance measures available, namely the Birnbaum, Criticality, Fussell-Vesely, Risk 
Reduction Worth, Risk Achievment Worth and Differential importance measures. Each has a unique 
interpretation of component importance, and each appropriate for use with certain reliability improvement goals. 
For example, the Birnbaum importance measure shows those components with highest structural importance 
and therefore those for which a fixed reliability improvement would lead to the largest reduction in system 
reliability whilst the Risk Reduction Worth importance measure highlights those that provide the scope for 
achieving the greatest improvement in system reliability. Importance measures can provide even more precise 
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data for system reliability improvement with systems operating in phased missions. For example, they can show 
how the reliability of the system can be improved specifically in the phase of the mission with the highest 
consequence of failure. However, whilst the development of importance measures for non-phased mission 
systems has reached an advanced state, significantly less research into phased mission importance measures has 
been carried out. The further development of those suitable for phased mission systems is therefore required 
since importance measures have an important role in facilitating reliability optimisation. 
Chapter 7 is a review of the existing importance measures and covers those that have been developed for both 
non-phased and phased mission systems. The importance measures range from the widely used and well known 
Birnbaum importance measure to the recently introduced Differential importance measure, and include both 
those for measuring the importance of a component and groups of components. Notable is that significantly less 
importance measures have been developed for phased mission systems and that no method for dealing with the 
cost of system failure, which may vary dependant on the phase in which the system has failed, has been 
presented. Chapter 8 seeks to address this imbalance by presenting several new importance measures that have 
been developed to help with the optimisation of phased mission system reliability. These include interpretations 
of many of those previously only available for non-phased mission systems, those with the ability to find the 
importance of components with respect to precise time periods and the first developed for the measurement of 
the importance of a group of components. 
1.3 Research Objectives 
The objectives of the research presented in this thesis are to provide the following for phased mission systems: 
1. Computationally efficient methods for the measurement of phase and mission reliability of both non-
repairable and repairable systems. 
2. Importance measures that provide information that can be used to direct and predict the outcome of a 
variety of phased mission system reliability improvement and optimisation actions. 
 
  
8 
 
2 Reliability Theory and Definitions 
2.1 Introduction 
The United States Defence Standard [4] defines reliability as “The probability that an item will perform a 
required function without failure under stated conditions for a stated period of time”. The reliability of systems 
is a topic of great importance to both business and society in general. Increasing competition, safety legislation 
and customer expectation levels is pushing the search for ever higher levels of reliability in a wide range of 
systems ranging from military aircraft to everyday household appliances. The consequences of system failure, 
the failure of a system to meet its intended objectives, vary from the catastrophic, such as the Chernobyl nuclear 
power plant disaster [5] in 1986 which caused multiple fatalities, to financial, such as the fines incurred by UK 
electricity suppliers when customers suffer a loss of supply [6]. The field of reliability and risk assessment 
advances theory, methods and tools that lead to enhanced understanding and improvement of the reliability of 
systems. 
This chapter gives a brief overview of theory and definitions that are commonly used in this field. 
2.2 Definition of Risk 
Risk can be defined as the consequence, C, of a hazardous event occurring multiplied by the probability or 
frequency of the event‟s occurrence, P, as shown by Equation 2.1. The risk can therefore be decreased by 
reducing the consequence of failure or the frequency of failure. 
PCRisk   2.1 
 
The consequence can be measured in a number of ways depending on the analysis being carried out. For 
example, it could be defined as the number of fatalities caused by exposure to radiation from a nuclear power 
station safety system failure or as the number of tonnes of oil spilled by an oil tanker. The acceptable level of 
risk for some application can be determined through a cost benefit analysis and is often subject to the law of 
diminishing returns [7] such that the reduction in risk for a given input of resources decreases as the level of risk 
is decreased. For safety application, the acceptance means of the UK Health and Safety Executive is “as low as 
reasonably practicable” (ALARP) [8], which means that, in order to comply with UK health and safety law, 
duty-holders should carry out risk reduction measures unless the costs are deemed to be grossly disproportionate 
to the level of risk reduction that would be achieved.  
2.3 Components and System Definitions 
Components are generally defined as the items at the „limit of resolution of the system‟, items whose reliability 
is not described in terms of their constituent parts. This may be a subsystem, consisting physically of more than 
one part, but which is treated as a single entity with its own statistical reliability model for the purposes of the 
analysis being carried out. A component may have multiple failure modes, meaning that it can fail in more than 
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one distinct way. Usually these failure modes cannot occur simultaneously and such failure modes are mutually 
exclusive. A component failure mode is usually denoted by the component name with the failure mode name as 
a subscript, e.g. bA  denotes failure mode b of component A. An example of a component with multiple 
mutually exclusive failure modes is a switch whose failure modes include sticking in the closed and open 
positions.  
A system is a set of components that interact to perform some overall function. Determining what to include in 
the definition of the system for the purposes of a reliability analysis is an important step. External systems and 
other factors that influence the system but are not part of the system itself are deemed external to the „system 
boundary‟ and excluded from the analysis.  
2.4 Reliability Metrics 
Reliability metrics provide useful information on the frequency and probability of failure of the system. These 
metrics are used to present the current or predicted level of system reliability, compare the reliability between 
systems and to set reliability targets. A high proportion of reliability engineering focuses on methods to 
determine and predict the values of these metrics. 
A few of the most commonly used metrics are described in this section. 
2.4.1 Item State 
Let       denote the state of event i (typically, the occurrence of an item failure where the item could be a 
component, subsystem or subsystem) at time t. So: 
       
                         
           
  
2.4.2 Time to first failure 
If event    represents a failure event for an item then the time to first failure,   , is the time that elapses between 
it being new (and assumed working), t=0, to the time that it fails for the first time (i.e. earliest time at which 
    ). 
2.4.3 Reliability and Unreliability 
The unreliability of an item at time t which has its failure event is represented by   ,        , is defined as the 
probability that it fails one or more times before t, given that it was operating at t = 0. It is therefore represented 
by the cumulative distribution function shown in Equation 2.2. 
                        2.2 
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The reliability of an item at time t which has its failure event represented by   ,        , is the probability that it 
works continuously from t = 0 to time t, as shown by the complementary cumulative distribution function in 
Equation 2.3. It is a very important metric for failure critical systems. 
                        2.3 
 
The relationship between unreliability and reliability is shown in Equation 2.4. 
                  2.4 
 
2.4.4 Availability and Unavailability 
The availability of an item at time t which has its failure event represented by   ,        , is defined as the 
probability that the item is working at time t as shown by Equation 2.5.. For a non-repairable system or 
component this is equivalent to the reliability. 
                    2.5 
 
The unavailability of an item at time t which has its failure event represented by   ,        , is defined as the 
probability that the item is in a failed at time t as shown by Equation 2.6. 
                   2.6 
 
The relationship between availability and unavailability is shown in Equation 2.7. 
                  2.7 
 
2.5 System Reliability Structure Representation 
Usually a system‟s reliability will be analysed through a combination of data on the reliability behaviour of its 
subsystems or components and the relationship between the reliability of these and the complete system. This is 
often far more practical than dealing with system level as directly obtaining data on the system reliability may 
take too long, be unsafe, be impractical or not even possible – for example when the system exists only as a 
design. Furthermore such analysis is far more useful as it can be used to discover the areas of the system 
contributing to failure, how the system reliability can be improved and used to determine the reliability of the 
system under different scenarios and conditions. This leads to the requirement for methods used to describe the 
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system reliability in terms of the reliability of its subsystems and components, known as the system reliability 
structure.  
The system reliability structure can be represented by a Boolean function of Boolean variables, known as a 
system‟s structure function. Each Boolean variable represents the state of one of the system‟s components. If the 
structure function evaluates to one for a given mapping of component states, then this set of component states 
results in system failure, otherwise the function evaluates to zero and the system works. 
Except for trivial systems, it is impractical to derive the structure function directly from a system description or 
understanding. Instead representations are used that can be produced from a system description. These 
communicate the system reliability logic graphically and allow fast quantitative and qualitative analysis. Several 
methods exist for the efficient representation of these structure functions in the form of directed acyclic graphs. 
The most widely known and used methods are event trees, reliability block diagrams, fault trees and binary 
decision diagrams. Each of these system reliability structure representations is discussed in this section. 
2.5.1 Event Trees 
An Event Tree [9] is a graphical representation in the form of a tree that begins with an initiating event (usually 
some deviation from normal system operation) and then considers further system events that could occur, 
following the possible paths to their final consequences. At each possible system event, a new node is added to 
the tree, branching into two each time with one branch representing the occurrence of the event and the other 
representing its non-occurrence. It is most commonly used to model safety systems and determine the likelihood 
of consequences of various severities after the occurrence of a hazardous event. An example of an event tree is 
shown in Figure 2.1. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 – An example of an event tree. 
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2.5.2 Reliability Block Diagrams 
Reliability block diagrams (RBD) [10] describe the reliability structure of the system as a connected network of 
components that are required to maintain the system in an operational state. They consist of a start and an end 
node, a series of intermediate nodes, a series of edges each representing a component and an incidence function 
associating each edge with its adjacent pair of nodes. If a path from the start to the end node passing through 
working components (edges) exists then the system is in a working state. If a component fails then there is no 
path through that component. Figure 2.2 shows an example of an RBD; here the system fails if A fails or if B 
and C both fail together. 
 
Figure 2.2 - A Simple Reliability Block Diagram 
 
2.5.3 Fault Trees 
Fault trees [11] are a graphical representation of the combination of basic event failures (component failure 
modes) that lead to the top event (system failure). The events are connected by Boolean logic gates and can be 
used for both qualitative and quantitative analysis. They are easy for people to understand and produce from 
knowledge of the system reliability logic.  
An example of a simple fault tree, equivalent to the RBD in Figure 2.2, is shown in Figure 2.3. 
 
Figure 2.3 - A simple fault tree 
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The construction of a fault tree begins with an undesired state of the system, known as the top event, whose 
structure function is to be represented. The causes of this top event are deduced and connected to it via logical 
gates representing the logical relation between the causes and the top event. This process is continued with each 
successive cause broken down into its causes, until the limit of resolution is reached. This limit of resolution is 
usually the component level, for which reliability data exists thus allowing the system reliability to be 
calculated. The lowest levels of the fault tree therefore consist of basic events.  
The three most commonly used gate symbols correspond to Boolean logical operations; an AND gate to the 
„union‟ operation, an OR gate to the „intersection‟ operation and a NOT gate to the „complementation‟ 
operation. A fault tree such that increased unreliability of any of its basic events cannot reduce the top event 
probability is known as coherent (meaning that the Boolean function that the fault tree represents is 
monotonically increasing). Thus, fault trees containing NOT gates can be non coherent [12] whilst those 
consisting of only AND and OR gates are always coherent. The most commonly used components of a fault tree 
are shown in Table 2.1. 
Table 2.1 - Common fault tree symbols 
Name of Gate Fault Tree Symbol Description 
OR 
 
The output occurs if at least one input 
occurs. 
AND 
 
The output occurs if all inputs occur. 
NOT  The output occurs if the input doesn‟t 
occur. 
Transfer 
 
Represents a sub fault tree that is developed 
elsewhere. 
2.5.4 Binary Decision Diagrams (BDDs) 
2.5.4.1 Motivation 
Although fault trees are convenient for people to understand and to produce from an understanding of the 
underlying system reliability logic, it is computationally expensive to derive the exact top event probability 
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directly from them. This is particularly the case for large fault trees, for which the solution can be difficult to 
compute within acceptable processing and memory constraints. Approximate solution methods for fault trees 
exist, such as the rare event approximation [13], but the error can be large – particularly if the tree is non-
coherent since the usually high probability of success events falsifies the rare event assumption. A fault tree is 
therefore often converted into a BDD prior to analysis. 
2.5.4.2 BDD Representation of a Boolean function 
A binary decision diagram (BDD) [14] is a compact data structure, in the form of a rooted, directed, acyclic 
graph, which can be used to represent and manipulate the Boolean function representing a system‟s reliability. 
They were introduced by Bryant [15] and are based upon Shannon decomposition theory [16]. The compact 
nature results from two important reduction features: 
1. The merging of isomorphic subgraphs 
2. The elimination of any node whose children are isomorphic  
A BDD consists of decision nodes and two terminal nodes called terminal 0 and terminal 1. Each decision node 
is labelled with a Boolean variable and has two edges, a 0 edge and 1 edge, each of which connects to a child 
node. The 0 edge represents an assignment of 0 to the node‟s Boolean variable, whilst the 1 edge represents an 
assignment of 1. The Boolean variables are ordered such that if an edge from a node labelled with variable i 
connects to a node labelled with variable j then i < j. The chosen variable ordering often has a significant impact 
on the size of the resultant BDD. Unfortunately finding the optimum variable ordering is an NP-hard problem 
[17], although heuristic techniques have been developed that enable good orderings to be obtained efficiently 
[18]. 
A BDD starts at a single node known as its top or root node. An example of a BDD is shown in Figure 2.4. The 
value of the Boolean function represented by the BDD corresponding to the mapping of Boolean values to 
variables on any route from the root node to a terminal node, is given by the terminal nodes value. These routes 
are known as the BDD‟s paths. Often not all variables will appear on a route through the BDD and these are 
variables whose value has no bearing on the Boolean function value, given the variable value assignments on 
the path. Such variables are sometimes known as „doesn‟t matter variables‟. 
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Figure 2.4 – An example of a BDD with variable ordering: A < B < C < D. 
 
The BDD structure can be presented in terms of a series of nested if-then-else (ite) structures, each representing 
a decision node in the BDD. The ite structure represents the decomposition of a Boolean function f, of Boolean 
variables  nxxx ,,, 21  , around ix  as given by Equation 2.8 where 1ixf  and 0ixf  are defined in Equation 
2.9 and Equation 2.10 respectively.  
01 )0()1(   ii xixi fxfxf  2.8 
 niix xxxxff i ,,,1,,, 1111     2.9 
 niix xxxxff i ,,,0,,, 1110     2.10 
Using the ite format this becomes Equation 2.11. 
),,( 01  ii xxi ffxitef  2.11 
Equation 2.11 describes the following situation, if variable ix occurs (fails) then 1ixf  is considered, else 0ixf  
is considered. 
2.5.4.3 Forming a BDD from a fault tree 
It is not practical to directly derive a BDD from a system description due to the difficulty in forming the correct 
logical structure and the huge numbers of nodes and edges that they often contain. In comparison the fault tree 
representation is compact and intuitive. It is therefore normal to form a fault tree and then convert it into a BDD 
through the application of an algorithm. 
To form the BDD representation of a fault tree, the first step is to convert each of the basic events in the fault 
tree into their ite structure representations. 
A
B
1
C
0
D
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
Top node with variable A
Terminal 0 node (system works)
Assignment of 1 to 
variable A (A fails)
Intermediate node with 
variable D
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Any basic event in the fault tree, for example   , maps to the ite structure shown in Equation 2.12. 
               2.12 
To represent the success of a component the terminal nodes are switched. The ite form of the event that    
doesn‟t occur is shown in Equation 2.13. 
               2.13 
The ite structure representation of a gate in the fault tree is formed by performing the appropriate logical 
operation on the ite structures representing the gate inputs. If the gate has more than two inputs, then the 
Boolean logical operation is first performed on the initial two inputs and the resultant ite structure obtained. The 
logical operation is then performed on this structure and the next gate input. This process of combining the 
resultant ite structure from previous gate inputs and the next gate input‟s ite structure is continued until all gate 
inputs have been processed and the final ite structure obtained. 
A logical operation such as AND or OR between two nodes F and G, presented in ite form in Equations 2.14 
and 2.15 respectively, outputs a new node as shown by Equation 2.16, where represents a logical operation 
(AND or OR),                      and                     . 
)0,1,(),,( 01 FFxiteFFxiteF xx    2.14 
)0,1,(),,( 01 GGyiteGGyiteG yy    2.15 
),,( VUxiteGF   
2.16 
 
The failure child node, U, and success child node, V, of the node output by the operation are given by Equation 
2.17 to Equation 2.18, where index(x) is an index given Boolean variable x from a global ordering across all 
Boolean variables. 
   
                          
                         
  2.17 
   
                          
                         
  2.18 
 
The BDD is formed through the recursive application of Equation 2.16 whilst applying the following reduction 
rules: 
 Identical sub trees are shared. 
 Any node whose failure and success child is the same node is removed and replaced by that child node. 
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The conversion process for the example fault tree in Figure 2.5a that results in the BDD shown in Figure 2.5b, 
when the variable ordering is A < B < C,  is: 
)0),0),0,1,(,(,()0,1,()0),0,1,(,()0,1,()0,1,()0,1,( CiteBiteAiteCiteBiteAiteCiteBiteAite   
 
 
Figure 2.5 - A fault tree and an equivalent BDD. 
2.6 Representing the top event in terms of basic event 
combinations 
A common form of qualitative analysis is to determine the combinations of basic events that cause system 
failure when they all occur. Explained in this section are cut sets and implicants, widely used basic event 
combinations with specific properties. 
2.6.1 Cut Sets 
A cut set is any combination, and a minimal cut set a least combination, of basic events that cause system failure 
when they occur.  The difference is therefore that a subset of a cut sets basic events occurring may cause system 
failure whereas a minimal cut set requires that all basic events in the set occur.  For example a minimal cut set 
consisting of basic events representing the failure of components A, B and D requires all three of the 
components to be failed for the system to fail. Minimal cut sets can be determined from a set of cut sets by 
applying the distributive, idempotent and absorption Boolean algebra rules demonstrated in the example 
equations 2.19, 2.20 and 2.21 respectively. The idempotent rule removes repeated cut sets and failure events 
whilst the absorption rule removes redundant cut sets.  
)()()()()()( DBCBDACADCBA   
2.19 
AAAAA   
2.20 
ABAA  )(  
2.21 
 
System Failure
CBA
A
B
C
1
1
1 0
0
0
01
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2.6.2 Implicants 
An implicant is a similar concept to that of a cut set but includes success events as well as failure events. They 
are often derived from non-coherent fault trees or from BDDs.  
2.7 Quantification methods 
The methods used to perform quantitative analysis on fault trees and BDDs, such as determining the probability 
of failure of the system, are explained in this section.  
2.7.1 Fault Tree Based Quantification Methods  
To quantify the probability of the occurrence of a fault tree‟s top events, the minimal cut sets (or minimal 
implicant sets if the fault tree is non-coherent) are used. The „Bottom-up‟ approach can be used to obtain the 
minimal cut sets from a fault tree. This approach begins with the basic events of the tree which are then 
expanded into higher level events according to the Boolean gates used. The basic event combinations necessary 
for the higher level event failures are therefore determined. This process is repeated for these higher level events 
until the top event of the tree is reached, at which point the system failure mode (the top event) is defined by a 
set of cut sets. The cut sets are then converted into minimal cut sets by removing repeated events and cut sets 
that are contained within other cut sets. 
2.7.1.1 Inclusion-Exclusion Expansion 
To determine the probability of a top event represented by a set of cut sets or implicants, it is necessary to 
perform the inclusion-exclusion expansion. 
T is defined as the top event represented by Nmcs minimal cut sets, Ki, i=1,…, Nmcs, as shown in Equation 2.22. 

mcs
mcs
N
i
iN KKKKT
1
21

  
2.22 
 
The probability that T occurs can then be expressed as the probability that at least one of its minimal cut set 
occurs, as shown in Equation 2.23. 









mcsN
i
iKPTP
1
)(  
2.23 
 
The inclusion-exclusion expansion must be performed on the minimal cut sets, as defined by Equation 2.24, in 
order to correctly calculate the top event probability. 
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The higher order terms of the inclusion-exclusion expansion become negligible when the probability of each 
individual basic event occurring is very small. In this case the Rare Event Approximation shown in Equation 
2.25 may be used. It consists of the first term from Equation 2.24 and gives an upper bound on the actual 
probability.  



cN
i
iKPTP
1
)()(  
2.25 
 
A lower bound on the probability is found by using only the first two terms from Equation 2.24 and is known as 
the Lower Bound Approximation, as shown in Equation 2.26. 
 




mcsmcs N
i
i
j
ji
N
i
i KKPKPTP
2
1
11
)()(  
2.26 
2.7.2 BDD Based Quantification Methods 
Each path through the BDD from the root (top) node to a terminal node represents a unique mapping of Boolean 
values to the variables (represented by the nodes) on the path, and the terminal node value is the structure 
function‟s output for this mapping. The Boolean value mapped to each variable is indicated by the variables 
edge the path passes through, with the 1 edge representing the variable‟s occurrence event and the 0 edge 
indicating the variable‟s non-occurrence event. The combination of events existing on a path terminating at a 
terminal 1 node is an implicant for the structure function. 
The probability of the function represented by the BDD evaluating to 1, occurrence of the top event, is therefore 
found from the sum of the probabilities of these mutually exclusive implicants. Assuming that all node variables 
are independent, the probability of a node F,  )(FP , is evaluated through Equations 2.27 to 2.29, where x, F0 
and F1 are the node‟s variable, failure child and success child respectively.  
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      , if F is a terminal 1 node. 
2.27 
      , if F is a terminal 0 node. 
2.28 
                                , 
 if F is an ite node. 
2.29 
BDDs can be evaluated very efficiently since the probability of each BDD node, which represents part of the 
systems reliability structure, depends only on the probability of the failure and success events of its variable and 
the probabilities of its two child nodes. The probability of each node is only calculated once and is then cached 
to be used in the calculations of all nodes which have that node as a child. 
2.7.3 Markov Model Methods 
Quantitative analysis cannot be performed directly from the structure function (or its representation) on systems 
that include repair queuing, standby redundancy and common cause failures. This is because such systems 
contain basic events whose state depends on the state of other basic events (i.e. they are not independent). 
These systems may be analysed using the Markov modelling technique. A Markov model [10] is a form of 
directed graph consisting of nodes and transitions.  
Each node represents a discrete system state. The system states are the finite set of mutually exclusive and 
exhaustive conditions in which the system can reside, defined in terms of the states of the basic events of the 
system. The transitions represent the transfer of the system between these states caused by the failure or repair 
of a basic event. The system‟s structure function is then used to determine the subset of the system states that 
represent system failure. 
Markov models are only suitable to analyse systems that meet the following requirements: 
i. The basic event failure behaviour must not vary with time; the failure and repair rates must be constant, 
otherwise known as stationary or homogeneous processes. The failure and repair time must therefore 
be represented by exponential probability distributions. 
ii. The future behaviour of the system must not be influenced by its past behaviour; the system must lack 
memory. 
iii. The states of the system must be identifiable, where a system state denotes a vector of the system‟s 
component states (whether working or failed). 
Requirement i may however be relaxed when numerical solution schemes, such as Runge-Kutta [19], that can 
model time dependant transition rates are used [20]. When a numerical solution scheme is used, transition rates 
can be globally time dependant, i.e. dependent on the time elapsed from some globally specified time such as 
the start time at which system operation begins. 
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An example Markov diagram for a two component system is shown in Figure 2.6, where x is the failure rate of 
basic event x and x is the repair rate of basic event x. 
 
Figure 2.6 - Example Markov Diagram. 
 
One of the major drawbacks of Markov models is that the number of nodes can become huge for systems with 
large numbers of basic events, making analysis unfeasible due to the computational expense. This is known as 
the state explosion problem. 
2.7.4 Petri Net Models  
Another method, especially well suited to modelling complex repairable systems, is Petri Nets. A Petri Net [21] 
is a directed bipartite graph in which the nodes represent transitions, represented by bars in a graphical 
representation, and places which are represented by hollow circles. Directed arcs linking places to transitions are 
known as inputs and those connecting transitions to places are known as outputs. In addition, multiple input or 
output arcs can link the same place and same transition, with the number of arcs known as the multiplicity, often 
represented as a single arc with a backslash through it and a positive integer denoting the multiplicity. Places 
may contain 0 or more tokens, represented by filled circles, and it is the distribution of tokens through the net, 
known as the net marking, that determines the state of the system. When the number of tokens in a place 
matches or exceeds the number of input arcs, the transition is enabled, and it may then fire, in which case the 
tokens are consumed from the input places, and deposited in the output places - thus altering the marking of the 
net and therefore the state of the system. The firing of the transition can be associated with a time delay, with the 
length of the delay often described through a distribution. The number of tokens consumed from the input place 
is equal to the number of input arcs and the number of token deposited in the output place is equal to the number 
of output arcs. Only one transition can occur at any instant of time, regardless of the number of transitions that 
are enabled. Figure 2.7 shows a simple Petri net with a transition with three input arcs from two places and a 
single output arc to another place. In Figure 2.7a there are tokens for each of the input arcs and therefore a 
A B 
AB 
 
 
B  A  
B  A  
A  
A  B  
B  The state with component B 
failed and A working. 
A repair 
transition 
between two 
states. 
The state with 
components A and 
B working. 
A failure 
transition 
between two 
states. 
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transition occurs, the tokens are consumed and a token deposited at the end of the output arc as shown in Figure 
2.7b. 
 
Figure 2.7 - Petri net transition 
 
A fault tree may be converted into a Petri Net and Figure 2.8a and Figure 2.8b show how a Petri net can be used 
to represent OR and AND gates respectively, where circles represent places, bars represent transitions and 
arrows represent arcs. In the simplest case a system fault tree is modelled as a Petri net with instantaneous gate 
transitions and the transition timings of basic events determined through simulation. A token entering the place 
representing the fault tree‟s top event then signifies system failure.   
 
Figure 2.8 - Petri nets of common fault tree gates. 
 
Many other additional features have been added to Petri net models, some that improve the representational 
power such as coloured tokens [22], and others that improve the expressiveness such as inhibitor arcs that block 
a transition from occurring. 
a) OR Gate Petri net b) AND Gate Petri net 
Output Output 
Inputs Inputs 
At some time, t, 
later 
Prior to  
transition 
After  
transition 
a) b) 
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2.7.5 Monte Carlo Simulation 
Monte Carlo simulation [23] is often used to analyse systems that are either too complex or too large for 
analytical techniques. In this technique, an outcome for the system is determined through randomly generated 
numbers (typically an algorithm is used to generate pseudo random numbers) that are used to sample from 
probability distributions in a model of the system reliability. For example a random time, t, from an exponential 
or Weibull distribution can be obtained from Equation 2.30 and Equation 2.31 respectively, where X is a 
uniformly distributed random variable between 0 and 1 [13]. Each simulated outcome is known as a trial, a large 
number of which are recorded over a typical simulation. The distribution of simulated outcomes should then 
follow the outcome distribution of the simulated system, provided that a sufficient number of trials have been 
computed. Reliability metrics are then computed from the generated outcome data. 
)ln(Xt   
2.30 

1
))ln(( Xt   
2.31 
 
Simulation used to model component reliability together when modelling system reliability through fault trees 
or Petri Nets. The main benefits of simulation over analytical solution schemes are that it is easy to apply, can 
be used to model very complex scenarios and has the ability to generate very detailed statistics. The 
disadvantages are that results are not exact and that generating a sufficient number of simulated outcomes has a 
high computational cost. Its independence from analytical methods makes it ideal for verifying their accuracy 
through a comparison of results. 
2.8 Phased Mission Analysis 
Many real world systems operate in what are known as phased missions [24]. A system operates in a phased 
mission if the reliability structure changes at the transition points between consecutive time periods, known as 
phases, of the system‟s operation. Common causes of the differences before and after a transition time are 
changes in the system configuration or mode of operation. Each phase has a certain duration that is normally 
fixed but may also be modelled by a random variable. At the end of the duration of a phase, a phase transition 
occurs, the current phase ends and the system reliability structure is replaced by that of the next phase. It is 
usually assumed that phase transitions occur instantaneously such that no component failures can occur whilst it 
takes place. The type of phased mission studied in this document are defined as successful if all phases are 
completed without system failure and failed if system failure occurs in any phase, at which point the mission 
terminates immediately. For details on phased missions with combinatorial phase requirement see Misra [25]. 
An example of a phased mission is a landing gear system used during a commercial airliner flight where the 
phases include take-off, climb, cruise, descent and landing; each of these phases have different component 
failure combinations resulting in phase failure due to the different configuration and role of the system. A chart 
showing the altitude and reliability of a landing gear system during a phased mission is shown in Figure 2.9. 
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A system operating in a phased mission can fail in one of two ways. It can fail within a phase if failures of its 
components cause a system failure combination to occur and this is known as an in-phase failure. Alternatively, 
the system may be functioning at the end of a certain phase, and without additional component failures, fail on 
transition to the next phase due to the change in the system reliability structure resulting in a system failure 
combination, present in the previous phase, to cause system failure under the new phase conditions. This second 
failure type is known as a transitional failure. Phase failure alone, when in-phase or transitional failure is not 
specified, includes failures on transition to and during the phase. 
 
Figure 2.9 – Landing gear system altitude and reliability in a phased mission 
2.8.1 Phased Mission Fault Trees 
Phased mission fault trees are used to represent the failure or success of a phased mission over a certain period. 
The most commonly used fault trees are shown in Figure 2.10, where N is the number of phases in the mission. 
The complement of a phase fault tree, formed by placing a NOT gate as a parent to the existing top gate, is 
known as the phase success tree or phase dual tree. This is equivalent to replacing AND gates with OR gates, 
OR gates with AND gates and component failure basic events with component success basic events. 
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Figure 2.10 – Common mission fault trees 
 
2.8.2 Calculation of system failure during any period of the mission 
The probability of system failure between times T1 and T2 in a non-repairable phased mission, denoted as  
     , 
can be calculated from Equation 2.32, where    represents the failure event for the system. 
 
                          where       2.32 
 
The values of T1 and T2 for the calculation of system failure during phase j,      phase j in-phase system failure, 
  
   system failure on transition to phase j,   
   and failure during a mission of N phases,      , are given in 
Table 2.2, where    is the time at which phase j ends,    
  is the time just before the phase change at the end of 
phase j (i.e.       ) and   
  is the time just after (i.e.      ). 
Exclusive 
failure in 
phase X
1
X
X-1
Mission 
Failure
1 N
Mission 
Success
1 N
Where: X = Phase fault tree for phase X
X Y
= Sequence of fault trees from phase X to phase Y
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Table 2.2 - The T1 and T2 times for calculating probabilities of system failure in various time periods of a 
phased mission. 
Period of phased mission in 
which system failure occurs 
Symbol Equation 2.32 T1 value Equation 2.32 T2 value 
Overall phase j        
    
  
In-Phase phase j   
      
    
  
Transition to phase j   
      
      
  
Mission of N phases             
 
Note that whilst system failures on transition to phase j occur at time   , the probability is measured through 
Equation 2.32 as the probability of system failure occurring in an infimintesimal time period that contains   .  
2.9 Summary 
Risk and reliability engineering is an important field that advances methods for measuring and improving the 
risk and reliability of systems. Risk is the product of the probability of occurrence of some undesired event and 
its consequences. The various reliability metrics are useful for presenting reliability performance and comparing 
the different aspects of reliability between systems. Many methods are available that can be used to represent a 
system‟s reliability structure and the choice depends on both the system being analysed and the desired type of 
analysis. Different quantitative analysis methods, ranging from those that give exact results, such as binary 
decision diagrams, to the more flexible Monte Carlo simulation can be used, each with its own advantages and 
disadvantages. Phased missions, where the system‟s reliability structure varies over consecutive time periods, 
are a common occurrence in the real world and research into their reliability is an important topic. 
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3 Literature Review of reliability methods for non-
repairable phased missions 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter covers existing research on the reliability analysis of non-repairable systems undergoing phased 
missions with independent component failures. Systems in many real world phased missions are non-repairable, 
e.g. it is not possible to repair landing gear components during a passenger aircraft flight. The research covered 
begins with the earliest methods that are based on transformations and utilise methods developed for non-phased 
missions. It then covers methods based on the use of Boolean phase algebra and finishes with the most recent 
methods that utilise binary decision diagrams.   
3.2 Early Phased Mission Methods 
The earliest method for analysing the reliability of non-repairable phased mission was developed by Esary and 
Ziehms [3]. They present a method that transforms a multi-phase mission into an equivalent single phased 
mission for the purpose of calculating a system‟s mission reliability exactly. The data required to calculate the 
mission reliability using this method are the phase fault trees, which are assumed to be coherent, and the 
probability of failure in each phase for each component conditional on the component surviving until that phase. 
These conditional phase failure probabilities are easily determined from the components failure probability 
density or cumulative failure distribution functions. 
Esary and Ziehms show that attempting to calculate mission reliability by forming fault trees for each phase, 
calculating the reliability of each phase individually using standard fault tree methods and then multiplying the 
individual phase reliabilities together does not give the correct result. This is due to the invalid implicit 
assumption that failure probabilities of components in phases are statistically independent of the system 
performance in earlier phases, which would only be true if none of the phases contained common components. 
The resulting inaccuracy from this assumption can be significant. 
Esary and Ziehms method (EZ method) transforms the multi-phase mission into an equivalent single phased 
mission. In order to achieve this they note that the added complexity inherent in phased missions is because a 
component‟s performance in each phase depends on its performance in previous phases. Specifically, its 
performance in a given phase depends on whether it has functioned successfully, without failure, in all previous 
phases. This is based on the fact that the components are non-repairable and therefore to be in a working state in 
a given phase, they must have worked continuously in all previous phases. Hence where the system reliability 
structure is represented by a reliability block diagram, a component failure event in a given phase can be 
replaced by a series arrangement of events for each phase up to and including the current phase, where each 
event represents the failure of the component in that specific phase, i.e. the event that it fails within that phase 
conditional on it surviving until that phase. Where the system reliability structure for a phase i is represented by 
a fault tree, a basic event in that tree is replaced by a logical OR gate with input basic events representing 
component failure in each individual phase up to and including phase i. For example, Figure 3.1a shows a fault 
28 
 
tree for system failure in phase 2 prior to transformation and Figure 3.1b shows the same fault tree afterwards, 
where         represents the occurrence of event    between times    and    (i.e. during phase k if k=j+1). For 
example, in the fault tree shown in Figure 3.1a, basic event A is replaced by an OR gate with inputs of A(0,1) 
and A(1,2) in the transformed fault tree shown in Figure 3.1b. 
 
Figure 3.1 - Example of a phase fault tree transformation with the EZ method 
The mission unreliability is then represented through an OR gate with inputs of the individual phase fault trees, 
since failure in any phase results in failure of the mission. This results in a new, single phase, system that has the 
same mission reliability as the original system. The number of basic events in the resultant system, known as the 
equivalent system, will be increased, at most, by a factor equal to the number of phases in the mission. This can 
lead to a huge increase in the number of cut sets for mission failure, severely limiting the size of the systems that 
may be analysed due to the computational burden imposed. 
The minimal cut set cancellation technique can be applied prior to transforming the system and results in a 
reduced number of cut sets and overall computational effort. A minimal cut set can be cancelled, i.e. omitted 
from the list of minimal cut sets for that phase, if it contains a minimal cut set of a later phase. This relies on the 
fact that, for a non-repairable system, occurrence of the cancelled cut set means that the cut set it contains will 
also occur, causing system failure in the later phase anyway. The mission unreliability is therefore left 
unchanged by the application of the technique. Applying the cut set cancellation technique reduces the number 
of cut sets that must be computed by the fault tree algorithm and results in faster analysis.  
Burdick, Fussell, Rasmuson and Wilson [26] reviewed some approximation methods that allow the 
transformation into an equivalent single phase system to be avoided, hence reducing the computation burden. 
The methods rely on obtaining the reliability of each phase separately and using these to estimate the overall 
mission reliability. The methods are all conservative, giving an upper bound on the exact unreliability value, and 
can therefore be used to determine if the systems reliability performance is above a certain level. However, the 
use of conservative approximations can lead to the over design of a system, so whilst useful as fast estimates 
they should be used with care. 
Failure in phase 
2 
B 
A 
C 
Failure in phase 
2 
 
A(0,1)  A(1,2) 
 
B(0,1)  B(1,2) 
 
C(0,1)  C(1,2) 
a) b) 
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The INEX approximation involves carrying out an inclusion-exclusion expansion of the minimal cut sets of each 
phase, using unconditional basic event unreliabilities, to obtain the approximate unreliability of each phase. The 
appoximate phase j system unreliability found through this method is denoted as         . The overall INEX 
mission unreliability approximation,           , is then found by deducting the product of the individual phase 
reliabilities (1 – unreliability) from one. An alternative that gives an upper bound on           , is to sum the 
INEX unreliability approximations from each phase as shown in Equation 3.1, where N is the total number of 
phases in the mission. 
                   
 
   
 
3.1 
 
The INEX approximation can also be used after the cut set cancellation method has been applied, resulting in an 
equal or lower reliability approximation than that obtained without cancellation. This is known as the INEX-CC 
approximation,              . 
The second conservative method uses the minimal cut set bound and is known as the MCB approximation. The 
probability of cut set k occurring in phase j is calculated by the multiplication of its basic events, using 
unconditional failure probabilities, through Equation 3.2, where      is the probability of the occurrence of cut 
set k from the phase j fault tree,    is basic event i of kk,j basic events in cut set k from the phase j fault tree and 
           is the unconditional probability of    occurring at or before the end of phase j. 
                
    
   
 
3.2  
 
The MCB approximation of the reliability in phase j of the phased mission,       , is then calculated as the 
probability of no phase cut sets occurring,  using Equation 3.3, where      is the number of phase j cut sets. 
                
     
   
 
3.3  
  
The MCB approximation of the mission unreliability,         , is then calculated as one minus the product of 
the individual phase MCB reliability approximations as shown in Equation 3.4. 
                   
 
   
 
3.4  
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Again, prior application of the minimal cut set cancellation rules give a further approximation, known as the 
MCB-CC approximation,             . 
Zhiems [27] showed that the ordering of the approximations is given by Equation 3.5, where MissQ  is the exact 
mission unreliability calculated through the EZ transformation method. 
                    
            
          
           
 
3.5  
 
3.2.1 Conclusions 
Esary and Zhiems presented a method capable of determining the reliability of a mission from the phase fault 
trees and conditional failure probabilities of the basic events in each phase of the mission.  
The major disadvantage the method has is that due to the increase in the size of the system fault tree caused by 
the splitting of the component unreliability in a given phase into a series system of conditional probabilities, the 
number of cut sets can increase significantly, resulting in large computational requirements. A number of 
estimation methods were presented by Burdick et al that give upper bounds on the mission unreliability at lower 
computational expense than the exact value from the EZ method. 
A limitation of these early methods are that they can only calculate the overall mission unreliability and not the 
individual phase unreliabilities.  
3.3 Boolean phase algebra based methods 
Instead of replacing a component event in a particular phase with events representing its performance in each 
phase, as used in the EZ method with resultant increase in the number of basic events and computational 
expense, an array of methods have been developed that instead use Boolean phase algebra to resolve the phase 
dependencies between events that occur when analysing phased missions. The Boolean phase algebras in these 
methods resolve combinations of dependant events into minimal combinations of independent events so that the 
probability of a combination can be found from the product of the individual event probabilities; although some 
of the phase algebras leave certain dependencies unresolved. These algebra rules are used in conjunction with 
the standard Boolean algebra rules given in Equations 2.18 to 2.20. They offer a significant performance 
advantage over the earlier methods and some can also be used to directly obtain the probability of failure in an 
individual phase.  
The methods discussed in this section have been split into two sets; those whose unreliability evaluations are 
based on the inclusion-exclusion expansion based methods and the more recent methods that instead use the 
binary decision diagram technique to give improved performance. 
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3.3.1 Inclusion-Exclusion expansion based methods 
Dazhi and Xiaozhong [1] and Kohda, Wada and Inoue [28] developed methods that applied phased mission 
analysis methods to determine the probability of accident sequences. Not only did they advance the work of [3] 
by removing the significant increase in the number of cut sets and resultant computational expense caused by 
removing the need to model the same component failure in different phases as different basic events, but by 
developing methods that could analyse accident sequences containing the success of subsystems, they developed 
methods that also solved the problem of directly determining the probability of failure within a particular phase 
although this was not the intention of their work. 
Determining the probability of failure within an individual phase is very useful for many reasons. For example, 
there are often different consequences of failure depending on the phase and thus quantifying the risk of a 
mission requires knowledge of the individual phase failure probabilities. An example of this is the failure of an 
aircraft landing gear system during landing is likely to have greater consequences than its failure during taxi on 
the runway. Whilst possible to calculate using the EZ method, it requires the calculation of the difference 
between the mission unreliability up to the start and up to the end of the phase and therefore involves two 
phased mission unreliability evaluations. 
As stated earlier, the methods in [1] and [28] were developed for the analysis of accident sequences. An accident 
sequence consists of an initiating event, the failure of one or more subsystems and possibly the success of other 
subsystems. Each sequence is defined by the combinations of the subsystems that fail and those that operate 
successfully. Usually an event tree used to represent the possible accident sequences whilst fault trees are used 
to represent the combinations of basic events that cause failure of each subsystem. Failure of a system in a 
certain phase of a phased mission, known as exclusive phase failure, requires its successful operation in 
preceding phases, so that the phase is reached, and then failure occurring at some point in that phase. It is 
therefore clear that the methods described in [1] and [28] can be applied to obtaining the probability that failure 
occurs in a certain phase of a phased mission. Essentially, the problem of determining the probability of failure 
in a certain phase can be treated as an accident sequence with an initiating event probability of 1 and a sequence 
consisting of the successful operation of a set of subsystems (the prior phases) followed by the failure of a 
subsystem (the phase being analysed). The subsystem fault trees are therefore replaced by the phase fault trees, 
with earlier phases successful and failure occurring in the final phase. 
Both introduced new Boolean phase algebra to resolve the statistical dependences between failures of a 
component in different phases. Due to this, the application of their methods requires the use of specific fault tree 
codes that implement the Boolean algebra rules. 
The Boolean algebra rules introduced by [1], which they name the generalized intersection and union concept, 
consider the time of component failures and allow faster evaluation of the mission unreliability than the EZ 
method as well as the calculation of the unreliability in individual phases. Their method will be described using 
phased mission rather than accident sequence terminology (e.g. phase instead of subsystem) and with slight 
modifications (e.g. initiating events, not relevant to phased mission analysis, have been omitted). In addition to 
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the usual phased mission assumptions and those stated in the introduction, this method assumes that phase fault 
trees are coherent. 
Instead of considering the same component failure in different phases as different basic events, as is the case 
with the EZ method, in this method a component failure in a phase is represented by the basic event that the 
component fails up to the end of that phase. For example, the failure event for component B appearing in the 
phase 3 fault tree is represented by the basic event B(0,3), since that event will occur if it has failed at any time 
up to the end of that phase. The phase dependencies between basic events representing component failures in 
different phases are then resolved through the application of phase Boolean algebra rules. Since the assumption 
is made that phase fault trees are coherent, the Boolean algebra rules only cover Boolean OR and Boolean AND 
operations between failure basic events, as success basic events will not be encountered. The Boolean algebra 
OR reduction rule is given by Equation 3.6 and the Boolean algebra AND reduction rule is given by Equation 
3.7.  
),0(),0(),0( jAjAkA  , where 1 kj  
3.6  
),0(),0(),0( kAjAkA  , where 1 kj  
3.7  
 
The two rules are based on the fact that ),1(...)2,1()1,0(),0( jjAAAjA   - the transformation applied 
with the EZ method. Therefore, when split into individual phase basic events and 1 kj , ),0( jA  contains 
all the basic events contained in ),0( kA , hence the reduction shown in Equation 3.6 applies to a logical OR 
between the basic events, and the basic events common to both ),0( kA  and ),0( jA  are just ),0( kA , thus 
Equation 3.7 applies to a logical AND between them. 
The failure conditions for phase j,   , can be expressed as the union of the       phase j minimal cut sets since 
failure occurs when at least one cut set occurs. This is shown by Equation 3.8, where      is the kth cut set for 
phase j. 
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   can also be expressed in terms of the individual component failure events from each cut set, as shown in 
Equation 3.9, where l is a component failure event from the kth phase j cut set. 
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A mission fails if system failure occurs in any phase, therefore Equation 3.10 expresses the mission unreliability 
as the probability of the union of failure in any of the mission phases. 
           
 
   
  
3.10  
 
To calculate the probability of exclusive failure in phase j, the first step is to set the top events of the fault trees 
from the j-1 earlier phases, which represent the success phases, as inputs to a logical OR gate and determine the 
minimal cut sets from this fault tree. This fault tree represents mission failure in any of the success phases, i.e. 
the mission ending before phase j is reached. The second step is to find the minimal cut sets from the phase j 
fault tree. The probability of failure in phase j, jQ , is then the probability of the occurrence of any of the       
minimal cut sets from phase j minus the probability that any of the       minimal cut sets from phase j occur 
along with any of the minimal cut sets from the earlier success phases, as shown in Equation 3.11. 
           
     
   
  
 
 
 
       
     
   
        
     
   
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
3.11  
 
The Boolean algebra rules will automatically lead to the cancellation of cut sets that contain a minimal cut set of 
a later phase in Equations 3.8 to 3.11. 
Dazhi and Xiaozhong note that Equation 3.11 is computationally expensive due to the large number of minimal 
cut sets and because the inclusion-exclusion expansion must be used to evaluate the exact probabilities of the 
sets of cut sets. They therefore present a method that approximates the exclusive phase j failure probability 
based on the rare event assumption and the concept of superset minimal cut sets. Minimal cut set A is defined as 
a superset of minimal cut set B, if each element in A is also in B. It is named a superset (even though it is a 
subset in terms of its elements) since all component failure combinations that cause B to occur also cause A to 
occur.  It gives an approximation that is greater than or equal to the actual unreliability. This approximation is 
calculated through Equation 3.12, where      for          are the phase j cut sets that have no supersets in 
the success phase cut sets,      for                 are the phase j cut sets with at least one superset in the 
success phase cut sets and        is the set of success phase cut sets that are supersets of the kth failure phase 
cut set,     . In Equation 3.12, the probability that the failure conditions for both phase j and an earlier success 
phase occur is calculated as the sum of the probabilities of the intersection of each minimal cut set from phase j 
with its superset minimal cut sets from the success phases. The probability that the phase j failure conditions 
occur is calculated as the sum of the phase j cut set probabilities. The probability that exclusive phase failure 
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occurs in phase j is then calculated as the probability that the failure conditions for phase j are met minus the 
probability that both the failure conditions for phase j and the failure conditions for an earlier success phase are 
met, as before. Dazhi and Xiaozhong justify the removal of the terms not present in the unreliability calculation 
when Equation 3.12 is used compared to when the exact calculation is used, Equation 3.11, by showing that they 
are negligible, assuming rare events, through a series of examples. Since the approximation is based on the 
assumption of rare events, it can be inaccurate when cut sets with a high probability of occurrence exist, in 
which case Equation 3.11 should be used instead. 
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Kohda, Wada and Inoue [28] presented a new method for application to accident sequences that can also be used 
to obtain exact phase failure probabilities for a phased mission. It expresses the time requirements for a basic 
event explicitly and reduces the computational burden present in the earlier methods. Again, their method is 
described here in terms of phased missions instead of the accident sequence terminology used in their paper and 
is based upon the usual assumptions for non-repairable phased missions, therefore, unlike Dazhi and 
Xiaozhong‟s methods discussed earlier, it can be used with non-coherent phase fault trees. 
The method requires the derivation of the path sets for each of the j-1 preceding success phases, in addition to 
the failure implicants (rather than cut sets, since non-coherent fault trees are allowed) for phase j, in order to 
obtain the exclusive phase j failure probability. Whilst a phase failure implicant is a combination of basic events 
that represent system failure conditions for that phase, a phase path set is a combination of basic events that 
result in system success for that phase. Phase path sets are found from the phase dual tree [29]. 
Kohda, Wada and Inoue introduced a phase Boolean algebra that operates directly on the start and end times of 
the basic event time periods. Since the event that a component works successfully up to a certain time is 
equivalent to the component failing at some point after that time, they represent basic event that a component, A, 
works successfully until time   , as       .        is therefore equivalent to         in the usual notation. This 
transformation allows both failure and success basic events to be represented through the start and end times of 
the time period of a failure event, reducing the number of Boolean algebra rules that must be specified. The 
Boolean algebra rules are shown in Equations 3.13 to 3.15. 
                  3.13 
                                                                  3.14 
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                                           3.15 
 
Equation 3.13 expresses the fact that the event never occurs, since the time period for the event has no duration, 
therefore any combination containing such an event can be removed from the analysis as it has zero probability. 
Equations 3.14 and 3.15 implement the Boolean OR and AND rules respectively and extend the equivalent rules 
given in Equations 3.6 and 3.7 by Dazhi and Xiaozhong, by also resolving combinations that include basic 
events representing component success.  
The success conditions for phase j,   , can be expressed as the union of the  phase j minimal path sets since 
success occurs when at least one path set occurs, as shown by Equation 3.16, where      is the kth minimal path 
set from phase j  and       is the total number of minimal path sets for phase j. 
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   can also be expressed in terms of the individual component success events as shown in Equation 3.17, where l 
is a component success event from the kth phase j path set. 
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The mission unreliability is calculated through Equation 3.10, as in [1]. The complement of the mission 
unreliability, the mission success probability or reliability,      , can be calculated directly through Equation 
3.18. 
           
 
   
  
3.18  
 
 
The probability that exclusive failure in phase j occurs is now calculated through Equation 3.19. Comparing 
Equation 3.11 with Equation 3.19 shows the two different approaches for calculating the exclusive phase failure 
probability used by Dazhi and Xiaozhong and Kohda et al. In the method from Dazhi and Xiaozhong, the 
probability of exclusive phase failure in phase j is calculated by deducting the probability that the failure 
conditions for both phase j and at least one earlier phase are met from the probability that the failure conditions 
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for phase j are met.  In the method from Kohda et al, a direct representation of the success of the j-1 earlier 
phases and failure in phase j is used in the probability calculation. 
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Kohda et al demonstrate the improved performance of their method over the EZ method in a series of examples 
that show calculations of both the mission unreliability and probability of failure in a specific phase of the 
mission. 
Another method that utilises a phase Boolean algebra to calculate the mission unreliability, but unlike the others 
is unable to calculate exclusive phase failure probability directly, was presented by Somani and Trivedi [30]. 
Like the other methods using Boolean phase algebra, it avoids the transformation of the mission into a single 
phase and resultant increase in the number of basic events and computational expense.  
Somani and Trivedi describe the possible cases that can occur on transition between phases due to the different 
reliability structures between phases: 
1. A combination of component failures does not lead to system failure in both phases i and i + 1. 
2. A combination of component failures leads to system failure in both phases i and i + 1. 
3. A combination of component failures does not imply system failure in phase i but leads to system 
failure in phases i + 1. 
4. A combination of component failures implies system failure in phase i but does not imply system 
failure in phase i + 1. 
The third case results in failure on transition between phases and can be considered as a failure combination for 
both phases, i.e. this can be considered in the same way as case 2. The first three cases can be treated in the 
same way as the situation where the reliability structure of the system remains the same between phases. The 
effect on mission reliability of these cases can be determined by evaluating the fault tree of the last phase of the 
mission. For the fourth case, where a combination implies system failure in the phase i but not in subsequent 
phases, only the occurrence of the combination until the end of phase i needs to be accounted for. The 
occurrence of such combinations in later phases does not affect the system reliability. 
The mission reliability can therefore be split into two parts:  
 The common failure combinations (first three cases). 
 Phase failure combinations (fourth case). 
The contribution to mission unreliability of the common failure combinations is determined by calculating the 
component availability at the end of the last phase and then evaluating the fault tree for the last phase. 
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Calculating the contribution to mission unreliability of the phase failure combinations is more complicated. The 
combinations that fail phase j but not subsequent phases,  PFCj,  can be found through the intersection of the 
phase failure implicants and subsequent phase path sets as shown by Equation 3.20.  
 njjj SSXPFC   1  3.20 
Equation 3.20 leads to expressions involving combinations of component failure and success events. Somani 
and Trivedi present the set of Boolean phase algebra rules shown in Equations 3.21 to 3.26 to resolve the 
dependencies between these events.  
),0(),0(),0( jAjAiA  , where i < j. 3.21 
),0(),0(),0( iAjAiA  , where i < j. 
3.22 
0),0(),0(  jAiA , where i < j. 3.23 
),0(),0(),0( jAjAiA  , where i < j. 
3.24 
),0(),0(),0( iAjAiA  , where i < j. 3.25 
1),0(),0(  jAiA , where i < j. 3.26 
 
Note that there is no rule specified in the Boolean phase algebra to resolve a combination of component success 
up to a certain phase and component failure before some later phase, i.e. ),0(),0( jAiA   where ji  . The 
probability of combinations such as this are calculated through Equation 3.27. The algebra is therefore less 
complete than that specified by Kohda et al, which resolves all dependencies. 
     ),0(),0(),0(),0( iAPjAPjAiAP  , where ji  . 3.27 
The method is also limited to evaluating the mission unreliability or unreliability at the end of a certain phase. 
This is due to the way in which the method accounts for failure combinations that satisfy the failure conditions 
for more than one phase, whilst satisfying the success conditions for later phases in the mission. The method 
accounts for these combinations as phase failure combinations in the latest phase in which they cause failure. 
The effect of the occurrence of these failure combinations, on the mission unreliability, will therefore be 
correctly accounted for. However, since their contribution is accounted for only in the final phase for which they 
are a system failure combination, the method cannot be used to calculate individual phase reliabilities directly. 
The overall mission unreliability,      , is calculated as the probability of the occurrence of a phase failure 
combination or a common failure combination, as shown by Equation 3.28. To calculate the probabilities of the 
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phase failure combinations,     , and the common failure combinations,   , they must first be expanded 
through the inclusion-exclusion expansion. 
                    
   
   
 
3.28  
3.3.1.1 Example 
The methods from Dazhi and Xiaozhong, and Kohda et al are demonstrated in this section through the 
calculation of the probability of exclusive phase failure in the last phase of a simple two phased example 
mission whose fault trees are shown in Figure 3.2. The method from Somani and Trivedi is not included in this 
example as it cannot be used to derive exclusive phase failure probabilities directly. 
 
Figure 3.2 - Phase fault trees 
The phase one fault tree has the three minimal cut sets shown in Equations 3.29 to 3.31, whilst the phase two 
fault tree has the two minimal cut sets shown in Equations 3.32 and 3.33.  
            3.29 
            3.30 
            3.31 
            3.32 
                   3.33 
 
 
Phase One 
Failure 
Phase Two 
Failure 
B A C 
A 
B C 
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The components are all assumed to have constant failure rates with the values given in Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1 - Component failure rates. 
Component  Failure Rate (failures per hour) 
A 4103   
B 4105   
C 3101   
 
The durations of phases one and two are 10hrs and 20hrs respectively. The probabilities of component failure in 
phases 1 and 2 are given in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 – Component phase failure probabilities. 
Component Failure Event Probability 
)1,0(A  3109955.2   
)2,1(A  3109641.5   
)1,0(B  3109875.4   
)2,1(B  3109005.9   
)1,0(C  3109502.9   
)2,1(C  2109604.1   
Dazhi and Xiaozhong method 
The exclusive phase two failure probability will be first calculated through the exact method given by Dazhi and 
Xiaozhong, Equation 3.11. The first term in Equation 3.11 requires the union of the minimal cut sets from the 
failure phase, phase 2, to be determined, as shown in Equation 3.34. 
      
 
   
                      
3.34
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The second term in Equation 3.11 requires the intersection of the unions of the minimal cut sets from the 
success and failure phases, phases 1 and 2 respectively, to be determined. The union of the success phase 
minimal cut sets is shown in Equation 3.35. 
      
 
   
                      
3.35 
The intersection of the unions of the minimal cut sets from the two phases, Equations 3.34 and 3.35, is shown in 
Equation 3.36. 
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The probability of the union of the phase two cut sets, Equation 3.34, uses the inclusion-exclusion expansion 
and is shown in Equation 3.37.  
       
 
   
                                                     
3.37 
The probability of the intersection of the unions of the minimal cut sets from the two phases, Equation 3.36, 
using the Lower Bound approximation to limit the number of terms, is shown in Equation 3.38. 
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The probability of exclusive failure in phase 2, an estimate due to the use of the Lower Bound Approximation in 
Equation 3.38, is shown in Equation 3.39. 
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Equation 3.39 shows that the use of the exact calculation, even with the simple phased mission used in the 
example and use of the Lower Bound Approximation, contains many terms with resultant computational 
expense. The same calculation using the approximation method, Equation 3.12, will now be shown to 
demonstrate the reduction in computational expense and the high accuracy achieved. 
Both the failure phase minimal cut sets have superset cut sets in the success phase, therefore       in Equation 
3.12.             and has one superset in the success phase cut sets,              , since          
implies that         .                   and has two supersets in the success phase cut sets,        
               , since both 1)1,0( B  and 1)1,0( C  imply that 1)2,0()2,0( CB . The calculation of the first 
term from Equation 3.12 is shown in Equation 3.40 and the two parts of the calculation of the second term are 
shown in Equations 3.41 and 3.42. 
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The calculation for the estimate of the exclusive phase 2 failure probability is shown in Equation 3.43.  
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Kohda et al method 
The exclusive phase two failure probability will now be calculated through the method given by Kohda et al, 
Equation 3.19. The equation for the exclusive phase 2 failure probability is shown in Equation 3.44. The success 
conditions for phase one are calculated through Equation 3.17 and 1
1
mpsN  since there is only one path set for 
this phase, giving the success conditions shown in Equation 3.45. The failure conditions for phase 2 are 
calculated through Equation 3.9 and 2
2
mcsN  as there are two cut sets for this phase, giving the failure 
conditions shown in Equation 3.46. The final calculation of the exclusive phase 2 failure probability, utilising 
the inclusion-exclusion expansion, is shown in Equation 3.47. 
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Example Conclusion 
A comparison of the results from the exact methods from Dazhi and Xiaozhong and Kohda et al, shown in 
Equations 3.39 and 3.47 respectively, shows that the methods agree, giving the same correct value. However it 
is clear that the final probability calculation from Kohda et al involves far fewer terms and therefore has better 
computational performance. Dazhi and Xiaozhong‟s approximation method gives a good, conservative estimate 
of the unreliability, within 2.5% of the exact value, whilst reducing the computational complexity significantly 
compared to their exact method. Comparing Koda et al‟s method, Equation 3.47, with the approximation 
method from Dazhi and Xiaozhong, Equation 3.43, shows that Kohda et al‟s method has similar computational 
expense whilst giving exact results. Kohda et al‟s approach of directly modelling the success phases using 
success fault trees and path sets is therefore superior. 
3.3.2 BDD based methods  
Quantifying the reliability of a system when its structure function is represented by a BDD is far faster and has 
better computational efficiency than when cut sets and the inclusion-exclusion expansion are used. In a phased 
mission, once a non-repairable component fails it remains in that failure mode for the remainder of the mission 
and therefore a basic event for component A and failure mode b appearing in the phase j fault tree is converted 
into ite format as:                 . Whilst in a non-phased non-repairable BDD dependencies can only exist 
between events on a path belonging to different failure modes of the same component, in a phased mission 
BDD, dependencies also occur between events in different phases from the same component. The BDD based 
methods described in this section use different strategies for resolving these dependencies between phases, 
failure modes, or both, during the BDD construction from the mission fault tree and the probability evaluation 
procedure.  
3.3.2.1 Systems with single failure mode components 
Rauzy [14] presented the first work on the use of the BDD method for the quantification of non-phased mission 
fault trees. Zang, Sun and Trivedi [31] extended this method for the analysis of systems operating in phased 
missions that have single failure mode components.  
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BDD Construction 
Zang et al provide a BDD build procedure, which outputs a resultant BDD node from a logical operation 
performed between two other nodes. The process depends on the variable order scheme of which two 
possibilities are considered – Forward Phase-Dependent Operation (PDO) and Backward PDO. The ordering 
schemes both order variables by component first and only vary in the ordering of variables belonging to the 
same component but in different phases. In the Forward PDO, the ordering of the variables matches the phase 
order such that earlier phases appear higher in the BDD, whereas with Backward PDO it is the reverse. The 
BDD computation algorithm, modified from that of Rauzy, uses phase algebra to produce a smaller BDD. 
If the two nodes in the computation belong to different components then the standard BDD computation rules, 
given by Equations 2.14 to 2.17, are used. Otherwise, the modified BDD computation rules shown in Equation 
3.48 are used, where x and y are variables belonging to the same component and the variable ordering scheme is 
the Forward PDO. Comparing Equation 3.48 to Equations 2.14 to 2.17 shows that the failure child of the 
resultant node is computed from 11 GF   instead of GF 1  when )()( yindexxindex  . This is because, when 
x and y belong to the same component and the Forward PDO is used, x=1 implies y=1, since if a non-repairable 
component is failed in a phase it will also be failed in later phases.   
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An example of the BDD size reduction is shown by comparing Figure 3.3a, a BDD constructed through 
Equations 2.14 to 2.17 and Figure 3.3b, a smaller BDD representing the same structure function that was 
constructed through Equation 3.48. 
 
Figure 3.3 – Reduction in BDD size through modified BDD algorithm from Zang et al. 
 
The computation rules corresponding to Equation 3.48 but for a Backward PDO ordering are shown in Equation 
3.49. Zang et al note that the BDD is smaller when the Backward PDO ordering is used.  
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BDD Evaluation 
Once the phased mission fault tree has been converted into a BDD using the procedure outlined above, it must 
be evaluated to find the top event probability. Evaluating the top event probability from the BDD is more 
complex than in the single phased case where a node‟s variables are independent of the variables in its children. 
A BDD node in a phased mission BDD may have child nodes containing dependant variables and it is no longer 
correct to derive the node probability as the sum of the products of its variables failure and success events and 
the corresponding child nodes probabilities. To resolve the dependencies in the BDD and determine the correct 
node probability, Zang et al provide an evaluation procedure that is based upon the phase algebra of [30] shown 
in Equations 3.21 to 3.26. The recursive procedures, specified for a BDD built with a Backward PDO ordering, 
shown in Equations 3.51 and 3.52 are used when variables x and y belong to different components and the same 
component respectively, where node F is as was defined in Equation 2.14, i.e. 
)0,1,(),,( 01 FFxiteFFxiteF xx   , F1 is defined as shown in Equation 3.50 and        is the component of 
the event represented by the Boolean variable   . 
)0,1,()1,1,(1 01 HHxiteFFyiteF xx    3.50 
))1()0())((1()1()( FPFPxPFPFP 
 
, if            . 
3.51 
))0()0())((1()1()( HPFPxPFPFP   , if            . 
3.52 
 
The method allows the probabilities to be cached for each BDD node, avoiding repeating calculations for nodes 
with multiple parents, and has far better computational efficiency than the earlier non-BDD phased mission 
methods. It can also be used to evaluate an exclusive phase failure fault tree and therefore derive the probability 
that mission failure occurs in a specific phase. 
Alternative method 
La Band and Andrews [32][33] presented another method and suggest the use of the BDD technique for better 
evaluation efficiency. Unlike the other Boolean phase algebra based methods, the method involves replacing 
component failure events in each phase fault tree by an OR gate with inputs of events representing the failure of 
the component in each phase of the mission up to and including that phase, as in the EZ method. The Boolean 
phase algebra rules from La Band and Andrews are shown in Equations 3.53 to 3.59. However, these rules do 
not resolve dependencies in many cases, for example none of the rules resolve the dependencies between the 
events  ),0( iA  and ),0( jA . 
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 0),1(),1(  jjAiiA , where i < j. 
3.53 
),1(),1(),1( iiAjiAiiA  , where i < j. 
3.54 
 0),1(),1(  iiAiiA  3.55 
),1(),1(),1( jjAjjAiiA  , where i < j. 3.56 
),(),1(),1( jiAjiAiiA  , where i < j. 3.57 
),1(),1()1,(),1( jiAjjAiiAiiA   , where i < j. 3.58 
),1(),1()1,(),1( jiAjjAiiAiiA   , where i < j. 
3.59 
 
The use of the BDD method, using the BDD computation algorithm from [14], is suggested for more efficient 
analysis than the use of the implicants and inclusion-exclusion expansion. The replacing of component failure 
events with the union of their individual phase events and a non-phased mission specific BDD algorithm result 
in far larger BDDs than when the methods given in [31] are used. The quantification algorithm is to sum the 
probabilities of each path to a terminal one node, a procedure that does not permit probabilities to be cached 
within BDD nodes and this together with the larger BDD size results in higher computational expense than the 
method from Zang et al.   
3.3.2.2 Systems with multiple failure mode components 
The methods discussed so far have been concerned with the analysis of systems with single failure mode 
components. Since many real world systems both operate in phased missions and contain components with 
multiple failure modes, the development of methods capable of analysing them is an important topic. Zang, 
Wang, Sun and Trivedi [34] extended the BDD algorithms from [14] to analysis of systems containing 
components with multiple competing failure modes. They utilised Boolean algebra from Caldarola [35] to deal 
with dependencies between variables belonging to the same component. Tang and Dugan [36] combined the 
phased mission BDD techniques from Zang et al [31] with the multiple competing failure mode BDD 
techniques from Zang et al [34], resulting in a BDD method capable of analysing phased mission systems 
containing multiple competing failure modes. 
Construction of the BDD 
In this section, the process of constructing a BDD from a phased mission fault tree according to the method 
given by Tang and Dugan will be explained. Two sets of Boolean phase multi-failure mode algebra are given, 
the first set dealing with dependencies between events belonging to different failure modes of the same 
component, Equations 3.60 to 3.64, and the second dealing with dependencies between events belonging to the 
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same failure mode, Equations 3.65 to 3.70, where Ab refers to the occurrence event for failure mode b of 
component A.  
0),0(),0(  jAiA ba , where ji   and ba  . 3.60 
),0(),0(),0( jAjAiA bba  , where ji   and ba  . 3.61 
),0(),0(),0( iAjAiA aba  , where ji   and ba  . 3.62 
),0(),0(),0( jAjAiA aba  , where ji   and ba  . 3.63 
),0(),0(),0( iAjAiA aba  , where ji   and ba  . 3.64 
),0(),0(),0( iAjAiA aaa  , where i < j. 3.65 
),0(),0(),0( jAjAiA aaa  , where i < j. 3.66 
0),0(),0(  jAiA aa , where i < j. 3.67 
),0(),0(),0( iAjAiA aaa  , where i < j. 3.68 
),0(),0(,0( jAjAiA aaa  , where i < j. 3.69 
1),0(),0(  jAiA aa , where i < j. 3.70 
The combinations ),0(),0( jAiA ba   and ),0(),0( jAiA ba   cannot be resolved into a single event and their 
respective probabilities are found through Equations 3.71 and 3.72. 
     ),0(),0(1),0(),0( jAPiAPjAiAP baba   3.71 
     ),0(),0(),0(),0( jAPiAPjAiAP baba   3.72 
 
In addition, as with the rules from Somani and Trivedi, the combination                is not resolved by 
these rules and its probability should be calculated through Equation 3.27, as before. 
The variable ordering for the BDD is stringent from the view of implementation, meaning that the BDD 
construction and evaluation algorithms are developed with the assumption that it is used. The variable ordering 
scheme is for variables to be ordered first by component, then by backward phase (such that later phases appear 
higher) and finally by failure mode. The resultant node from a logical operation between two nodes, F and G, 
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shown in equations 3.73 and 3.74 respectively, is determined through Equation 3.75, where L1 and L0 are 
defined in Equations 3.76 and 3.77 respectively. 
)0,1,(),,( 01 FFxiteFFxiteF xx    3.73 
)0,1,(),,( 01 GGyiteGGyiteG yy    3.74 
 )0,1,()0,1,( GGyiteFFxite  
)00,11,( GFGFxite  ,   if )()( yindexxindex   
)0,11,( GFLFxite  ,     if )()(),()(),()( yfmxfmycpxcpyindexxindex   
)00,1,( LFGFxite  ,    if )()(),()(),()( yfmxfmycpxcpyindexxindex   
)0,1,( GFGFxite  ,    otherwise  
3.75 
 
 
When x and y are from the same component but a different failure mode then x=1 implies y=0 since only one 
mutually exclusive failure mode can occur at any time, justifying L1 in Equation 3.75. When x and y are from 
the same component and the same failure mode, but x is ordered lower then it must be from a later phase (due to 
the ordering strategy) and therefore x=0 implies y=0, justifying L0 in Equation 3.75. 
101  xGL  3.76 
000  xGL  3.77 
 
Tang and Duggan [36] give Equation 3.78 as the procedure for determining L1 from node G. In Equation 3.78, 
if the variable of F0 belongs to same component as x then F0 is extended as F in Equation 3.78  until reaching 
sub-expressions which do not have variables that belong to the same component as x.  
if )()(),()( yfmxfmycpxcp  , 
1
11
11
0110
)01()(
L
GG
GyGyG
xx
xx





  
3.78 
Problems identified in construction method 
Some problems with the BDD construction method given by Tang and Dugan [36] were identified during its 
review and these are explained in this section. 
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Equation 3.78 is an incorrect procedure for finding L1 and this will now be shown through an example. The 
BDD shown in Figure 3.4a represents node G,                                                in ite format. 
Therefore y, the variable of node G, is )2,0(1A . In this example, L1 is to be formed as G for 1x , where x is 
the variable )2,0(2A . The correct BDD for L1 is shown in Figure 3.4b,                  in ite format.  
From Tang and Duggan, since x is a variable indexed lower than y in the ordering as it is from a later phase, and 
is also from a different failure mode, Equation 3.78 should be applied to determine G when 1x , i.e. to 
determine L1. Now according to Equation 3.78, L1 is determined by following the success children of G until a 
sub-expression is reached that does not contain variables that belong to the same component as variable x, i.e. 
component A. Since all variables in G belong to component A, according to Equation 3.78, L1 is represented by 
the BDD shown in Figure 3.4c, a terminal 0 node. It is therefore clear that Equation 3.78 is not the correct 
approach to finding L1 as it does not give the correct result of )0,1),1,0(( 1Aite . The correct approach is to simply 
replace all nodes in G that belong to the same component as x but belong to a different failure mode with their 
success child node.  
 
Figure 3.4 – BDD construction example 1. 
 
A1(0,2)
A3(0,1)
A2(0,1)
0
0
01
01
1
1
Variable ordering:
A1(0,2)< A2(0,1)< A3(0,1) A2(0,1)
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1 0
0
a) b)
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Figure 3.5 – BDD construction example 2. 
 
In addition, the BDD computation algorithm in Equation 3.75 does not minimise BDD size. From Equation 
3.75,                                             when                         
                 , as is the case when F and G are the BDDs shown in Figure 3.5a and Figure 3.5b 
respectively, or )0,1),2,0(( 2Aite  and ))0,1),1,0((,1),1,0(( 23 AiteAite  in ite format. The BDD shown in Figure 
3.5c,  )))0,1),1,0((,1),1,0((,1),2,0(( 232 HHAiteAiteAite  in ite format, therefore results from a Boolean OR 
operation between F and G. However, this resultant node is not minimal since the path to node H1 never occurs 
because if 0)2,0(2 A  then it is certain that 0)1,0(2 A  and therefore the node labelled with variable )1,0(2A  
in Figure 3.5c, ))0,1),1,0(( 2 HHAite  in ite format, can be replaced by H0. Since H1 could be a large BDD, the 
non minimised BDD could consume a lot of unnecessary memory.  
BDD Probability Evaluation 
The next section gives the methods and equations used to evaluate the probability from the BDD. 
b)
c)
1 0
A2(0,2)
1 0
F
F1 F0
a)
A3(0,1)
A2(0,1)
0
1
1
G
G1
G0
H1 H0
1 0
A2(0,2)
A2(0,1)
A3(0,1)
0
0
1
1
1
H1 H0
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Figure 3.6 – Labels for a BDD node’s relative children 
The probability for BDD node G, depicted in Figure 3.6 along with its relatively positioned child nodes G1, G0, 
H1, H0, I1 and I0, is evaluated through one of Equations 3.79 to 3.82.  The choice of Equations 3.79 to 3.82 
depends on which of the cases shown in Table 3.3 describes the relationship between the variables x, y and z 
from nodes G, G1 and G0 respectively. K2 in Equations 3.80 and 3.81 is defined by Equation 3.83, where W1, 
W2,…, Wn are variables with ascending order in I0 that all belong to the same component as variable x.  
 )10()10()1()10()10()11(  GPHPxPHPGPGP , if case 1. 
3.79 
 )12()10()1()10()10()11(  KPHPxPHPGPGP , if case 2. 
3.80 
 )12()11()1()10(  KPGPxPGP , if case 3. 
3.81 
 )10()11()1()10(  GPGPxPGP , if case 4. 
3.82 
 
Table 3.3 - BDD node probability evaluation cases corresponding to Equations 3.79 to 3.82. 
Case Conditions 
1 )()(),()(),()(),()( zcpxcpypnxpnyfmxfmycpxcp   
2 )()(),()(),()(),()(),()( zfmxfmzcpxcpypnxpnyfmxfmycpxcp   
3 )()(),()(),()( zfmxfmzcpxcpycpxcp   
4 )()(),()( zcpxcpycpxcp   
 
x 
z y 
H1 H0 I0 I1 
1 0 
1 0 1 0 
G 
G1 G0 
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Note that in the paper from Tang and Dugan, cases 2 and 3 are given with )()( zfmxfm   instead of the 
intended )()( zfmxfm   that is shown in Table 3.3. Cases 2 and 3 should have )()( zfmxfm   since in these 
cases x and z belong to the same component and as Tang and Duggan state, the 0 branch always links two 
variables that belong to different failure modes of the same component, or belong to different components. 
0...1 21
002   nWWWx IIK  3.83 
Comparison of performance of evaluation algorithm with single failure mode equivalent 
The performance of the BDD evaluation algorithm described above will now be compared with the earlier BDD 
method developed for the analysis of single failure mode phased missions by Zang, Sun and Trivedi [34]. The 
most complex case for the calculation of the probability of a BDD node for each of the methods is described 
below: 
Zang et al method when variables x and y belong to the same component:  
1. Calculate probability of the probability of the failure event for variable x. 
2. Get probabilities from nodes G1 and G0. 
3. Check if variable x and variable y belong to the same component. 
4. Get probability from node H0. 
5. Calculate probability from these values. 
Tang and Duggan method when variables x and y belong to the same component, failure mode and variables x 
and z belong to different components: 
1. Calculate probability of the probability of the failure event for variable x. 
2. Check if variable x and variable y belong to the same component. 
3. Check if variable x and variable y belong to the same failure mode. 
4. Check if variable x and variable z belong to the same component. 
5. Get probabilities from nodes G1 and G0. 
6. Get probability from node H0. 
7. Traverse down BDD along success children, starting at node I0, comparing nodes variable with x until 
node whose variable belongs to a different component is encountered. 
8. Calculate probability from these values. 
As shown above the method from Tang and Duggan contains all the steps from the method by Zang et al and the 
addition of three more steps, including step 7 which is an iterative rule that may involve a large number of 
variable comparisons. Thus, evaluating the probability of a node in Tang and Duggan‟s method can involve far 
greater computational expense. 
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Errors in BDD evaluation method 
Some problems with the BDD evaluation algorithms given by Tang and Duggan were identified during the 
review of their method, which will be discussed in this section. To show that the BDD evaluation algorithm is 
incorrect, it is sufficient to show that it gives an incorrect value for the probability of a node that can be formed 
through their BDD construction algorithm. For simplicity, assume that H1 and HO in Figure 3.5c contain no 
variables belonging to component A. The probability for the BDD in Figure 3.5c is then given by Equation 3.84. 
          03232 )1,0()2,0(1)1,0()2,0()( HPAPAPAPAPTopP   3.84 
A value for the probability of the BDD will now be calculated through the procedure given by Tang and 
Duggan. The top node of Figure 3.5c is to be evaluated according to case 3 from Table 3.3, through Equation 
3.81, as shown in Equation 3.85 where U is its success child node. Node U is also evaluated according to case 3 
from Table 3.3, through Equation 3.81, as shown in Equation 3.86, where V is its success child node. Node V is 
evaluated according to case 4 from Table 3.3, through Equation 3.82, as shown in Equation 3.87. 
   )1()2,0()()( 02 HPAPUPTopP   3.85 
    03 1)1,0()()( HPAPVPUP   3.86 
        0120 )1,0()( HPHPAPHPVP   3.87 
This example shows that the Tang and Duggan evaluation procedure is clearly incorrect since using it to 
determine the probability of the top node in Figure 3.5c, gives a value that depends on 1H , whereas the correct 
value, shown in Equation 3.84, does not. 
3.3.3 Summary and Conclusions  
A large number of methods have been developed for analysing the reliability of non-repairable phased missions. 
The earliest methods relied on transforming a phased mission into an equivalent non-phased mission, resulting 
in computationally expensive analysis. Methods using Boolean phase algebras were then introduced and give 
better computational efficiency, whilst the most recent, and most computationally efficient, methods use the 
BDD technique. The Boolean phase algebra based methods offer clear advantages over the earlier methods; the 
computational efficiency is far higher and most are capable of directly evaluating exclusive phase failure 
probabilities directly. A wide range of different Boolean phase algebras have been developed. All except the 
earliest method are able to resolve combinations that include success, in addition to failure, events, allowing 
them to be used with methods that can find probability of exclusive phase failure in a specific phase. The only 
algebra able to resolve all resolvable combinations for single failure mode components, was developed by 
Kohda et al and also has the benefit of being succinct - consisting of just three, easily implemented rules. The 
early Boolean phase algebra methods are still computationally expensive, since the inclusion-exclusion 
expansion must be used in each of the probability calculations. The full expansion of all terms is particularly 
important with the method from Kohda et al when calculating the probability of exclusive phase failure or 
mission success, since the component success events are unlikely to have the low probabilities that would allow 
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the approximate expansions based on the rare event assumption to be used. However, the direct modelling the 
success of earlier phases in the method by Kohda et al results in lower computational expense than the indirect 
approach taken in Dazhi and Xiaozhong. 
The use of the BDD technique in the later methods reduces the computational expense significantly. Zang et al 
presented a method utilising phased mission specific BDD conversion and evaluation techniques to offer very 
fast analysis of phased missions for systems with single failure mode components. Tang and Dugan presented a 
method and algebra for dealing with multiple failure mode component phased mission components, although 
there are some problems with the methods presented in their research. The evaluation of the BDD in this method 
is not as fast as the methods for single failure mode component based systems given by Zang et al, due to the 
potential distance between a node and the nodes with cached probabilities that are used in its probability 
calculation. The fast evaluation of phased missions for systems with multiple failure mode components is 
therefore an area for further research. 
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4 New methods for the analysis of non-repairable phased 
missions 
4.1 Introduction 
The literature review presented a wide range of methods developed for the analysis of non-repairable phased 
missions. The most recent methods use Boolean phase algebra together with the Binary Decision Diagram 
technique to resolve dependencies in event combinations and provide computationally efficient analysis. 
The method developed by Tang and Dugan [36] is the first for the analysis of phased missions that includes 
components with multiple failure modes. Systems with multiple failure mode components are likely to become 
more common as systems become more sophisticated, more integrated, and are required to carry out an 
increasing number of tasks. This increased sophistication increases the likelihood that the mode of failure for a 
component will affect the system reliability in different ways, thus increasing the importance of modelling 
multiple failure modes. Unfortunately, the method for the analysis of this type of system presented by Tang et al 
contains a number of errors that can lead to incorrect results, as was shown in section 3.3.2.2 of the literature 
review.  
The ability to analyse the reliability of a system in real time, where its reliability prediction is constantly updated 
to reflect its current situation, has recently received attention [37] and is likely to be of increasing significance as 
systems for which automation in decision making is important, such as UAVs [38], become more common. 
Recently, importance measures for phased missions have been developed by Andrews [2], as well as those 
developed in chapter 8 of this thesis. Both real time and importance measure analysis often require the re-
evaluation of the probability of the same reliability structure but with different component reliabilities and phase 
durations, and, particularly for real time analysis, require that it is performed in very small time scales. Whilst 
the method for phased mission systems with single failure mode components by Zang, Sun and Trivedi [31] has 
similar efficiency to the original BDD methods from Rauzy, the method from Tang et al does not perform so 
well. This is due to the potential for a substantial increase in the number of node variable comparisons and 
traversal distance during the probability evaluation procedure as was shown in section 3.3.2.2. 
This chapter presents a new method that has been developed to address the problems outlined above. It 
accurately analyses the reliability of phased mission systems with multiple failure mode components and offers 
increased efficiency compared to the method from Tang and Duggan – particularly when probability re-
evaluations of the same reliability structure are required. A software tool that implements this method has also 
been developed and is described in this chapter. 
4.2 New Binary Decision Diagram based method 
The latest research, such as from Zang et al [31], La Band and Andrews [32] and Tang et al [36]  have all used 
the Binary Decision Diagram technique as it offers far better computational efficiency than the earlier methods 
that relied on the derivation of cut sets and the use of the inclusion-exclusion expansion. In these techniques the 
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phased mission fault tree is first converted into its BDD equivalent and then a probability evaluation is 
performed.  The algorithms for the construction and quantification of the BDDs given by Zang et al and Tang et 
al were studied to determine where any improvements could be made. The method from Zang et al, suitable for 
the analysis of systems containing single failure mode components, was found to be very efficient, with a lower 
efficiency only when forward rather than backward phase orderings are used (i.e. where variables belonging to 
earlier phases appear higher in the BDD) identified as an area for improvement. However, a number of possible 
improvements were identified with the method for the more complex case of systems containing multiple failure 
mode components by Tang et al. As was shown in the literature review, the method contains errors that lead to 
incorrect results for the probability and additionally, the BDD probability evaluation has a high computational 
expense due to the significant node traversal and node variable comparisons involved in the resolution of the 
phase and failure mode dependencies. 
Common to both methods is that the conversion of node variables into events, their probability evaluation, and 
the resolution of dependencies are integrated together in the calculation of a node‟s probability. This means that 
if the probability evaluation is repeated, with different phase durations for example, then all three steps must be 
repeated, entailing unnecessary computation when only the probability of the events has changed. Repeated 
calculation of the top event probability from the same mission tree is required for certain types of analysis such 
as the calculation of component importance measures, see chapters 7 and 8, and real time analysis where it is 
constantly updated as the mission progresses (and hence phase durations change) and monitored components 
fail. 
Improvements have been developed for all the areas identified. An additional procedure has been developed 
that, when added to the fault tree to the BDD computation algorithm from Tang et al, results in a BDD of 
minimal size with both backward and forward phase orderings. For the analysis of systems with multiple failure 
mode components, an alternative to the method from Tang et al has been developed. It uses a different variable 
ordering scheme and introduces an additional step between the construction of the BDD and the probability 
evaluation. This new method gives correct results for this type of system and does so through a procedure that 
offers lower computational expense. It is particularly advantageous, in terms of increased efficiency, when 
multiple probability evaluations of the same mission fault tree are required, such as when carrying out real time 
or importance measure analysis. 
4.2.1 BDD Construction 
In this work the methodology for transforming the mission fault tree into a BDD is similar to the approach taken 
by Tang et al but with some changes that increase solution efficiency. 
4.2.1.1 Variable Ordering 
The method requires the use of a variable ordering that has some restrictions that are stringent from the view of 
implementation. The ordering of the variables within these restrictions is not considered in this paper although it 
can have a large effect on BDD size and solution efficiency.  Finding the optimum ordering is known to be an 
non-deterministic polymonial-time (NP) hard problem and has been studied for the case of phased missions with 
multiple failure mode components by Mo [39]. Each of the BDD nodes will be labelled with a variable of the 
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form Ij(0, p) and the ordering between two nodes is determined from a comparison between the component, 
failure mode and phase of their respective variables. The ordering restriction is that nodes are ordered first by 
component, then by failure mode and then by phase number (note that this differs from the ordering used by 
Tang and Dugan [36] where nodes are ordered by component, then by phase number and then by failure mode). 
An example of a valid ordering for a system consisting of two components, A and B, each with two failure 
modes, 1 and 2, when operating in a two phased mission would be A1(0,1)< A1(0,2)< A2(0,1)< A2(0,2)< B1(0,1)< 
B1(0,2)< B2(0,1)< B2(0,2).  
Zang et al [31] showed that their method results in a smaller BDD when used with a backward phase variable 
ordering (where later phases have a lower index) than a forward phase ordering. Since Tang and Dugan‟s 
method is partly based upon that method, it also performs better with that ordering. The method presented in this 
paper gives greater flexibility however and generates an equally sized BDD with either choice. The forward 
phase ordering will be used in the descriptions given in this paper.  
4.2.1.2 Node Computation 
The size of the BDD resulting from the computation algorithm given by Tang and Dugan is often larger than 
necessary, due to the inclusion of paths containing mutually exclusive events. For example, Figure 4.1 shows a 
phased mission and Figure 4.2 its BDD computed according to the method given by Tang and Dugan.  
The BDD node labelled A1(0,1) could be replaced by the terminal 0 node without loss of information, since it is 
not possible for the failure mode to occur in the first phase if it did not occur in the first two phases (i.e. the path 
to the node‟s terminal 1 child will always have a probability of 0). The BDD therefore contains 33% more ite 
nodes than is optimal. Compared to the algorithm used by Tang and Dugan, the node computation algorithm 
used in the new method is an improvement as it results in the minimally sized BDD for a given variable 
ordering. 
  
Figure 4.1 - Fault tree for a phased mission system. 
Mission 
Failure
Phase One Phase Two
A1 A2
A1
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Figure 4.2 - BDD calculated for phased mission shown in Figure 4.1 through Tang and Dugan’s 
method. 
 
The BDD is constructed from the mission fault tree, as before, by converting the fault tree basic events into 
BDD nodes and then applying Equation 2.15. with the Boolean logical operation of each gate on its inputs. A 
non-repairable component remains in a failure mode for the remainder of the mission upon entry and therefore a 
basic event for component I and failure mode j appearing in the phase p fault tree is converted into ite format as: 
                . 
Changes to the method used to calculate the output node from a Boolean logical operation between two nodes F 
and G, as described by Equations 2.14-2.17 for the non-phased mission case, are introduced here and result in a 
BDD that is optimised for efficient solution. The calculation of the success child of the resultant node, node V, 
remains the same as in the non-phased mission case, using Equation 2.17. The calculation of the failure child of 
the resultant node, node U, also remains the same, using Equation 2.16 when the index of the variables of nodes 
F and G, i.e. x and y, are equal. However, if variable x has a lower index than variable y, dependencies may exist 
between variables x and y, and new rules are used to calculate node U, replacing the rule given in Equation 2.16. 
The calculation of node U when variable x has a lower index than variable y, will now be described in detail. 
The relationship between the variables of nodes F and G, x and y, determine which of the exhaustive set of rule 
conditions is met and accordingly, which of the rules from Table 4.1 to apply in the computation of node U. The 
reasoning behind each rule from Table 4.1 is now explained: 
Rule 1: If x and y are variables of the same failure mode of the same component, then the phase of x must be 
earlier than or equal to the phase of y (due to the variable ordering) and x=1 implies y=1 since the failure mode 
is non-repairable. This implies that the resultant node‟s failure child, node U, should be formed from the 
computation of the failure children of node U and V as shown in rule 1 of Table 4.1. 
  
A1(0,2)
A1(0,1)
A2(0,1)
01
Variable ordering:
A1(0,2)< A2(0,1)< A1(0,1)
1
1
1 0
0
0
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Table 4.1 – Rules for computing nodes U and V. 
Rule U and V computation Condition 
1 11 GFU   If x and y are variables belonging 
to the same failure mode of the 
same component. 
2 
101  xGFU   
where 10 xG  is equal to G0 if G0‟s variable 
belongs to a different component to x, otherwise 
it is the first node with a variable belonging to a 
different component encountered during a 
traversal down the success children of the BDD 
starting from G0. 
If x and y are variables belonging 
to different failure modes of the 
same component.  
3 GFU  1  Otherwise. 
 
Rule 2: If x and y are variables belonging to the same component but different failure modes then x=1 implies 
that y, and any other variable belonging to a different failure mode of the same component as x, equals 0. This is 
true since a component‟s failure modes are mutually exclusive. The failure child of the resultant node, U, is 
therefore computed from the failure child of node F, F1, and the first success child of node G which has a 
variable not belonging to the same component as x,      . The recursive nature of finding       through the 
success child traversal is shown by Equation 4.1 where H x=1 is determined until its variable belongs to a 
different component to x at which point it becomes equal to      . 
      
                                                      
                                                                                                        
  
                                      
4.1 
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Figure 4.3 - Example application of Equation 4.1. 
 
The procedure to determine       is illustrated by applying Equation 4.1 in the computation between the nodes 
shown in Figure 4.3: 
                   
                                                 
To determine G0x=1, Equation 4.1 is applied. As x=1, i.e. A1(0,2)=1, then Aj(0,p)=0 for all    . Initially H=G 
hence w=A2(0,2), H1=1,                                   . Applying Equation 4.1 gives: 
                                              
   
 
The variable of H, A3(0,2), belongs to the same component as x, hence Equation 4.1 must be applied again with 
w= A3(0,2), H1=1,                    : 
                                   
In this case the variable of H, D2(0,2), belongs to a different component to x and hence 
                      . 
If G0 in the Figure 4.3 example had a variable from a different component to x, such as C1(0,1), then G0x=1 
would instead be G0. 
A2(0,2)
D2(0,2)
A3(0,2)
01
1
1
1
0
0
0
= Hx=1 = G0x=1 since it‟s the 
first node encountered in the 
success child traversal from G 
with a variable from a different 
component to x, i.e. component 
D not A
Node G0 with a variable from 
the same component as x.
Node G with y=A2(0,2).
1 0
A1(0,2)
1 0
Node F with x=A1(0,2).
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Rule 3: In all other cases, x and y belong to different components and are independent, therefore U is calculated 
according to Equation 2.16. 
A new reduction rule introduced in this paper, is for the case where x belongs to the same failure mode as node 
V‟s variable, defined here as variable z, such that x=1 implies that z=1, and Vz=1 and U are the same node. In this 
case this node can be replaced by its success child, node V.  Figure 4.4 shows an example of the application of 
this reduction rule. The top node in Figure 4.4a is an example of a BDD that was output from an OR operation 
between two nodes F and G: 
                     ,  
where the reduction rule was not used. The reduction rule can be applied to this BDD since the top node and its 
success son, node V, both have variables from failure mode A2 and both have node U as their failure child. 
Applying the reduction rule replaces the top node in Figure 4.4a with its success child, node V, resulting in the 
smaller BDD shown in Figure 4.4b. 
 
Figure 4.4 – BDD computation result reduces from a) to b) due to reduction rule 
1 0
A2(0,1)
1 0
B3(0,1)
1
1 0
A2(0,2)
1 0
B3(0,1)
1
F G
F and G node definitions
Results of combining F and G through 
logical OR operation
A2(0,1)
A2(0,2)
B3(0,1)
1 0
0 0
0
0
0
1
1
1 V
U
A2(0,2)
B3(0,1)
1 0
0
0
1
1
U
V
a) Without reduction b) With reduction
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The use of this reduction rule means that the number of nodes in the BDD is: 
 Often significantly reduced. 
 Independent of whether a forward or backward phase variable ordering is used. 
4.2.2 BDD Probability Evaluation 
If, as is often the case, a BDD path contains multiple events associated with the same component, but from 
different phases or failure modes, then dependencies will exist between them. In order to evaluate the 
probability at a BDD node, which is the sum of the probabilities of the paths from that node, these dependencies 
must be resolved. 
In the methods from Zang et al and Tang et al, the probability at a particular BDD node is calculated using a 
traversal of the BDD. During these traversals, the component, phase and failure mode for the BDD node 
variable is compared with that of its child node in order to determine where dependencies exist. The 
corresponding form of the probability calculation is then chosen, based on the dependencies found, and the node 
probabilities that form part of that calculation are either calculated, in an identical manner, or fetched from the 
cache if calculated previously. In the method from Zang et al the traversal is limited to comparisons between the 
variables of the node being calculated and its immediate children, whilst the node probabilities used in the 
calculations are limited to those from child nodes that are a maximum of two levels below (i.e. the immediate 
children of the immediate children for the node being calculated). However, in the method from Tang et al the 
traversals can extend through the complete BDD, terminating at the terminal nodes. Each traversal therefore has 
potentially high computational expense as many comparison operations may need to be performed in the 
probability calculation of each node. In addition, due to the inherent coupling between the probability evaluation 
and dependency resolution, the dependencies must be resolved each time the BDD probability is evaluated (for 
example, when re-evaluating the BDD due to a change in failure mode failure rates or phase durations).  This is 
costly in terms of computational resource and occurs when calculating importance measures, during real time 
analysis and when investigating the effect of different component reliabilities for example. The evaluation 
procedure specified by Tang et al also contains a number of errors that lead to incorrect probability evaluations 
in certain circumstances. For example, the mission failure probability for the BDD shown in Figure 4.2 is not 
evaluated as the correct P(A1(0,2)) + P(A2(0,1)) by their method. 
Due to the problems with computational efficiency and accuracy that were identified in the method from Tang et 
al, a new and improved method was developed. This new method involves the formation of a dependency free 
data structure, named the Implicant Tree, prior to the probability evaluation step. This data structure is a 
representation of the mutually exclusive implicants from the BDD, comprising of combinations of independent 
events, in a form that is primed for fast evaluation. The absence of dependencies during probability evaluation 
permits higher evaluation efficiency during repeat evaluations such as when calculating importance measures or 
performing real time analysis.  
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4.2.2.1 Phase algebra 
To construct the Implicant Tree, a set of rules are used to resolve dependencies between events associated with 
the same component. The four rules were derived by modifying a subset from a larger set of rules originally 
developed for accident sequence analysis by by Kohda et al [28]. 
The first two reduction rules, given by Equation 4.2 and Equation 4.3, are used to resolve phase dependencies 
between events from the same failure mode. 
                                           , where 21 pp  . 4.2 
 
                                          , where 21 pp  . 4.3 
The third and fourth rules, given by Equation 4.4 and Equation 4.5 are used to resolve dependencies between 
events associated with different failure modes from the same component: 
                                               , 
where .21 jj   
 
4.4 
 
                                              
                                                  , 
where 
njjj  21 . 
4.5 
 
 
Equation 4.2 expresses that the probability of a component not failing in a certain failure mode before the end of 
a phase, but failing in that failure mode before the end of some later phase is equal to the probability of failure 
between the two phases. Equation 4.3 expresses that the probability that a component does not fail in a certain 
failure mode before the end of two different phases is equal to the probability that it does not fail prior to the end 
of the later phase. Equation 4.4 expresses that the probability a component does not fail in a failure mode before 
the end of a certain phase but fails in a different failure mode belonging to the same component at some point 
between the end of two phases is equal to the probability of this latter event alone. Finally, equation 4.5 
expresses that the probability of a component not failing in a set of its failure modes before specific phases is 
equal to 1 minus the sum of the probabilities of each of the failure modes occurring before the end of the phase 
that they are successful until.  
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The only other combinations that can occur on a BDD path are between events belonging to different 
components and since these are already independent no reduction rules are necessary. 
4.2.2.2 Dependency Resolved BDD Structure 
To efficiently evaluate the BDD described in the preceding section, it is first converted into another data 
structure, named the Implicant Tree. The Implicant Tree formed from a BDD node represents its set of mutually 
exclusive implicants in the form of a set of independent component event combinations. 
Overview 
The Implicant Tree is a connected acyclic graph with two types of node and a single end (leaf) node. The first 
type of node, named an Event Node, represents an event, with all Event Nodes except the single end (leaf) node 
of the tree representing an event for a component. Note that multiple failure mode success events from the same 
component (see equation 4.5) are considered to be a single component event and are therefore represented by a 
single Event Node. The tree‟s end node usually represents the terminal 1 node and is treated as the certain event 
which has a probability of one. In the special case of the Implicant Tree representing the BDD that consists of a 
single terminal 0 node, the tree‟s end (and root) node is a null node that represents the impossible event and has 
a probability of zero. All event nodes, except the end node, have a single child node but may have multiple 
parents. An Event Node represents an event from an implicant that belongs to a certain component. One 
important property of the Implicant Tree is that no path from root to end node passes through an Event Node 
representing an event from the same certain component more than once; events on a path are therefore fully 
dependency resolved and independent.    
The second type of node is called a Summing Node and, unlike an Event Node, nodes of this type can have 
multiple child nodes as well as parents. A Summing Node‟s children all belong to the same component and this 
component is known as the component of the Summing Node. Summing nodes exist where sets of implicants 
share common event combinations belonging to certain components.  
Implicant Tree Construction 
The Implicant Tree for a particular BDD node is formed through the procedure outlined below:   
If the node is a terminal 1 node, then its Implicant Tree consists of a single terminal one Event Node 
representing the certain event. If instead the node is a terminal 0 node then the Implicant Tree is represented by 
a null node. Otherwise the BDD node is an ite node and the Implicant Tree is formed from steps A, B, C, D and 
E below. 
Step A – Get the Implicant Trees representing the BDD node‟s failure and success child. In turn each child node 
will build its Implicant Tree from the procedure outlined here and this is therefore a recursive process that ends 
at the terminal nodes. This step is shown in Figure 4.5. 
65 
 
 
Figure 4.5 – Step A of forming an implicant tree for an ite node. 
 
Step B – Form the node events that will later be combined (in step C) with the Implicant Trees acquired in step 
A. 
1. The event to combine with the Implicant Tree from the failure (1) child is 1),0( qI j   
2. The event to combine with the Implicant Tree from the success (0) child is 0),0( qI j . 
 where I is the node variable‟s component, j is its failure mode and q is its phase. 
An example of this step is shown in Figure 4.6. 
 
Figure 4.6 – Step B of the data structure derivation. 
 
Step C – derive a new set of Implicant Trees by combining the Implicant Trees from step A with the appropriate 
node event that was generated in step B.  
Ij(0,q)
Process repeats 
recursively until 
terminal nodes 
are reached.
Implicant tree from 
success child.
Success child
Failure Child
Binary Decision Diagram continues to terminal nodes
B1(0,3)
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The following steps are carried out for each of the two corresponding implicant Tree and node event pairs: 
1. If the Implicant Tree is a terminal one Event Node then create an Implicant Tree consisting of an Event 
Node representing the node event whose child node is the terminal one Event Node. Alternatively, if 
the Implicant Tree is a null node then no Implicant Tree is created. For all other Implicant Trees, 
continue to step 2. 
2. If the Implicant Tree and node event belong to the same component, then a dependency exists between 
the two and rule 3a below should be used to generate the new Implicant Tree. Otherwise use rule 3b 
(this is always the case with the Implicant Tree from the failure child, due to the BDD construction 
rules discussed earlier).  
3. If the Implicant Tree from step A‟s root node is a Summing Node then nXX ...1  designate the 
Implicant Trees represented by its n children (each of which has an Event Node as it‟s root node). The 
node event from step B is designated as event Y. 
a. This step results in n Implicant Trees. For i = 1 to n, find the event representing the intersection of 
event Y and the event represented by the root node of iX  using the rules for combining dependant 
events that were given in equations 4.2 to 4.5. If combining iX  and Y results in the event represented 
by the root node of iX  then Implicant Tree i is iX . Otherwise, Implicant Tree i is formed by creating 
a new Event Node representing the resultant event as the root node and setting its child node to the 
child node of iX . 
b. Create a new Implicant Tree with event Y as the root Event Node and the Implicant Tree as its child 
node. 
 
Figure 4.7 – Equivalent Implicant Trees due to merging of summing nodes. 
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Step D – If only one Implicant Tree was formed in Step C then this step can be skipped. Otherwise, form a 
Summing Node with each of the Implicant Trees derived in step C as its children, resulting in a single Implicant 
Tree. Since a Summing Node with a child Summing Node effectively results in a merging of Summing Nodes, 
this is equivalent to setting the children of the root nodes from the Implicant Trees derived in step C as the new 
Summing Node‟s children, as shown by the equivalent Implicant Trees in Figure 4.7a and Figure 4.7b. 
Step E – Cache the Implicant Tree derived in step D so that the same Implicant Tree is reused where the BDD 
node has multiple parents. This is the Implicant Tree representing the BDD node. 
The Implicant Tree representing the full BDD is found by forming the Implicant Tree from its top node. 
Figure 4.8 shows an example of a BDD, with nodes labelled A – F, and the corresponding Implicant Trees for 
each BDD node that was formed through the procedure outlined above are shown in Figure 4.9. 
 
Figure 4.8 – BDD with nodes A-F. 
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Figure 4.9 – Implicant Trees A-F corresponding to nodes A-F from Figure 4.8. 
 
Evaluation of the Implicant Tree 
Once the Implicant Tree representing the paths through the BDD has been constructed the evaluation of mission 
probability is simple and fast. The probability of an event node is calculated as the product of its event 
probability and its child node‟s probability, whilst the probability of a summing node is found from the sum of 
its child node‟s probabilities. The terminal 1 node is treated as the certain event and therefore has a probability 
of 1, whilst the null node, which is only ever present in the Implicant Tree representing a single terminal 0 node, 
has a probability of 0. The probability of each node in the Implicant Tree is cached upon calculation to avoid 
recalculation when it has multiple parent nodes.  
Since the Implicant Tree completely represents the mission reliability structure, it does not need to be rebuilt 
unless the reliability structure changes. If the Implicant Tree is re-evaluated, for example in real time analysis, 
the cached values may no longer be correct and must be cleared. The combination of caching and each node‟s 
probability being dependent only on its own event and the probability of its immediate children, results in 
efficient evaluation compared to the phased mission BDD evaluation algorithms which rely on traversing the 
BDD. 
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4.2.3 Full Example 
The example phased mission shown in Figure 4.10 will be used to demonstrate the method presented in this 
chapter. This example system has 6 non-repairable components: A, B, C, D, E and F. Each of which has 2 
mutually exclusive failure modes, named 1 and 2, with constant failure rates of 0.001 failures per hour. The 
duration of each of the three phases is 100 hours. 
 
Figure 4.10 - Mission failure fault tree for example phased mission. 
 
The BDD produced from the mission fault tree is shown in Figure 4.11 when constructed using the following, 
ramdomly chosen, component and failure mode ordering: B2<B1<A1<A2<C2<C1<D2<D1 <F1<E2. Note that this 
BDD does not follow the usual convention of linking nodes to their failure child from the same side (usually 
left) of the node for all nodes due to the need to produce a clear and concise diagram. The Implicant Tree 
formed from the BDD is shown in Figure 4.12. The mission unreliability for the example mission, using the 
component reliabilities given earlier, is 0.116. 
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Figure 4.11 – BDD representation of the phased mission for the example phased mission from Figure 
4.10. 
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Figure 4.12 – Implicant Tree from from the BDD shown in Figure 4.11. 
4.3 Software Implementation 
A software tool, implementing the new techniques discussed in the previous section has been developed that can 
perform many types of complex phased mission analysis. The major part of the software is in the form of a class 
library, i.e. a collection of related, integrated code files designed to analyse phased missions. It can therefore, 
potentially, be used in many ways, for example as the analysis engine behind a user interface in a desktop 
phased mission analysis program or embedded within a hardware system performing reliability monitoring. The 
software library has been designed to ensure that future developments and improvements can be easily 
integrated. This has been achieved by constructing it from easily extended, replaceable modules with minimal 
interdependencies where possible. For example, the ability to read a new fault tree data file format or the 
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addition of a different BDD computation algorithm require minimal modifications to existing code. Some 
extensions to its basic function that have already been implemented, such as the calculation of importance 
measures, are discussed in later chapters of this thesis. 
High efficiency in terms of computational resources required, such as processing time and memory 
requirements, has been an important goal in the development of the software. The reliability analysis of phased 
missions is a computationally expensive process and an inefficient implementation could limit the applicability 
of the software to the analysis of only very simple phased missions.  
The operation of the software, some implementation details and reasons for the major design decisions will now 
be explained. 
4.3.1 Mission Reliability Analysis Overview 
The flowchart shown in Figure 4.13 depicts the basic steps performed by the software when analysing the 
reliability of a phased mission. The dashed arrows in Figure 4.13 depict referential links, for example the fault 
tree references the component models since the basic events in the fault tree refer to the component models. 
Each of the steps shown in Figure 4.13 will be explained in greater detail in subsequent sections.  
Start / End
Load phased 
mission data
Phased 
mission data
Fault tree data
Component 
data
Load component 
and fault tree data
Create component 
models
Component 
models
Create fault tree 
models
Fault tree 
models
Get analysis type 
Get phased 
mission data 
filename
User
Form mission fault 
tree
Mission 
fault tree 
model
Form mission 
BDD
Mission 
BDD
Form mission 
implicant tree
Mission 
Implicant 
Tree
Get phase 
durations
Calculate mission 
reliability
Phase 
duration 
model
Output results
Results
Create phase 
durations model
 
Figure 4.13 – Overview of steps performed to analyse reliability of a phased missions 
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The user inputs to the program in this example are the phased mission data file, the phase order, the phase 
durations and the analysis type. The output is the mission reliability in the time period of interest. 
4.3.2 File Formats 
The software reads two types of data file that describe different data pertaining to the system to be analysed; the 
first describes a system‟s components and the second a system‟s reliability structure in the form of a fault tree. 
A third type of data file represents a phased mission and contains references to the data files for the missions 
phase fault trees and the component data file containing the components whose basic events appear in the fault 
trees. 
The component data file contains data on component names, their failure modes and the failure model used for 
each failure mode. The failure models currently supported are fixed probability (a time independent, hard coded, 
value), exponential and Weibull. The parameters and their valid value ranges for the supported failure model 
types are shown in Table 4.2. 
Table 4.2 – Parameters for supported component failure models. 
Model Type Parameter Valid values 
Fixed Probability 10  value  
Exponential Failure rate 0value  
Weibull Shape 0value  
Weibull Scale 0value  
Weibull Location  value  
 
Separate files for components and fault trees are used to decouple them and allow a single fault tree to use 
component data from multiple sources. The phased mission data file does not contain any information regarding 
the order of the phases as this allows the user to analyse various phase sequences from the same file. 
4.3.2.1 XML data files 
Although the benefits of standards based file formats for data in any field are well known, no standard file 
format for the representation of phased missions, fault trees or component reliability models exists. The benefits 
of adoption of a standard include the ability to share data and the use of independently developed programs to 
verify the results of analysis.  
XML [40] based file formats to represent phased missions, fault trees and component reliability models were 
developed to be used with the software. File formats based on XML were chosen as they are easily interpreted 
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by both people and computers, they are easily extensible to include future developments (whilst remaining 
backward compatible) and parsers for XML are available in the majority of programming languages. 
XML Schemas 
XML Schemas describe the structure of an XML document, precisely specifying its expected format. The XML 
Schemas for the fault tree and component data files read by the software are shown in this section. 
The XML Schema for a fault tree data file is shown below: 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
 
<!-- definition of complex types --> 
  <xs:complexType name="basiceventinputtype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="componentName" type="xs:string"/> 
      <xs:element name="failureModeName" type="xs:string"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
  <xs:complexType name="gateeventinputtype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
  <xs:group name="eventinputsgroup"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="basicEvent" type="basiceventinputtype" minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
      <xs:element name="gateEvent" type="gateeventinputtype" minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:group> 
 
  <xs:complexType name="inputstype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:group ref="eventinputsgroup" minOccurs="1"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
   
  <xs:complexType name="gatetype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 
      <xs:element name="type" type="xs:string"/> 
      <xs:element name="inputs" type="inputstype"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
  <xs:complexType name="faulttreetype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="gate" type="gatetype" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
  <!-- definition of fault tree --> 
  <xs:element name="faultTree" type="faulttreetype"/> 
   
</xs:schema> 
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The XML Schema for component data files is shown below:  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<xs:schema xmlns:xs="http://www.w3.org/2001/XMLSchema"> 
 
<!-- definition of complex types --> 
  <xs:complexType name="parametertype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 
      <xs:element name="value" type="xs:double"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
  <xs:complexType name="parameterstype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="parameter" type="parametertype" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
  <xs:complexType name="failuremodetype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 
      <xs:element name="modelType"> 
        <xs:simpleType> 
          <xs:restriction base="xs:string"> 
            <xs:enumeration value="Fixed"/> 
            <xs:enumeration value="Exponential"/> 
            <xs:enumeration value="Weibull"/> 
          </xs:restriction> 
        </xs:simpleType> 
      </xs:element> 
      <xs:element name="parameters" type="parameterstype" /> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
  <xs:complexType name="failuremodestype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="failureMode" type="failuremodetype" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
  <xs:complexType name="componenttype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="name" type="xs:string"/> 
      <xs:element name="failureModes" type="failuremodestype" /> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
  <xs:complexType name="basiceventdatatype"> 
    <xs:sequence> 
      <xs:element name="component" type="componenttype" maxOccurs="unbounded"/> 
    </xs:sequence> 
  </xs:complexType> 
 
<!-- definitition of basic event data --> 
  <xs:element name="basicEventData" type="basiceventdatatype" /> 
 
</xs:schema> 
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Shown below is the data file for the phase one fault tree from the example mission that validates against the 
schema that was previously described: 
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8"?> 
<faultTree> 
  <gate> 
    <name>Phase One</name> 
    <type>AND</type> 
    <inputs> 
      <basicEvent> 
        <componentName>A</componentName> 
        <failureModeName>1</failureModeName> 
      </basicEvent> 
      <basicEvent> 
        <componentName>B</componentName> 
        <failureModeName>1</failureModeName> 
      </basicEvent> 
      <gateEvent> 
        <name>G1</name> 
      </gateEvent> 
    </inputs> 
  </gate> 
  <gate> 
    <name>G1</name> 
    <type>OR</type> 
    <inputs> 
      <basicEvent> 
        <componentName>C</componentName> 
        <failureModeName>1</failureModeName> 
      </basicEvent> 
      <basicEvent> 
        <componentName>C</componentName> 
        <failureModeName>2</failureModeName> 
      </basicEvent> 
    </inputs> 
  </gate> 
</faultTree> 
4.3.3 Software Implementation Details 
The software tool has been written in C Sharp (C#) [41] which is a modern object-oriented programming 
language that is related to C++ [42]. In object-oriented programming, the characteristics of a certain data 
structure consisting of data fields and methods are defined through a class. The actual realisation of a class, an 
object whose characteristics are defined through the class definition, is known as an instance. For more 
information on object orientated program, including advanced concepts such as inheritance and polymorphism 
used in the implementation, see [43].   
4.3.3.1 Components 
Components with multiple mutually exclusive failure modes are modelled by the software. In this section the 
details of the component models are explained. 
Component 
A Component class instance represents a component in a system. It is modelled as an entity with a name and one 
or more mutually exclusive failure modes. The component‟s name is mainly used to identify the component in 
any output from the program but can also be used by other parts of the software; for example it is used by 
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certain BDD variable ordering algorithms. There is no limit on the number of failure modes that can belong to 
each component. 
Failure Mode 
A FailureMode class instance represents a failure mode of a component. It is modelled as an entity with a name, 
a component (represented by an instance of the Component class) and a cumulative distribution function (see 
FailureModel class) representing its time to occurence.  Similar to its use in the component model, the name is 
used mainly for the purposes of program output. The main methods defined for this class are the 
MutuallyExclusive and FailureProbability methods. The MutuallyExclusive method is given a FailureMode 
instance as an argument and returns a Boolean result indicating whether the failure mode represented by the 
argument is mutually exclusive with the failure mode this instance represent, i.e. whether they belong to the 
same component. The FailureProbability method has two arguments that represent the start and end times of a 
time period, and calls the Probability method on its FailureModel instance, returning the result that represents 
the probability that the failure mode fails during the time period. It also has GetFailureEvent and 
GetSuccessEvent methods that have a phase number argument and return a representation of the event that the 
failure mode occurs or doesn‟t occur in that phase (see description for FailureModeEvent class). 
Failure Model 
A FailureModel class instance represents a time to occurence model for a failure mode. The implemented 
distribution types include the exponential and Weibull distributions. The parameters that must be set for some of 
the implemented failure model types are shown in Table 4.2. It has a method that returns the probability of 
failure during a specified time period when given the start and end times of that period, calculated from its 
parameters and the distribution given by the model type. It can also store and return a reference to another 
failure model instance and this feature is primarily used to set a temporary failure model for a failure mode - 
used in more advanced reliability analyses described in later chapters. 
It is very simple to expand the software to include a new failure model type, such as the normal distribution, 
without changing any existing code.   
Component Collection 
An instance of the ComponentCollection class represents a collection of uniquely named components and is 
used in the construction of a fault tree from a fault tree data file. The reason for restricting the collection to 
uniquely named components is that fault tree data files refer to components by name, and therefore ambiguity 
could arise if multiple components were to share the same name. It has a method that has a filename argument, 
pertaining to component data file, from which it creates component model instances and adds them to the 
collection. 
4.3.3.2 Fault trees 
The software can model fully featured fault trees and the details of these models are explained in this section. 
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Fault tree nodes 
An instance of the FaultTreeNode class is used to represent a gate or basic event node in a fault tree. It 
implements the properties and methods that are common to all the classes that model fault tree nodes. The most 
important of these is that both have a method, named GetBDD, which returns a representation of a BDD (see 
description of the BDDNode class in section 4.3.3.4). This method receives an instance of a BDDBuilder class 
as an argument (see section 4.3.3.4), along with a phase number, which are used to construct its BDD 
representation. A fault tree itself is represented by the instance of this class that represents the top (or root) node 
of the fault tree. The subclasses of this class that are used to represent the different types of fault tree gate are 
described in the remainder of this section. 
Gate nodes 
The GateNode class is a subclass of the FaultTreeNode class that is used to represent a gate in the fault tree. 
AND, OR and NOT gates are all currently implemented, as these are the three most commonly encountered 
fault tree gate types. There are two types of fault tree gate: those that apply a unary operator to a single input and 
those that apply binary operators to their inputs. The subclasses of this class that model the specific features of 
those using binary and unary operators  will now be described. 
Binary Operator Gate Nodes 
An instance of the BinaryOperatorGateNode class models gates that apply binary Boolean logic operations 
between their inputs. They have a reference to an instance of the BooleanBinaryOperator class, explained in 
section 4.3.3.3, that applies the appropriate Boolean logic. Therefore the only difference between AND and OR 
gate node models is that they hold references to different subtypes of the BooleanBinaryOperator class. The 
GetBDD method first calls GetBDD on each of the input FaultTreeNode instances to get their BDD 
representations (see BDDNode class described in section 4.3.3.4). The Computation method on the BDD 
Builder instance is then called with arguments of the BDD representations from the first two inputs and the 
BooleanBinaryOperator class instance. The call to the Computation method is then repeated but with the 
BDDNode instance arguments replaced with the BDD node instances belonging to the next input and the 
instance returned from the previous call to the Computation method, until no inputs remain. The BDDNode 
instance returned by the last call to the Computation method represents the BDD for the gate. 
Unary Operator Gate Nodes 
An instance of the NOTGateNode class applies a unary Boolean logic operator on its single input and therefore, 
unlike instances of the BinaryOperatorGateNode class, does not hold a reference to a Boolean Binary Operator 
model instance. The GetBDD method sets a flag indicating that NOT logic is switched on in the BDDBuilder, 
calls the GetBDD method on its input node instance to get the BDDNode instance representing the BDD of this 
NOT gate (equivalent to its input node instance‟s BDD representation with terminal nodes switched), switches 
the NOT logic flag back and then returns the BDD node instance. The affect of this flag and reasons for this 
implementation choice are given in section 4.3.3.4. 
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Basic event nodes 
An instance of the BasicEventNode class is used to represent a basic event in the fault tree. Since a basic event 
represents the occurrence of a component failure mode, the instance contains a reference to an instance 
representing the relevant failure mode. The GetBDD method calls the GetFailureModeNode method on the 
BDDBuilder instance with arguments of the failure mode instance and phase number to form the BDDNode 
instance representing the basic event of the failure of the failure mode before the end of the phase, which it then 
returns.  
Phased mission fault tree 
A phased mission fault tree, see section 2.8.1, represents the failure of the system within a specific time period 
of the mission, e.g. a particular phase or the complete mission. Phased mission fault trees therefore have a top 
gate that applies Boolean logic on its inputs which each represent the occurrence of a fault tree before the end of 
a phase, as was shown in Figure 2.10. The phased mission fault tree therefore differs from a standard fault tree 
by including a time aspect through the phase applied to each of the fault trees that represent system reliability 
structure in that phase. This is represented by „time‟ nodes in the fault tree model. 
Time fault tree nodes 
The TimeTreeNode class models the time based nodes in the fault tree. Two special types of time nodes are 
used in the construction of phased mission fault trees, represented by the MissionNode and PhaseNode 
subclasses. Similar to those modelling standard fault tree nodes, this class defines a GetBDD method that returns 
a BDDNode instance representing its equivalent BDD representation. The only difference is that the method has 
only one argument for time fault tree nodes, a BDDBuilder instance. 
Mission nodes 
A MissionNode class instance represents a gate in the phased mission fault tree that applies Boolean logical 
operations on its input nodes to describe the Boolean logic of the tree with respect to times of failure. It is 
similar to a GateNode, except its inputs are other time fault tree node instances rather than fault tree node 
instances. The Boolean logical operator applied to its inputs is determined by the instance of the 
BooleanBinaryOperator class, explained in section 4.3.3.3, that it references. The GetBDD method for this node 
type behaves exactly as it does for GateNode instances, except there is no phase argument in any of the calls to 
the GetBDD method. 
Phase nodes 
An instance of the PhaseNode class represents a phase fault tree. It has a phase number and a reference to a 
FaultTreeNode instance, representing the fault tree for the system‟s reliability structure in that phase. The 
GetBDD method for this node type calls the GetBDD method on its input FaultTreeNode instance, giving its 
phase number as the phase argument. The returned BDDNode instance represents the BDD for the phase fault 
tree conditions being met before the end of the phase. 
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Mission Factory 
An instance of the MissionFactory class is used to produce MisisonNode instances that represent a mission fault 
trees for failure of the mission during a particular period, such as the fault tree representing exclusive phase 
failure, from a set of PhaseNode instances that represent phase fault trees. The types of mission tree 
representations output from this class include exclusive phase failure, mission success until the end of a phase 
and mission failure before the end of a phase.   
4.3.3.3 Boolean Binary Operators 
The models of Boolean binary operators that output a Boolean value from two Boolean input values are 
described in this section. 
Boolean Binary Operators 
An instance of the BooleanBinaryOperator class represents a Boolean binary operator. It has a GetOutput 
method that has two BDDNode instances as inputs and returns a BDDNode instance computed from these 
inputs using the logic of the operator. It also has a GetReverse method that returns an instance of the 
BooleanBinaryOperator subclass whose GetOutput method returns the opposite output for opposite inputs.  
The ANDOperator and OROperator subclasses have been implemented to represent Boolean AND and OR 
operations respectively - the two most common types of Boolean binary operator. 
AND Operator 
ANDOperator class instances represent the AND Boolean binary operator. The output of instances of the 
GetOutput method for the possible combinations of input BDDNode types are shown in Table 4.3. When the 
operator is applied to two ITENode instances, described in section 4.3.3.4, that represent if-then-else (ite) BDD 
nodes, the output cannot be determined by the operator alone.  
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Table 4.3 – Boolean AND operator truth table for BDDNode instance inputs. 
Input Node A Type Input Node B Type Output 
Terminal One Node Terminal One Node Terminal One Node 
Terminal One Node Terminal Zero Node Terminal Zero Node 
Terminal One Node If-Then-Else Node Node B 
Terminal Zero Node Terminal One Node Terminal Zero Node 
Terminal Zero Node Terminal Zero Node Terminal Zero Node 
Terminal Zero Node If-Then-Else Node Terminal Zero Node 
If-Then-Else Node Terminal One Node Node A 
If-Then-Else Node Terminal Zero Node Terminal Zero Node 
If-Then-Else Node If-Then-Else Node Requires computation 
 
The GetReverse method returns an instance of the OROperator class discussed in the next section. 
OR Operator  
An instance of the OROperator class represents a OR Boolean binary operator. The outputs from its GetOutput 
method for each input BDDNode type combination are shown in Table 4.4. As with the AND operator model, it 
cannot determine the output of operations between two ITENode instances.  
82 
 
Table 4.4 – Boolean OR operator truth table for BDDNode instance inputs. 
Input Node A Type Input Node B Type Output 
Terminal One Node Terminal One Node Terminal One Node 
Terminal One Node Terminal Zero Node Terminal One Node 
Terminal One Node If-Then-Else Node Terminal One Node 
Terminal Zero Node Terminal One Node Terminal One Node 
Terminal Zero Node Terminal Zero Node Terminal Zero Node 
Terminal Zero Node If-Then-Else Node Node B 
If-Then-Else Node Terminal One Node Terminal One Node 
If-Then-Else Node Terminal Zero Node Node A 
If-Then-Else Node If-Then-Else Node Requires computation 
 
The GetReverse method returns an instance of the ANDOperator class discussed in the previous section. 
4.3.3.4 Binary Decision Diagram 
The software has a full implementation of phased mission Binary Decision Diagrams that uses the methods 
developed in this chapter. The various aspects of the Binary Decision Diagram implementation are described in 
this section. 
BDD Node 
The BDDNode class represents a BDD node and defines the methods common to the models for the two 
specific types of BDD node, the ite node and the terminal node, that are modelled by the subclasses described in 
the remainder of this section. The most important of these methods is the GetImplicantTree method that returns 
a ImplicantTreeNode instance, described in section 4.3.3.6, representing the Implicant Tree for the BDD node.  
If-Then-Else Node 
An instance of the ITENode class is used to represent an ite node in a BDD. It holds a reference to a 
FailureMode instance and has a phase number which together represent the failure mode and phase of its 
Boolean variable. It also holds a reference to two BDDNode instances that represent its failure and success child 
nodes. The GetImplicantTree method implementation in this class first gets the ImplicantTreeNode instances 
representing the Implicant Tree nodes for its failure and success child nodes. Secondly, FailureModeEvent 
instances representing the failure and success events for the node‟s Boolean variable are then formed from the 
FailureMode instance and phase number. In the third step, the AND method is called on each 
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ImplicantTreeNode instance returned from the failure and success child nodes with the FailureModeEvent 
instances representing the failure and success event used as the argument respectively. If this results in more 
than one ImplicantTreeNode instance, a SummingNode, described in section 4.3.3.6, is formed with these as 
inputs and returned from the method. Alternatively, if only a single ImplicantTreeNode instance is obtained then 
that ImplicantTreeNode instance is returned directly. 
Terminal Node 
Instances of the TerminalNode class are used to represent the terminal nodes in the BDD. It holds a Boolean 
value of true or false, the value of which indicates whether the instance represents a terminal one or terminal 
zero BDD node respectively. The implementation of the GetImplicantTree method for this class is very simple; 
depending on whether the node represents a terminal one or terminal zero BDD node, a TerminalOneNode or 
TerminalZeroNode representing the Implicant Tree node equivalent is returned.  
BDD Builder 
An instance of the BDDBuilder class manages the construction of BDDs from fault trees. It is used in the 
GetBDD method of the FaultTreeNode class to create the BDDNode instance that represents the BDD 
equivalent of the fault tree node. 
If-Then-Else Table 
 ITETable class instances represent an if-then-else BDD node table that prevents the creation of identical 
ITENode instances and ensures that they are instead shared (i.e. given multiple parents) - vital to the efficiency 
of the BDD method. The decoupling of the BDDBuilder from a single BDD is an important implementation 
feature that facilitates the sharing of BDD nodes not only within a single BDD but across the BDD 
representations of multiple fault trees. This can lead to a significant increase in computational efficiency when 
multiple related fault trees are modelled at the same time. The ITETable class defines two main methods, named 
TryFindNode and AddLastSearched. The TryFindNode method is given arguments of a FailureMode instance, a 
phase number and two BDDNode instances that represent failure and success child nodes. Together these 
arguments define the properties of an ite BDD node and the method searches for a matching node in the table, 
returning true along with the BDDNode instance representing the matching node if found, and false otherwise. 
The AddLastSearched method creates a BDDNode instance with the properties of the ite BDD node that was 
last searched for using the TryFindNode method, adds it to the table and then returns it. 
Previous Computation Table 
An instance of the PreviousComputationClass keeps track of the computations performed during the 
construction of a BDD, allowing the previously computed result to be used when any computation is repeated. 
The class defines two important methods, named TryGetResult and AddResultForLastSearched. The 
TryGetResult method has arguments of a BooleanBinaryOperator instance and two BDDNode instances that 
define the computation. It searches through the previously stored computations to try and find a match, returning 
true and the BDDNode representing the computation result if successful and returning false if not. The  
AddResultForLastSearched method is given a BDDNode argument that represents the result of the last 
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computation that was searched for using the TryGetResult method, and then stores it as the result of that 
computation. 
Ordering strategy 
To represent an ordering strategy, that determines the relative ordering of ite node variables within a BDD, an 
instance of a subclass of the OrderingStrategy class is used. A method named GetPriority is defined within the 
class that receives two ITENode instances, determines the relative orderings of their variables according to the 
implemented ordering strategy and returns a variable that indicates which node should appear higher in the 
BDD. 
A subclass named SimpleBDDOrdering that orders variables according to the strategy described in section 4.2.1 
has been implemented but it makes no attempt to optimise the orderings of either components or failure modes 
to minimise the size of the BDD as this is beyond the scope of this work. The process of adding more complex 
ordering strategies is simple, requiring only the definition of a new OrderingStrategy subclass that defines the 
GetPriority method. 
Application of NOT logic 
The Boolean logical NOT of a BDD is given by swapping its terminal one and zero nodes, however simply 
swapping the value of the terminal one and zero nodes in the implementation presents some difficulties and is 
not the most efficient approach. One problem with this approach is that the results from the table containing 
previous computations from the BDD construction can no longer be used, reducing the efficiency for future 
computations. This is because the result stored in the table for a particular computation may now refer to the 
NOT equivalent of the true result. A second problem is that any other BDDs produced by the same BDDBuilder 
instance would also unintentionally become their NOT logic equivalents, as they will share the same terminal 
nodes. An alternative approach, avoiding these problems, would be to create a copy of the BDD but with the 
terminal nodes swapped. This approach is also inefficient due to the need to produce two BDDs and the lack of 
a previous computation table produced for the NOT logic BDD resulting in lower efficiency for future 
calculations. In the most efficient approach, the BDD with swapped terminal nodes is built directly, without the 
prior creation of its equivalent that is necessary in the alternatives. This is achieved in the implementation 
through the setting a flag in the BDDBuilder instance that indicates that NOT logic is on, causing it to produce 
the NOT equivalent BDD representation of a fault tree node until it is switched off. The switching of this flag 
was discussed in section 4.3.3.2. 
Creation of BDD node from Fault Tree Node 
The main role of a BDDBuilder instance is to create BDDNode instances from FaultTreeNode instances, i.e. 
converting fault tree representations into their BDD equivalents. The implementation of the conversion process 
for BasicEventNode and BinaryOperatorGateNode class instances is given in this section.  
Basic Event Fault Tree Node 
As was discussed in section 4.3.3.2, BasicEventNode instances call the GetFailureModeNode method on a 
BDDBuilder instance, passing its FailureMode instance and phase number as arguments, which then returns the 
85 
 
BDDNode instance representing its BDD. The GetFailureModeNode method forms a ITENode instance with 
the FailureMode instance and phase number, defining the BDD node variable, and failure child and success 
child nodes consisting of the terminal one and terminal zero nodes respectively. If the NOT logic flag is on then 
the orientation of the terminal one and terminal zero nodes is the reverse. 
Gate Fault Tree Node - BDD computation algorithm 
BinaryOperatorGateNode instances call the Computation method on a BDDBuilder instance with arguments of 
its BinaryOperator instance and the BDDNode instances representing its input fault tree nodes, as was discussed 
in section 4.3.3.2. The first step in the Computation algorithm is performed only if the NOT logic flag is on. In 
this step the GetOpposite method on the BinaryOperator instance is called to get its logical opposite, the flag is 
then switched off, and the Computation method called again this time using the new BinaryOperator instance 
with the other arguments the same, before switching the flag back to on. This has the effect of swapping all 
AND gates for OR gates, and vice versa, and all failure basic events into their success event equivalents in the 
fault tree from which the BDD node representation is calculated – thus implementing the NOT logic. The 
second step is to check whether the computation has been previously performed, using the previous computation 
table discussed in section 4.3.3.4. The previously calculated result is returned directly if a matching computation 
is found, otherwise it must be calculated. The first step in the calculation process determines whether the result 
can be determined from the GetOutput method of the BinaryOperator instance with arguments of the two 
BDDNode instances. If a result is determined then it is returned, otherwise further calculation is required. In this 
case an algorithm builds the BDDNode instance representing the resultant BDD according to the method 
developed in this chapter and returns the result. This algorithm includes the steps for minimising the BDD size 
according to the phase and failure mode algebra, along with the developed reduction rules. 
Phase durations 
An instance of the MissionTimes class represents a set of phase durations for a phased mission. A number of 
methods are defined for this class that allow them to be modified and values, such as a phase end time, to be 
obtained.  
4.3.3.5 Component Event 
The software models the various types of events that can occur for a multiple failure mode component during a 
phased mission. These are described in this section. 
Component Event 
Subclasses of the ComponentEvent class represent failure and success events, pertaining to a single component, 
during a particular period of the mission that is defined by the phase ends it occurs after and before. This class 
defines the methods and properties that are common to all of these subclasses. The most important of these are 
the Probability and SameComponentAND methods. The Probability method is given a MissionTimes instance 
as an argument and, and using the phase durations that it represents, returns the probability of the event 
occurring during the mission. By using an argument to this method that represents the phase durations, and 
defining the period in which the event occurs in terms of the phase ends rather than actual times, the event‟s 
probability for any set of phase durations can be evaluated by using the appropriate MissionTimes instance. A 
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NOTProbability method is also defined that returns the probability that the event doesn‟t occur, calculated from 
unity minus the output of the Probability method. The SameComponentAND method is given an argument of a 
FailureModeEvent instance, representing an event from a single failure mode and discussed in the following 
section, that must belong to the same component as this event and returns a ComponentEvent instance that 
represents the result of a Boolean logical AND operation between the two. The subclasses of this class that 
represent events for a single failure mode and success events for multiple failure modes belonging to the same 
component are discussed in the remainder of this section. 
Failure Mode Event 
Subclasses of the FailureModeEvent class represent events for the failure or success of a single failure mode of 
a component. They have a reference to a FailureMode instance, representing the failure mode of the event, and 
methods named FailsAfter and FailsBefore that return numbers indicating the phase ends that the failure mode 
occurs after and before respectively, according to the event. The SameComponentAND method is defined in this 
class for the case that the argument event belongs to the same failure mode as the event instance on which it is 
called (i.e. where the phase algebra rules from Equations 4.2 and 4.3 apply), whilst the other cases (i.e. the 
application of the phase algebra from Equations 4.4 and 4.5) are dealt with in the subclasses that are described 
below. In all cases the output of the method follows those phase algebra rules. 
Failure Mode Occurrence Event 
An instance of the FailureModeOccurrenceEvent class represents the event that a failure mode occurs in a 
certain phase period. It has two phase numbers representing the phase end that the failure mode occurs after and 
before. The Probability method first converts the phase numbers into phase end times using the 
GetPhaseEndTime method of the MissionTimes instance and then calls the FailureProbability method of the 
FailureMode instance with these time arguments to determine the probability of failure, which it then returns.  
Failure Mode Success Event 
The event that a failure mode does not occur during a phase period is represented by an instance of the 
FailureModeSuccessEvent class. Since it is assumed that components are non-repairable, the event must 
represent success from the start of the mission, and therefore it has only the phase number representing the 
phase end that the failure mode does not occur before. Since the event that a failure mode does not occur during 
a certain period indicates it does occur sometime after that period, the FailsAfter and FailsBefore methods return 
the phase end that the failure mode does not occur before and infinity respectively. The Probability method first 
converts the phase number into a phase end time and then calls the SuccessProbability method of the 
FailureMode instance with this time argument to determine the probability of success, which it then returns. 
Multiple Failure Mode Success Event 
 An instance of the MultipleFMSuccessEvent class represents the event that more than failure modes do not 
occur in defined phase periods. It stores references to a FailureModeSuccessEvent instance and another 
MultipleFMSuccessEvent instance that together represent the set of failure modes that do not occur. The 
Probability method first calls the NOTProbability methods on the FailureModeSuccessEvent and 
MultipleFMSuccessEvent with the MissionTimes instance argument. The results from these method calls are 
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summed to give the probability that any of the failure modes occur during their respective time periods and this 
is then deducted from unity to give the probability that they all do not occur, which is then returned.  
4.3.3.6 Directed Acyclic Implicant Graph 
The modelling of the Implicant Tree data structure is described in this section. 
Implicant Tree 
Implicant Trees are represented through instances of subclasses of the ImplicantTreeNode class. Two main 
methods, named Probability and AND, are defined for this class. The Probability method is given a 
MissionTimes instance argument, representing the phase durations of the mission, and uses this to calculate, 
cache and return the probability of the Implicant Tree. The AND method is used to perform Step C of BDD node 
to Implicant Tree node construction that was explained in section 4.2.2.2. It is given a FailureModeEvent 
argument, representing a failure mode event, and returns a ImplicantTreeNode instance representing the 
Implicant Tree node output from the combination of the event and the Implicant Tree node represented by the 
instance on which it is called. A method is also defined for clearing the cached probability values in the 
Implicant Tree nodes so that probability re-evaluation can be performed. The subclasses that represent Event 
Nodes, Summing Nodes, Terminal One Nodes in an Implicant Tree are described in the remainder of this 
section. 
Event Node 
Instances of the EventNode class are used to represent Event Nodes in an Implicant Tree. They store a reference 
to a ComponentEvent instance that represents its component event and a ImplicantTreeNode instance that 
represents its child node. The Probability method calculates the nodes probability by calling the Probability 
methods on its ComponentEvent and ImplicantTreeNode instances and multiplying the results returned. If the 
AND method is called on an instance of this class with an argument event that belongs to the same component, 
then the SameComponentAND method is called on the argument event with the event from the instance as the 
argument, and a new EventNode instance returned that references the returned event as its event and has a child 
node matching the child node of this instance. Alternatively, if they belong to different components, then a new 
EventNode instance is returned that references the argument event as its event and has the instance as its child 
node.  
Summing Node 
Instances of the SummingNode class are used to represent Summing Nodes in a Implicant Tree. They store 
references to the ImplicantTreeNode instances that represent their children. The probability of the node is 
calculated in the Probability method by calling the Probability method on the ImplicantTreeNode instances that 
represent its children, passing the MissionTimes instance as the arguments, and then summing the returned 
results. When the AND method is called on an instance of this class with an argument event that belongs to the 
same component, then the AND method is called on the ImplicantTreeNode instances that represent its children, 
passing the FailureModeEvent instance as the argument, and a new SummingNode instance returned that 
references the returned ImplicantTreeNode instances as its child nodes. If they instead belong to different 
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components, then a new EventNode instance is returned that references the argument event as its event and has 
the instance as its child node. 
Terminal One Node 
An instance of the TerminalOneNode class represents a terminal one node in an Implicant Tree. The Probability 
method always returns a value of 1, since this node type represents the certain event. Calling the AND method 
on an instance of this type returns a new EventNode that references the argument event as its event and the 
instance as its child. 
4.3.3.7 Mission Failure Probability Evaluation 
As discussed earlier in this chapter, analysing the probability of failure of a phased mission in a particular period 
is a multistep process that involves the creation of the appropriate mission fault tree, conversion into a BDD and 
the conversion into an Implicant Tree. The classes described in the remainder of this section encapsulate some 
of the steps of this process and facilitate the analysis of the mission failure in precise periods of the phased 
mission. 
Top Event Probability 
An instance of the TopEventProbability class is the most general of the classes described in this section and can 
be used to automate the process of deriving the top event probability from a phased mission fault tree. It holds 
references to the MissionNode instance that represents the phased mission tree that is to be analysed and a 
BDDBuilder instance that is used to construct the BDD during the probability analysis. It defines a Probability 
method that has a MissionTimes instance argument, representing the phase durations of the mission, and is used 
to determine the top event probability for that tree according to those phase durations. Two subclasses of this 
class are defined for analysing the probability of mission failure in time periods that cannot be represented by a 
phased mission tree alone, namely the probability of failure on transition to a phase and the probability of in-
phase phase failure, and will now be described. 
Transitional Probability 
The TransitionalProbability class allows the probability of failure on transition to a specific phase to be 
determined from the set of phase fault trees and phase durations for a mission. An instance of this class holds a 
reference to a phase number that indicates the phase of the mission to be analysed and is given a MissionFactory 
instance, representing a set of phase fault trees for a mission, from which it forms and stores a reference to a 
MissionNode instance that represents the exclusive failure of the mission in that phase. The Probability method 
then calculates the probability of failure on transition to the phase of the mission by first creating a copy of the 
argument MissionTime instance but with the duration for that phase set to 0, and then uses that with the 
Probability method of the MissionNode instance to get the probability of exclusive transitional phase failure.  
In-Phase Probability 
The InPhaseProbability class is used to find the probability of in-phase failure in a specific phase from the set of 
phase fault trees and phase durations for a mission. It is constructed with a MissionFactory instance and phase 
number from which it forms and stores a reference to a TransitionalProbability instance for finding the 
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probability of failure on transition to that phase. It also forms and stores a reference to the MissionNode instance 
that represents the exclusive failure of the mission in that phase. The Probability method then calculates the 
probability of in phase failure in the phase from the difference between the overall probability of exclusive 
phase failure, calculated from the MissionNode instance, and the probability of failure on transition to the phase, 
calculated from the TransitionalProbability instance. This is an example of where the probability from the same 
Implicant Tree is re-evaluated, as both the overall and transitional failure probability calculations are performed 
on the same Implicant Tree with only the duration of the analysed phase changing. Since the re-evaluation of a 
Implicant Tree is very fast, there is only a small proportional increase in the amount of time taken to analyse in-
phase probability in a phase compared to the overall probability of exclusive phase failure. 
4.3.3.8 Phased Mission 
The PhasedMission class provides an easy to use interface for the analysis of a phased mission. It provides 
methods for loading component data, loading phase fault tree data and analysing mission failure during any 
period of a phased mission. A user interface built on top of the class library would therefore only need to 
interact with the simple methods of this class and display its outputs, insulating it from the internal details and 
steps taking during the analysis of a phased mission. 
4.3.3.9 Verification and Unit Testing 
The correct operation of the methods developed and their implementation has been verified through the use of a 
large number of unit tests. Each of these verifies the correct operation of a specific part of the programme by 
comparing its output for various inputs against their known correct results. Due to the successful passing of all 
tests, the accuracy of the developed methods and their implementation is assured. 
4.4 Comparison to method by Tang and Dugan 
In order to compare the performance of the method introduced here with the method by Tang and Dugan, 
referred to as the TD method, it is necessary to test them on a large number of different fault trees. A program 
was written to randomly generate phased missions with certain properties. The properties that could be varied 
include the number of components and failure modes available, the depth of the phase fault trees, the proportion 
of AND to OR gates, the maximum number of gate and basic event inputs to each gate and the number of 
phases in the mission. The missions were analysed for both overall mission failure probability and exclusive 
phase failure in the final phase (i.e. system survives until final phase and fails in that phase) as the solution of 
the latter often has higher computational expense.  
The accuracy of the method presented in this paper has been verified against the results published in Zang et al 
[34] and Tang and Dugan [36]. The TD method gave an incorrect result for some of the additional test cases 
including the example phased mission shown in Figure 4.10. 
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A comparison has been made of both the performance and the accuracy. The three metrics used in the 
comparisons are: 
1. Probability value (to compare accuracy) 
2. Number of nodes in BDD (to compare BDD construction efficiency)  
3. Solution time (to compare evaluation efficiency) 
Table 4.5 shows the settings for each configuration that were used to generate the 10 random missions. This set 
of mission configuration settings were chosen to provide a range of component sets, phase counts, AND/OR 
gate ratios and phase fault tree shapes (i.e. variations in depth and breadth). Generally, the complexity of the 
mission increases with fewer components, higher numbers of failure modes, larger phase fault trees and higher 
numbers of phases. Fewer components and larger numbers of failure modes cause an increase in the number of 
failure mode dependencies between basic events in the mission fault tree, whilst higher numbers of phases 
increase phase dependencies. Larger numbers of gates and greater tree depth increase the size of the problem, 
causing a general increase in complexity. For these reasons, configuration settings I and F can be considered to 
generate the most and least complex phased missions respectively. 
Table 4.5 – The settings used in the random generation of 10 phased missions. 
Configuration Component 
count 
Failure 
mode 
count 
Tree 
depth 
Gate 
inputs 
Basic 
event 
inputs 
OR/AND 
gate ratio 
Phases 
A 10 5 5 3 2 0.5 4 
B 10 5 5 3 2 0.5 12 
C 20 5 5 3 2 0.5 16 
D 20 5 5 3 2 0.9 16 
E 20 5 5 3 2 0.1 16 
F 20 3 5 3 2 0.5 4 
G 20 5 5 5 2 0.5 16 
H 20 3 3 3 3 0.5 16 
I 20 8 8 3 2 0.5 16 
 
The average solution times for each of the methods, given in elapsed clock ticks, are shown in Table 4.6. As 
shown the new method gives a significant performance boost for all except configuration settings F, the simplest 
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case, where it shows reduced performance. For example, with configuration settings G the evaluation time is 
reduced by 98% on average compared to the TD method.  
Table 4.6 - Average solution time comparison between the new and TD methods for each of the 
configuration settings. 
 Mission Failure Final Phase Failure  
Configuration New method  TD method New 
method 
TD 
method 
Overall improvement 
(% reduction) 
A 1320 6691 1187 1462 69 
B 3433 12672 2727 12474 76 
C 6852 77085 3280 72489 93 
D 1535 1925 653 1705 39 
E 708 10980 570 18890 95 
F 6473 1979 5863 2916 -152 
G 3082 82168 2330 149541 98 
H 1200 3477 692 4351 76 
I 16171 312354 14403 464165 96 
 
Table 4.7 shows the average BDD node count for each of the methods with each mission configuration type. For 
every mission configuration tested, the new method resulted in a smaller BDD, often significantly such as in 
configurations G and H where the node count was reduced by 97% on average. As with the solution times, the 
magnitude of the improvement is greatest in the configurations with higher levels of basic event dependencies, 
as shown by the relatively small 4% size reduction achieved in the simplest configuration. 
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Table 4.7 - Average BDD node count comparison between the new and TD methods for each of the 
configuration settings. 
 Mission Failure Final Phase Failure  
Configuration New method  TD method New 
method 
TD 
method 
Overall improvement 
(% reduction) 
A 78 101 130 144 15 
B 175 1102 293 1045 78 
C 264 5936 386 5727 94 
D 89 182 92 167 48 
E 57 793 118 1374 92 
F 200 214 304 311 4 
G 171 5950 314 10859 97 
H 82 320 124 411 72 
I 492 21658 956 33719 97 
 
Finally, Table 4.8 shows the average percentage error in the probability value given by the TD method for each 
of the phased mission configuration settings. This shows that the accuracy of the TD method is very poor, 
particularly when complex phased missions are analysed, and this is due to the errors in that method that have 
been identified. 
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Table 4.8 - Average percentage error in the solution given by the TD method for each of the mission 
configuration settings. 
Configuration Mission Failure Probability Error (%) Final Phase Failure Probability Error (%)  
A 9 23 
B 22 24 
C 32 111 
D 10 22 
E 73 107 
F 2 6 
G 65 117 
H 22 74 
I 308 44 
4.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The literature review revealed a number of methods that had been developed for the analysis of non-repairable 
phased mission reliability. The most recent was developed by Tang and Dugan [36] and designed for the 
analysis of systems containing components with multiple failure modes. However, analysis of the method found 
that it had a number of problems that resulted in it often giving very poor accuracy in its assessment of the 
reliability of a phased mission. The need to perform real time or importance measure analysis, that each require 
the repeated reliability analysis of the same system, was noted as an important application for phased mission 
reliability analysis methods. For these reasons, research into a method capable of accurate and highly efficient 
analysis of a phased mission system containing multiple failure mode components was carried out. This resulted 
in the development of a new method that is particularly efficient when performing repeat analysis and improves 
on the method by Tang et al in all areas. The BDD construction algorithm results in smaller BDDS reducing the 
computational memory it requires to store, uses a very compact phase algebra to produce a new pre-evaluation 
and dependency resolved structure, named an Implicant Tree, and features an evaluation method that is highly 
optimised. By resolving all dependencies prior to evaluation, instead of resolving dependencies during 
evaluation as is the case with the method by Tang et al, repeat evaluations, such as those performed in 
importance measure analysis, are more efficient. The method has been implemented as a computer code and its 
performance compared to an implementation of the method developed by Tang et al by applying them to the 
analysis of a wide range of example phased mission systems. The new method was shown to be an improvement 
in terms of both efficiency and accuracy. 
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5 Literature review of reliability methods for repairable 
phased missions 
Certain systems operating in phased missions have components that can be repaired during the mission to 
increase its reliability. This chapter is a review of the available methods for the analysis of the reliability of such 
systems. These methods use the Markov, binary decision diagram (BDDs) and Monte Carlo simulation 
techniques. 
5.1 Markov model based methods 
The Markov modelling technique has been widely used to analyse the reliability of repairable phased missions. 
Phased mission Markov models must be able to model transitions between phases and minimise the state space 
to avoid the computational expense that can occur when modelling large systems and many phases. Various 
methods have been developed and they can be split into two strategies; those that use a separate state transition 
matrix for each phase of the mission and those that use a single state transition matrix for the entire mission. 
Each of these approaches has their own distinct advantages and disadvantages. Common to these methods is the 
assumption that failed components are integrated back into the system immediately upon repair.  
5.1.1 Methods with a separate transition matrix for each phase 
In this section methods that use a separate transition matrix for each phase are discussed. This is a natural 
approach since the states which represent failure and the transition rates between them vary between phases. The 
use of separate phase transition matrices reduces the maximum matrix size compared to the use of a single 
matrix for the complete phased mission. This along with the minimisation of the individual phase matrices 
reduces the computational expense. 
The earliest Markov modelling method for analysing repairable phased missions was developed by Alam and 
Al-Saggaf [44]. In that method the Markov modelling technique is used to determine the state of the system at 
the end of a phase, and correspondingly the initial conditions for the following phase, from the initial conditions 
and the transition rates between states. Repeating this process for each phase of the mission allows the 
probability of failure in each phase and the probability of the system residing in each state at the end of the 
mission to be found. Additionally, the probability of the system failing due to each separate system failure mode 
in each phase can be found. 
The first step in implementing the method is to determine the exhaustive set of states in which the system can 
reside. Since in each state a component is either working or failed (the possibility of multiple failure modes is 
not considered), the total number of states is C
N
2 , where CN  is the total number of components in the system. 
A C
N
2  by  C
N
2  transition-rate matrix,  , is then formed containing the transition rates between these system 
states. The element at row i and column  j of  , ),( ji , for C
N
i 21 and CNj 21 and ji   is set to 
the rate of transition from state j to state i, ij, ,  as shown in Equation 5.1. 
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ijji ,),(    , where ji  . 5.1 
 
Each element on the diagonal of  , ),( ii , for C
N
i 21 , is set to the negation of the sum of the other 
elements on column i and represents the transition rate out of state i, as shown in Equation 5.2. 



CN
ijj
ijii
2
,1
),(),(   
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From this overall transition-rate matrix,  , which includes all possible transitions between states, transition-rate 
matrices for each individual phase of the mission are formed by setting to zero all repair rate transitions out of 
states that represent system failed states in that phase. Therefore the transition-rate matrix for phase k, k , is as 
shown in Equation 5.3.where jk ,  is a Boolean variable for state j during phase k with a value of 1 if it is a 
system failure state and a value of 0 if it is a system success state. 




0
),(
),(
ji
jik

   
otherwise
if jk 0, 
 
5.3 
 
Preventing the system from leaving the states representing system failure is required since a phased mission 
ends as soon as the system enters a failed state. Such states are known as „absorbing‟. Any of the standard 
structural reliability methods may be used to ascertain which states represent system failed states, such as the 
fault tree or reliability block diagram methods. 
A length C
N
2  column vector for phase k, )(tPk , where ith element represents the probability that the system 
resides in state i at time t from the start of the phase, is used to represent the status of the system and is referred 
to as the state probability vector. The initial state probability vector, )0(1P , representing the state of the system 
at the start of the mission, contains the probability that the system starts the mission in each state. Usually the 
element corresponding to all components working is given a value of 1, whilst all others are given a value of 0, 
based on the assumption that all component are working at the start of the mission. The state probability vector 
for the end of phase k is then given by Equation 5.4, using the duration of phase k,        , the initial 
probability vector for phase k,      , and the phase k transition-rate matrix, k . Equation 5.4 assumes constant 
failure and repair rates are used for all components. 
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                 5.4 
 
Once the state probability vector at the end of phase k,            , has been found, the probability of phase 
k  in-phase system failure, 
P
kQ , is obtained by summing the elements that correspond to system failed states in 
that phase. This is shown in Equation 5.5 where               is the ith element of            . 
  
                             
   
 5.5 
The probability of failure on transition to the next phase, phase k+1, is denoted by 
T
kQ 1 , and calculated as the 
sum of the elements from the state probability vector at the end of phase k,            , that correspond to 
working states in phase k and failed states in phase k+1. This is shown by Equation 5.6. 
    
                                         
   
 5.6 
In order for the system to progress from phase k to phase k+1 it must be in a system success state for both 
phases. The probability that the system is in state i at the start of phase k + 1, )0(,1 ikP  , is therefore found from 
probability that the system is in state i at the end of phase k,              ,  through Equation 5.7. 
           
                             
            
  5.7 
The end of phase probability vector for the next phase is then found through the same process, i.e. using the 
state probability vector, phase transition-rate matrix and phase duration in Equation 5.4. This process is repeated 
for each phase of the mission until the state probability vector corresponding to the mission end time has been 
determined. The mission unreliability, MissQ , is then calculated as 1 minus the sum of the probabilities that the 
system is in a working state at the end of phase N, where N is the number of phases in the mission, as shown in 
Equation 5.8. 
                                   
   
 5.8 
For large systems, this method can suffer from the „state explosion‟ problem, as every possible system state is 
included in each phase‟s transition-rate matrix. Kim and Park [45] proposed a Markov model method, building 
upon the work of Alam and Al-Saggaf, that produces a smaller state space compared to the earlier methods by 
not including the absorbing, system failed, states in the phase transition-rate matrices. The removal of the 
absorbing states reduces the memory and computational overhead compared to Alam and Al-Sagaf‟s method, 
resulting in faster computation of mission unreliability with no loss in accuracy. A disadvantage with this 
approach is that, unlike the method from Alam and Al-Sagaf, it is not possible to determine the probability of 
the system failing in a particular failed state, only the overall probability of phase failure can be determined. 
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However, for most types of analysis, only the overall probability of failure during the mission or in a particular 
phase is of interest and so the use of this compact state model with its computational benefits is often 
advantageous.    
The first steps in Kim and Park‟s method are the same as the earlier method from Alam and Al-Saggaf , i.e. 
determine all possible system states and form the full C
N
2  by  C
N
2  transition-rate matrix,  . A reduced 
transition-rate matrix is then formed for each phase of the mission, consisting of only the rows and columns 
from   that represent transitions from and to states that are working states in that phase. The columns 
containing transition rates from failed states can be removed since the mission ends as soon as the system fails, 
and therefore a transition out of a failed state is impossible. The rows containing transition rates to failed states 
can be removed because the rates are contained within the diagonal elements, representing the transition rates 
out of the working states, of the reduced matrix. The reduced transition-rate matrix for phase k will therefore be 
of order      by     , where      is the number of working states in phase k.  
The remaining steps are similar to Alam and Al-Saggaf but with state probability vectors that vary in size and 
whose corresponding states must be determined between phases. A length     column vector for phase k, 
)(tPk , is used to represent the probability that the system resides in each of the working states from that phase 
at time t from the start of the phase. Since there is no longer a one-to-one correspondence between elements in 
the reduced state transition-rate matrices from different phases, there is also no longer a one-to-one 
correspondence between the elements in their state probability vectors. An indexing method is therefore 
required so that the elements corresponding to the same system state in the reduced state probability vectors 
from different phases can be mapped to one another.  The working states in each phase are re-ordered 
sequentially with the first working state numbered 1, as shown by Equation 5.9, where       is the re-ordered 
index of state i, A is the set of original indexes of working states from phase k and  
    is the total number of working states in phase k. 
                 5.9 
The original state index (the index that includes all states, both working and failed) for each re-ordered working 
state index must be retained so that the working state indexes can be mapped back to the corresponding full state 
index. In other words, there must be a one-to-one mapping between the original and re-ordered indexes of 
working states in each phase. This is shown by Equation 5.10, where       is the original phase k state index of 
re-ordered index i,     is the total number of working states in phase k and A is the set of original indexes of 
working states from phase k.  
                   5.10 
Kim and Park provide a simple algorithm for carrying out the re-ordering, although any method that allows the 
one-to-one mapping between indexes will suffice.  
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The ith element of )(tPk  therefore represents the probability that the system is in state )(ik , at time t from the 
start of phase k. The state probability vector for the end of a phase k,            , is found from the phase‟s 
initial state probability vector, )0(kP  through Equation 5.4. The reduced state probability vector for the start of 
the following phase is then formed by copying across the value from the end of phase reduced state vector to the 
element corresponding to the same system state. Elements in the next phase‟s probability vector corresponding 
to a system failed system state in the previous phase, and therefore not present in the previous phase‟s end of 
phase probability vector, are initialised to a value of 0. Another possibility is that an element in an end of phase 
probability vector does not represent a system failed state in that phase but does in the next phase, and is 
therefore not represented in its initial probability vector. Summing these elements gives the probability of 
transitional failure between the phases. The mission unreliability is then determined from the state probability 
vector for the end of the mission,            , and is calculated as 1 minus the sum of the elements of this 
vector, as shown in Equation 5.11, since these elements represent the success states for the final phase.  
                      
    
   
 
5.11 
5.1.2 Single Transition Matrix 
An alternative to separate state transition matrices for each phase is to use a single state transition matrix for the 
complete mission. The main challenge with this approach is to avoid a huge state space that is computationally 
very expensive to solve.  
Dugan [46] presents an alternative method for Markov analysis of phased missions which avoids the process of 
mapping end of phase state probability vectors to the start of phase state probability vectors for the following 
phase. A single state transition-rate matrix is formed with the full set of states for the components in the model 
but with transition rates that vary according to the current phase of the mission. The state transition matrix is 
therefore the same size as a state transition rate matrix resulting from the method by Alam and Al-Saggaf.  
The variation in transition rates between phases is achieved by multiplying a transition rate for phase j by j , 
where j  equals 1 during phase j and 0 at all other times. As in the other methods, the failure states specific to 
each phase are made absorbing, preventing the system from returning to a working state since the mission would 
have ended. 
At the end of each phase, the probability of phase failure and failure on transition to the next phase are 
calculated from Equations 5.5 and 5.6. The probabilities of all failure states for that and the next phase are then 
set to 0, the transitions rates are switched to those of the next phase and the analysis for the next phase begins. 
Once the end of the mission is reached, the mission unreliability is then found through Equation 5.8. 
The method therefore results in a single state transitional matrix of the same size as the phase state transitional 
matrix from Alam and Al-Saggaf‟s, whilst having only this matrix to solve compared to one for each phase. The 
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disadvantages are that the state space cannot be minimised for each phase as it can with Kim and Park‟s method 
and that a numerical solution scheme must be used leading to greater computational expense. 
Smotherman and Zemoudeh [47] investigated a Markov modelling approach suitable for analysing repairable 
phased mission systems with time dependant failure and repair rates, random and state dependant phase 
transition times and multiple mission objectives. It is therefore able to model aspects of phased missions that are 
beyond the scope of the other Markov based methods found in the literature.  
Their model includes a different Markov state for each system component state in each phase and for each 
mission objective. For example, with a two component system, there could be a state for both components 
working in phase one, a state for both components working in phase two with objective (or task) 1 and a state 
for both components working in phase two with objective (or task) 2, amongst others. The transitions between 
the different states are then determined and include, as well as the component failure and repair transitions, 
transitions for phase transitions (i.e. rates for the transfer between phases). These phase transition rates can vary 
between different Markov states; indeed the phase transition rate may be 0 from a certain state, if the system 
cannot progress to another phase from it. The system is assumed to be in the all component working state at the 
mission start time and the resultant differential equations in the model are then solved through a Runge-Kutta 
numerical solution scheme. To model the phase transition times, uniform probability density functions are used 
that are zero outside the range of possible transition times. This results in the rate of phase transition before the 
earliest transition time being zero, increasing and approaching infinity as the time reaches the latest transition 
time and being set to zero after the end of the interval. The phase transition time distribution intervals must be 
non-overlapping for multiple phase transitions from the state, for example when different phase transitions 
represent transitions to different objectives in the phase entered. The mission status probabilities, such as the 
probability a certain objective was reached or whether failure occurred, are found from the state probabilities at 
the mission end time, through Equation 5.8. 
Although this method is able to analyse complex phased missions with state dependant transition rates, it can 
result in very large state spaces. The state space increases rapidly with the number of phases, unlike with the 
other Markov methods that either have a separate state transition rate matrix for each phase or a single state 
transition rate matrix with non phase specific system states. For this reason, the analysis of large systems with 
many phases using this method may be difficult due to limitations in available computational resources. 
5.2 BDD based method 
Recently, the BDD technique has become the preferred method for the analysis of non-repairable phased 
missions due to its ability to derive exact unreliability at relatively low computational expense [33]. Although 
the method has limitations when applied to the analysis of repairable systems, a method developed by Wang and 
Trivedi [48] that is discussed in this section demonstrates its potential for the efficient analysis of certain types 
of repairable phased mission.   
Even with the recent developments in the Markov methods that result in smaller state spaces, the models can 
still present computational difficulties when large systems are analysed. Wang and Trivedi [48] presented a 
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method that uses the BDD technique to represent the system structure and continuous time Markov chains to 
model the state of individual components. The use of small Markov models for each individual component 
instead of modelling the complete system means that the maximum state space size is kept very small. The 
major advantage is that, since large state spaces are avoided, larger systems can be modelled efficiently. The 
main difference from the Markov modelling based methods is that the method assumes repaired components are 
only integrated back into the system at the end of a phase instead of immediately upon repair. This limits the 
types of phased mission system that can be modelled accurately.  Unlike the phase dependencies for non-
repairable systems that can be incorporated into the BDD construction procedure to minimise BDD size, such as 
by the algorithm presented by Zang, Sun and Trivedi [31], when repair is included the situation is more complex 
and the BDD cannot be minimised during construction. The method therefore assumes all events are 
independent for the purposes of BDD construction and the original fault tree to BDD computation operations 
from Rauzy [14], Equations 2.14 to 2.17, are therefore used. The dependencies between events on the paths 
through the BDD are then resolved during the probability evaluation. The authors present two node variable 
ordering schemes along with their corresponding evaluation procedures, each having its own advantages. The 
first optimises for memory requirements as it results in a smaller BDD size but an evaluation speed that is linear 
with the number of paths (which is normally many orders of magnitude greater than the number of nodes), 
whilst the second results in a larger BDD size but an evaluation speed that is linear with the number of nodes. 
The first scheme groups variables from the same phase together, with arbitrary ordering within a group, and 
variables of a later phase behind those from earlier phases across groups. The second scheme groups variables 
of the same component together, with variables of an earlier phase behind those from later phases within each 
group, and arbitrary ordering across groups.   
Each component is modelled as an arbitrary, finite state, homogeneous continuous time Markov chain with a set 
of failed states and a set of working states, thus allowing components with multiple failure modes to be 
modelled at the component level.  
The n states for component c can be split into two sets, where states 1,2…,m are the operational states and states 
m+1,m+2,…,n are the failure mode states. An n by n matrix, 
)(CQ , can then be formed, where element (i, j) is 
the transition rate from state i to state j of component c. The method therefore models components with multiple 
operational as well as multiple failure states. The matrix can be partitioned into four matrices as shown in 
Equation 5.12, where 11Q  is an m by m matrix containing transitions from operational to operations states, and 
21Q , 12Q  and 22Q  contains transitions from failed to operational states, operational states to failed states and 
failed to failed states, respectively. 
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Transition matrix 
)(CP , shown in Equation 5.13, can then be formed by replacing 21Q  and 22Q  in 
)(CQ  by 
zeros matrices of the same size, thus the difference between 
)(CP  and )(CQ  is that )(CP  contains no transitions 
out of failed states (i.e. no repairs). 
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The matrix 
)(C
iE  where element (j, k) is the probability that component C ends phase i in state k given that it 
started the phase in state j can be found from the exponential of the matrix 
)(CQ , as shown by Equation 5.14. 
Matrix 
)(C
iU , where element (j, k) is the probability that component C ends phase i in state k given that it 
started the phase in state j and the component remained operational throughout the phase, is found from the 
exponential of matrix 
)(CP  and is given by Equation 5.15, where      is the m by m identity matrix.  
  
   
   
             5.14  
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Finally, matrix 
)(C
iD , where element (j, k) is the probability that component C ends phase i in state k given that 
it started the phase in state j and the component failed at some point during the phase, is found from matrices 
)(C
iE  and 
)(C
iU , as shown by Equation 5.16. 
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The state of component C in phase i is represented by a Boolean variable as shown by Equation 5.17, where a 
value of 1 for the variable indicates that component C fails at sometime during phase i, 0 indicates that 
component C is operational throughout phase i and x indicates that the status of component C during phase i 
doesn‟t matter.  
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The joint probability vector, where the k
th
 element is the probability that component C is in state k at the end of 
phase p given a set of mappings for the Boolean variables representing the state of C in phases 1 to p, is shown 
by Equation 5.18, where 
)(
0
Cv  is the initial probability vector for component C and )(CiX  is defined by 
Equation 5.19. 
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The joint probability can then be found from the joint probability vector, defined in Equation 5.18, through 
Equation 5.20, where 
T1  is a unit column vector of size m. 
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Wang and Trivedi present efficient algorithms for evaluating the probability of a BDD node from a BDD 
constructed using each of the Boolean variable ordering schemes. As states earlier, although the BDD resulting 
from the second ordering scheme is larger, it can be evaluated far more efficiently. The evaluation procedure for 
this ordering scheme will now be described.    
 
Figure 5.1 – BDD node G and its children, G1 and G0, labelled with their state probability vectors. 
Figure 5.1 shows node G from a BDD with its failure and success child, G1 and G0 respectively, labelled with 
their respective node variables x, y and z. Here x represents a variable from component c in phase i and 
therefore, due to the ordering scheme, variables y and z must either represent variables from a different 
component or from the same component and a lower phase.  The state probability vector
)(xw , where the kth 
element is the probability that the Boolean function G=1 and component c is in state k at the end of phase i, is 
cached in node G and calculated through Equation 5.21. 
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The state probability vector )1,1( 1  xGxp  in Equation 5.21 is calculated through Equation 5.22 if x and y 
both represent variables from component c in phases i and j respectively, where j<i due to the ordering, and 
through Equation 5.23 otherwise. 
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The state probability vector )1,0( 0  xGxp  in Equation 5.21 is calculated through Equation 5.22 if x and z 
both represent variables from component c in phases i and j respectively, where j<i due to the ordering, and 
through Equation 5.25 otherwise. 
)(
1
1
)()(
0 )1,0(
c
i
i
jk
c
k
z
x UEwGxp 







 



 if )()( zcpxcp  . 
5.24 
 
 Tzci
i
k
c
k
C
x wUEvGxp 1)1,0(
)()(
1
1
)()(
00 





 


  if )()( zcpxcp  . 
5.25 
 
The state probability vector for each node can be calculated through Equations 5.21 to 5.25, starting from the 
bottom of the BDD with the terminal one and terminal zero nodes, whose state probability vectors are (1,0,...,0) 
and (0,0,...,0) respectively. The probability of the top event from the fault tree is then given by the sum of the 
elements in the state probability vector from the root BDD node. For full descriptions of each of the algorithms, 
including pseudo code implementations, see Wang and Trivedi [48].  
Although modelled at the component level, at the structural level, multiple failure modes are not modelled, thus 
the occurrence of all failure modes are treated the same in the reliability structure. Due to this no advantage is 
gained from the detailed component failure modelling with the current structural model, although the authors 
intend to extend it to model multiple failure modes in future work.   
Analysing the reliability of a phased mission through this method results in much lower computational expense 
than through the Markov methods discussed earlier. However, due to the assumption that repaired components 
are only integrated at the end of a phase, it is only suitable for the analysis of phased missions where this is the 
case. 
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5.3 Markov Computation 
All techniques discussed in this literature review so far involve the use of Markov techniques. All the methods 
use the Markov technique to model the system except the method described in section 5.2 where it is used to 
model individual components. In this section the term states will be used to refer to the system or component 
states modelled by the Markov methods. The Markov techniques involve the solution of Equation 5.4 which 
describes the relationship between the probabilities that the system or component is in each state at an initial and 
some future time. The computational requirements for the solution of this equation in terms of both memory and 
processing power are discussed in this section. 
The memory requirements are largely governed by two factors: 
1. The order of the transition rate matrix - itself governed by the number of states represented. 
2. The proportion of non-zero elements in the matrix. 
The number of elements in the transition rate matrix, and therefore potentially the number of transition rates that 
must be stored in memory, increases with the square of the number of states represented. Fortunately, this 
matrix is usually sparse as direct transitions cannot occur between many pairs of states and this allows 
encodings that achieve greater storage efficiency to be used. A number of methods exist for computing the 
matrix exponential in Equation 5.4, whose exact value is given by a converging infinite power series, with 
varying degrees of complexity and accuracy, for more detail see Moler and Loan [49]. Iterative schemes for 
solving Equation 5.4 such as Runge-Kutta methods also exist, which compute the results by successive 
approximations using small time steps. These schemes rely on the choice of a time step that is small enough to 
give accurate results without being so small as to add unnecessary computational expense. Rauzy [50] discusses 
and compares several of these iterative schemes including advice on choosing a good time step value. The 
processing power required to compute a solution to Equation 5.4, i.e. the future state probability vector from the 
initial state probability vector and transition rate matrix, increases rapidly with the size of the transition rate 
matrix. For example, the computational resources required to calculate the exponential of an n x n matrix using 
the widely used Páde Approximation with scaling and squaring is O(n^3) [49]. Thus a 10 fold increase in the 
order of the transition rate matrix leads to the computational expense of its solution increasing by around 1000 
times. The overall computation requirements for the use of the Markov methods, particularly in terms of 
processing power but also in terms of memory, therefore grow substantially as the size of the transition rate 
matrix increases. 
5.4 Techniques for reducing computational expense 
The Markov modelling methods can suffer from an explosion in the size of the state when used to analyse large 
systems, resulting in models that are difficult to solve with the available computational resources for the reasons 
discussed in the previous section.  
Sharma and Bazovsky [51] give examples of techniques that can be used with the Markov techniques to reduce 
the size of system state spaces. Since these reduction methods only apply to system state Markov models, they 
are not applicable to the component state Markov models that appear in the method from Wang and Trivedi 
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discussed in section 5.2. The techniques involve forming truncated Markov models where the system states 
representing large number of component failures are omitted, thus reducing their size. The upper and lower 
bounds for mission unreliability can then be found from these reduced state space models. A special state is 
designated as the destination for failure transitions from states at the component failure count truncation 
threshold. Assuming that this state is a system working or failed state gives lower and upper bounds on the 
unreliability respectively. They also show that where possible, splitting the system fault tree into separate trees 
such that the individual trees are independent and components have the same inspection interval, allows the 
analysis to be carried out on a set of smaller Markov models. This is beneficial due to the reduction in the 
computational effort required to solve several smaller Markov models in comparison with a single but much 
larger model.  
5.5 Monte Carlo Simulation based methods 
Monte Carlo simulation has been used to analyse repairable phased missions and is particularly suited to 
modelling very large or complex systems with many dependencies, for which the Markov modelling methods 
are not suitable. 
Altshcul and Hagel [52] discuss the application of simulation to analyse phased missions through the phase fault 
trees.  
More recently, Chew, Dunnett and Andrews [53] developed a method to model repairable phased missions 
using a three layer stochastic Petri net and a Monte Carlo simulation solution scheme. The method can be used 
to model the reliability over maintenance free operating periods (MFOP). MFOP is a period or series of 
missions over which the system must be able to operate, free of restrictions or limitations, without maintenance. 
The three layers of the Petri Net consist of the Phase, Component and Master Petri nets, which interact with one 
another through arcs to form a single Petri net. The Phase Petri nets model the system reliability structure in 
terms of component failure combinations for each phase of the mission, the Component Petri nets model the 
failure and repair of each component including the modelling of dependencies between components, whilst the 
Master Petri net models phase sequence and progression. The inclusion of component dependencies and state 
dependant phase transitions allows complex phased mission scenarios to be modelled. Monte Carlo simulation 
is used as the solution technique to determine reliability metrics from the model. 
5.6 Summary and Conclusions 
A number of methods have been developed to analyse the reliability of repairable phased missions. It was found 
that the Markov modelling technique has been most widely used. Alam and Al-Saggaf developed a method 
using state transition rate matrices for each phase, which was further developed by Kim and Park to reduce the 
size of the state space, thus improving computational performance. Dugan developed a method using a single 
state transition rate matrix with phase varying transition rates, removing the need for state probability vectors to 
transfer between phases. The disadvantages with this approach are that it prevents phase by phase optimisations 
of state space size and requires the use of a numerical solution scheme. A further Markov approach using a 
single state transition rate matrix was introduced by Smotherman and Zemoudeh that is able to model additional 
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aspects of phased missions such as state specific phase transition rates. However, since the same component 
states in different phases are treated as different states in the Markov model, the resultant state space can be 
huge when large systems with many phases are modelled. Wang and Trivedi used the BDD technique in a 
method that can analyse certain repairable phased missions with very low computational expense. For missions 
where repaired components are integrated back into the system at the phase end times then this method is much 
more efficient than the approaches based on Markov models. Chew, Dunnet and Andrews developed an 
approach that uses a multi layer Petri net and Monte Carlo simulation to analyse system reliability in 
maintenance free operating periods (MFOP).  
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6 New Methods for the analysis of repairable phased 
missions 
6.1 Introduction 
The literature review showed that a variety of methods have been developed for analysing the reliability of 
repairable phased mission systems. Amongst those based on Markov modelling, the method from Kim and Park 
[45] is the most efficient. Only the method by Wang and Trivedi [48], which uses both Markov and BDD 
techniques, has lower computational expense. However all the methods have far higher computational expense 
than the methods developed for non-repairable phased missions, especially the Markov only methods as they 
suffer from huge state spaces when large systems are analysed. All the reviewed methods have restrictions on 
the type of system that can be analysed, for example the method by Kim and Park is limited to those containing 
single failure mode components whilst the method by Wang and Trivedi assumes repairs are integrated at phase 
end times.  
Due to the disadvantages of existing methods discussed above the research focus was on their modification and 
extension as well as using ideas developed in the field of non-repairable systems to create methods capable of 
analysing systems of the high complexity and large size often found in the real world. 
The research led to the development of the following five methods: 
1. An extension of the method from Kim and Park to the analysis of systems with multiple failure mode 
components. 
2. A BDD based method for identifying which system states are system failure states. 
3. An improved efficiency evaluation scheme for the BDD based method from Wang and Trivedi for 
repairable systems. 
4. A method for the efficient analysis of systems containing both repairable and non-repairable 
components and where repaired components are integrated back into the system at the end of a phase. 
5. A method for the efficient analysis of systems containing both repairable and non-repairable 
components where repaired components are reintegrated into the system immediately. 
6.2 Method for analysing missions with multiple failure mode 
components 
The Markov based repairable phased mission analysis method developed by Kim and Park [45] is the most 
efficient method for the analysis of repairable systems with immediate repair integration due to the phase by 
phase minimisation of the state space. However, that method is only described for systems containing single 
failure mode components and not those containing multiple failure mode components. An extension to the 
method that allows it to be used to analyse systems containing mutually exclusive failure mode components was 
therefore developed and is described in this section. Since many components have multiple failure modes, this 
method is applicable to a wider range of systems than the original from which it was extended. 
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Similar to the method from Kim and Park, the new method utilises the phase by phase state space optimisations 
to minimise computational expense. As shown in the literature review, this relies on the identification of the 
system states representing system failure. The analysis of multiple failure modes results in larger state spaces 
and the availability of an efficient method for this step is therefore particularly important for reducing 
computational expense. For this reason an efficient technique for performing this step has also been developed. 
The extension of Kim and Park‟s Markov method to systems containing multiple failure mode components and 
the efficient Markov state evaluation method are presented in the following sections. 
6.2.1 Extending the Markov method to systems with multiple failure 
mode components 
The method from Kim and Park, reviewed in section 5.1.1, is extended for the analysis of systems with multiple 
failure mode components in this section. Only small changes to some of the definitions are necessary due to the 
change in the state space size caused by multiple failure mode components, whilst the overall methodology 
remains unchanged. 
The first step is to determine the exhaustive set of Markov states that each represents a different system state, 
i.e. the set containing a state for every possible combination of states for the system‟s components. Since failure 
modes are mutually exclusive, no system state can have more than one failure mode from the same component 
present. The total number of Markov states,    , is therefore given by Equation 6.1, where    is the number of 
components represented in the phase fault trees for the mission to be analysed and      is the number of failure 
modes for component i. The equation shows that the size of the state space can increase very rapidly when the 
system contains components with many failure modes.  
             
  
 
 
6.1 
A msN  by msN  transition-rate matrix,  , is then formed containing the transition rates between these system 
states. The element at row i and column  j of  , ),( ji , for msNi ...1  and msNj ...1  and ji   is set to 
the rate of transition from state j to state i, ij , ,  as it was in the method from Alam and Al-Saggaf [44]and as 
was shown in Equation 5.1. 
Each element on the diagonal of  , ),( ii , for msNi 1 , is set to the negation of the sum of the other 
elements on column i and represents the transition rate out of state i, as shown in Equation 6.2. Again this is the 
same as in the method from Alam and Al-Saggaf but with a range of msNi 1  rather than C
N
i 21 . 
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The remainder of the method remains unchanged from Kim and Park, as was described in section 5.1.1, except 
for the use of a state probability vector for time t in phase k, )(tPk , of length msN  instead of 
CN2 . The initial 
state probability vector, )0(1P , used in the method will have a value of 1 for the element representing the state 
for the absence of any failure modes for all components and a value of 0 for all others. 
6.2.2 Using BDDs to identify system failure states 
In this section a method is presented that utilises the BDD technique to very efficiently determine whether a 
particular system state, i.e. set of component failure modes that are present, represents a failed or working 
system state in a particular phase. Such a method is required to form the correct reduced state transition rate 
matrix for a phase from the full state transition rate matrix but none is given by Kim and Park. Efficient state 
evaluation is critical to the methods overall efficiency since the number of system states that must be evaluated 
for each phase is C
N
2  in Kim and Park‟s method and msN  in the method given in section 6.2.1. For example, a 
system consisting of 10 components with 2 failure modes each and operating in a mission of 5 phases would 
require the evaluation of 295,245 system states. This efficiency is of even greater importance in the method for 
systems containing both repairable and non-repairable components, described later in section 6.4.2, where 
multiple reduced state matrices may need to be formed for the same phase. 
6.2.2.1 BDD Construction 
In this method, a separate BDD is constructed from each phase fault tree in order to evaluate whether the system 
is failed for each system state in that phase. These BDDs are constructed using the rules from Rauzy that assume 
node variable independence, given in section 2.5.4.3, except when computing the result of a logical operation 
between nodes with Boolean variables from different failure modes belonging to the same component. In that 
case rule 2 from Table 4.1 is used. An example fault tree is shown in Figure 6.1a and its BDD equivalent, 
constructed according to these rules, is shown in Figure 6.1b. 
 
Figure 6.1 – An example fault tree and its BDD. 
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6.2.2.2 Markov State Evaluation 
To evaluate the system status (working or failed) for a certain system state and phase, e.g. to evaluate if a 
particular Markov state in the method from Kim and Park can be removed from the state transition rate matrix, 
the BDD for that phase (constructed according to the rules given in the previous section) is used. The algorithm 
for checking whether the system is failed for a particular system state is very simple. The top node of the BDD 
is entered and the failure mode of its Boolean variable is checked against the set of component failure modes 
present in the system state. If the failure mode exists in the system state then the BDD node‟s failure child is 
evaluated against the system state next, otherwise it is the success child. This continues down the BDD until a 
terminal node is reached, the value of which indicates whether the system state being considered is a failed or 
working state in that phase. Specifically, reaching the BDDs terminal 1 node indicates that the system state 
represents system failure whilst reaching the terminal 0 node indicates that it represents system success. The key 
factor in the efficiency of this method is the systematic elimination of comparisons for failure modes that are 
non-critical to the system outcome due to the removal of nodes with isomorphic children during BDD 
construction. At each step in the process only a failure mode whose presence can influence the terminal node 
reached (i.e. whether or not the system state represents system failure) is checked, based on the outcome of the 
failure mode comparisons previously made in the higher nodes. The maximum number of evaluations required 
to determine the system status for any system state is therefore equal to the maximum depth of the BDD (i.e. the 
maximum number of nodes on any route through the BDD from the root to a terminal node). A pseudo code 
implementation of the evaluation procedure is shown below: 
evaluate_markov_state(ss, t_node): 
# ss is the system state to be evaluated. 
# t_node is the top node of the BDD used to evaluate the system state. 
# evaluate_markov_state(ss, t_node) returns true if the system state represents system failure based on the BDD,  
# and false otherwise. 
if t_node == terminal_one_node: 
 return true 
else if t_node == terminal_zero_node: 
 return false 
else if failure_mode(t_node) in ss: # evaluates to true if the variable of t_node belongs to a failure mode in ss  
 t_node = failure_child(t_node)  # sets t_node to its failure child. 
 return evaluate_markov_state(ss, t_node)  
else: 
 t_node = success_child(t_node) # sets t_node to its success child. 
 return evaluate_markov_state(ss, t_node) 
 
For example, the system state representing the occurrence of failure mode 1 of component A would enter the top 
node of the BDD shown in Figure 6.1b where the presence of failure mode 1 of component B would be checked, 
since this is the variable for the top node. Since it is not present the traversal would continue to the success son, 
which in this case is the terminal 0 node, thus indicating that the system state represents system success. 
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6.2.3 Summary 
Kim and Park‟s Markov based method for analysing repairable systems is limited to the analysis of single 
failure mode component systems and requires the classification of component state combinations into the 
system state they represent. No method for this had been previously described. The methods described in this 
section: 
 Extend that method to the analysis of systems with multiples failure mode components.  
 Efficiently determine which component state combinations represent system failure states. 
They have therefore extended the range of systems that can be analysed using these Markov based methods and 
provide an efficient algorithm to be used as part of their implementation. 
6.3 Improved Evaluation Efficiency in Wang and Trivedi BDD 
method  
The method presented in this section is an alternative to the BDD probability evaluation algorithm given by 
Wang and Trivedi [48] in their method discussed in section 5.2. This new evaluation procedure results in 
improved computational efficiency and therefore faster evaluations. The feasibility of applying a phased mission 
reliability evaluation technique to certain types of analysis, such as real time or importance measure, is 
dependent on its computational expense. If the technique has high computational expense, then the time taken to 
compute results from the analysis will be too great, particularly when large or complicated phased missions are 
analysed. Improvements in efficiency to existing techniques, such as those introduced in this section, are 
therefore useful in those contexts. 
Two sources of inefficiency were identified in the algorithm given by Wang and Trivedi and these will now be 
explained. A BDD node can, and often does, have multiple parents in a BDD (due to the BDD‟s sharing of 
isomorphic sub graphs property) and more than one of those parent nodes may have a variable belonging to a 
different component than its variable. Since, in the probability calculation method given by Wang and Trivedi, 
the probability vector from a child node, 
)( yw  or )( zw , is summed in the parent node, if the nodes have 
variables belonging to different components then there is an inefficiency as the same vector may be summed 
multiple times. This inefficiency occurs each time the probability of the BDD is evaluated. The second 
inefficiency, which occurs only on repeat probability evaluation of the same BDD, is the repetition of the 
comparisons between the component of the node‟s variable and that of its failure and success children. The two 
inefficiencies identified represent only a small proportion of the overall computation in the method since the 
computation of the matrix exponentials has higher relative expense. However, even small decreases in the 
probability calculation time due to increased efficiency are valuable in applications such as real time analysis. 
Research into the evaluation procedure led to the development of a new method that removes the identified 
inefficiencies. The changes involve the processing and conversion of the BDD into a different data structure and 
an evaluation procedure that operates on that new data structure instead of the BDD. The source of the improved 
efficiency is the avoidance of the repetition of processing that is performed during the BDD evaluation in the 
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original method. Instead that processing is performed just a single time during the conversion from BDD to the 
new data structure. The new data structure created is similar to the Implicant Tree data structure that was 
discussed in section 4.2.2.2 and is named the Repairable Implicant Tree. The maximum benefits in terms of 
increased efficiency are seen when the Repairable Implicant Tree is used to re-evaluate the probability of the 
same reliability structure, e.g. during real time or importance measure analysis. 
Other than the BDD probability evaluation, the rest of the method (such as BDD construction) remains the same 
as given by Wang and Trivedi. 
6.3.1 BDD Evaluation through Repairable Implicant Tree 
In this section the details of the Repairable Implicant Tree data structure, its construction from the BDD and its 
probability evaluation are explained. As with the non-repairable Implicant Tree, a node in the structure 
represents a set of mutually exclusive implicants whose probability can be calculated from the probability of the 
node‟s event and the probabilities of its immediate child nodes. 
6.3.1.1 Structure 
The Repairable Implicant Tree consists of two types of node, named Event nodes and Terminal nodes, which are 
described in this section. 
Event Node 
An Event node represents an ite node from the BDD. Unlike an ite node, the edges to its child nodes can be of 
one of two types, named a Vector edge and an Absolute Value edge, the significance of which is explained in 
section 6.3.1.2. 
Terminal Node 
A Terminal node represents a terminal one or terminal zero node from the BDD. 
6.3.1.2 Construction 
This section explains the construction of the Repairable Implicant Tree from a BDD that was constructed 
assuming node variable independence and using the second ordering scheme given by Wang and Trivedi. The 
construction process eliminates the need to compare node variables on repeat evaluations and limits the 
summing of a probability vector to a single time on each evaluation. By using the two types of edge there is no 
need to determine whether the child node belongs to the same component or not during repeat evaluations, that 
knowledge is built directly into the data structure during its construction.  
The Repairable Implicant Tree for a particular BDD node, defined as Repairable Implicant Tree R, is formed 
through the procedure outlined below:   
If the BDD node is a terminal one or terminal zero node, then R is the corresponding terminal node since they 
represent the certain and impossible events respectively. Otherwise the BDD node must be an ite node. 
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 R is formed from steps a, b, c and d described below: 
a. The set of implicants represented by an ite node is a combination of the set of implicants represented 
by its child node combined (through a logical AND) with the failure and success events for the ite 
node‟s variable. The first step is therefore to form the Implicant Tree nodes representing the child BDD 
nodes, which are defined as Repairable Implicant Trees U and V respectively. U and V are also formed 
from the procedure outlined here and this is therefore a recursive process that ends at the terminal 
nodes of the BDD. 
b. Create an Event Node to represent the ite BDD node.  This has an edge to each of the child Implicant 
Tree nodes, U and V, which were created in step a). Unlike the BDD ite nodes which have only one 
type of edge, here the type of each edge varies depending on the component of the child node‟s 
variable to which it links. The node therefore holds additional information on its relationship with its 
child node, allowing higher evaluation efficiency. For each of the child nodes: 
 If its variable belongs to the same component as the ite node, component C, then it is 
connected via a Vector edge since this node‟s probability calculation will then require the 
probability vector from the child node.  
 Otherwise it is connected by an Absolute Value edge, including when it is a terminal node, 
since this node‟s probability calculation will only require the sum of the probability vector 
from the child node. 
In steps c and d the failure and success event probability matrices are calculated and stored in the node. These 
are later used in the evaluation procedure, together with the child node probabilities, to determine the probability 
for this node. 
c. Calculate the failure event probability matrix, 
)(
,
c
imX , given by Equation 6.3, where i is the phase of the 
BDD node‟s variable, m is the phase of the BDD node‟s failure son‟s variable if it also belongs to 
component C or 0 otherwise, and 
)(c
kE  and 
)(c
iD  are as defined in Equation 5.19. Element (p,q) of 
)(
,
c
imX  is the probability that component C ends phase i in state q given it ended phase m in state p and 
the component fails in phase i. Thus, the probability of component C ending phase i in each of its states 
given it fails in phase i can be calculated from this matrix together with the probability vector or value 
obtained from Implicant Tree node U during evaluation. 
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6.3 
d. Calculate the success event probability matrix, 
)(
,
c
inY , given by Equation 6.4, where i is the phase of the 
BDD node‟s variable, n is the phase of the BDD node‟s success son‟s variable if it also belongs to 
component C or 0 otherwise, and 
)(c
kE  and 
)(c
iU  are as defined in Equation 5.19. Element (p,q) of 
)(
,
c
inY  is the probability that component C ends phase i in state q given it ended phase n in state p and 
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the component does not fail in phase i. Thus, the probability of component C ending phase i in each of 
it states given that it works throughout phase i can be calculated from this matrix together with the 
probability vector or value obtained from Implicant Tree node V during evaluation. 
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6.4 
 
 
An ite BDD node whose variable belongs to component C in phase i is therefore represented by the Repairable 
Event Node shown in Figure 6.2.  
 
Figure 6.2 – Diagram showing the Event Node representation of a BDD ite node whose variable belongs to 
component C in phase i. 
Since the failure and success event matrices calculated in steps c and d depend on the failure and repair rates for 
component C between phase i and phase k and the durations of those phases, the matrices must be updated if any 
of those variables change between evaluations. Note that only the affected matrices would need to be updated, 
whilst the others would remain constant; it is for this reason that the matrices are pre-computed during 
construction rather than during the execution of the evaluation procedure. 
6.3.1.3 Evaluation  
With the Implicant Tree data structure constructed it remains to specify the evaluation procedure used to 
quantify the probability. Due to the properties of that data structure many of the tasks that are normally 
performed when evaluating directly from the BDD, such as comparing node variables, have been eliminated. 
The evaluation is a recursive process that requires the calculation of a state probability vector and absolute 
probability value for each node in the Implicant Tree. It is initiated at the root node and commences in a bottom 
up manner with the probability of a terminal node evaluated first. The overall probability for the Implicant Tree 
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Failure event probability matrix: 
Success event probability matrix: 
Implicant Tree Node V 
representing ite node‟s 
success child. 
Implicant Tree Node U 
representing ite node‟s 
failure child. 
Vector edge if child is an Event 
DIAG node with a variable 
belonging to component c. 
Value edge if child is not an Event 
Node with a variable belonging to 
component c. 
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data structure, and hence the BDD from which it was constructed, is then given by the absolute probability value 
of its root node. 
A description of the evaluation procedure will now be given: 
The process for calculating for an Event Node is given by steps a and b below, whilst for a Terminal Node it is 
given by step c: 
a. Obtain state probability vectors from node U, the failure child, and node V, the success child. If the 
child is connected with an Absolute Value edge then its absolute probability value is obtained and 
converted into a state probability vector, childw , through Equation 6.5, where 
)(
0
Cv  is the initial state 
probability vector for component C, the component to which the Event Node belongs, and Pchild is the 
probability of the child node. If it is instead connected with a Vector edge then its state probability 
vector, childw , is obtained directly. The state probability vectors for child nodes U and V will be 
referred to as          and          respectively. Note that no node variable comparisons take place in 
this step, unlike Wang and Trivedi‟s procedure where the node‟s variable is compared to each child 
node‟s during each evaluation. 
child
C
child Pvw 
)(
0  6.5 
 
b. The state probability vector for the Event Node, w , is then calculated through Equation  6.6 using the 
state probability vectors obtained in step a and event probability matrices 
)(
,
c
imX  and 
)(
,
c
inY  that were 
computed during the construction process. The absolute probability value is then calculated as the sum 
of the elements of vector w. Both the state probability vector and absolute values are cached within the 
node after calculation, ensuring that multiple parent nodes can use them without recalculation. This 
avoids the repeated summing of the state probability vector in the parent nodes where a child node is 
shared due to merging of isomorphic sub graphs during BDD construction. 
success
c
infailure
c
im wYwXw 
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,
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c. The probability evaluation procedure for a terminal node simply returns the absolute value of 1 if it is a 
terminal one node or 0 if it is a terminal zero node, since they represent the certain and impossible 
events respectively. 
When the Implicant Tree is re-evaluated then the cached values that were calculated in b above must be cleared 
and the evaluation procedure repeated. 
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6.3.2 Summary 
Research discovered certain repeated calculations and node variable comparisons in Wang and Trivedi‟s phased 
mission repairable system analysis method that could be removed in order to boost efficiency. This involved the 
use of a new data structure and evaluation procedure that has efficiency advantages over the original method. It 
is particularly optimised for the case of repeat probability evaluations of the same reliability structure, such as 
those required in the case of real time analysis. 
6.4 A method for analysing repairable phased mission systems that 
contain some non-repairable components 
No research into methods for the analysis of phased mission systems containing both repairable and non-
repairable components was found in the literature. Only methods where all components are considered to be 
either non-repairable or repairable have been developed. This meant that mixed systems had to be analysed 
through methods developed for repairable phased missions with the repair rate set to zero for the non-repairable 
components. However this approach is not ideal since the repairable methods have far higher computational 
expense than the non-repairable methods due to the additional complexities that repair modelling introduces. 
Due to this, research was carried out into the development of methods that could analyse systems containing 
both types of component more effectively. These methods combine the strengths and developments from both 
non-repairable and repairable system reliability analysis and are presented in this section. 
6.4.1 End of phase repaired component integration method 
The method developed in this section can be used to analyse the probability of any phased mission fault tree for 
a system with both repairable and non-repairable components. It assumes that repaired components are 
integrated back into the system at the end of the phase in which their repair is completed (for example if a repair 
commences in phase 1 and is completed at some point during phase 3, then it will be reintegrated into the 
system at the end of phase 3 and ready for the start of phase 4). It also assumes that only the working and failed 
states of the repairable components (and not individual failure modes) are represented in the system‟s reliability 
structure. For the non-repairable components, mutually exclusive failure modes are fully modelled, at both the 
component and system reliability levels. The method is based upon the methods developed for non-repairable 
phased missions in chapter 4 and for repairable phased missions by Wang and Trivedi in [48], covered in section 
5.2 of the literature review, both of which use the BDD technique. It results in a single BDD that represents the 
Boolean function for the system‟s reliability structure from which mission unreliability and phase failure 
probabilities can be calculated at low computational expense.  
6.4.1.1 Construction of the BDD 
The phased mission fault tree to be analysed is first transformed into a BDD. The BDD formed in this method 
isolates the non-repairable and repairable parts of the systems such that the children of nodes in the BDD with 
variables belonging to repairable components have variables belonging only to repairable components. To 
ensure this is the case, the BDD variables are ordered according to the following hierarchy: non-repairable 
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components < repairable components, ordered by component, ordered by failure mode (only represented in node 
variables for non-repairable components) and backward phase ordering (higher phase < lower phase), where x<y 
signifies that x appears higher than y in the BDD. For example, a system with repairable components A and B, 
and non-repairable two failure mode components C and D, when operating in a two phased mission could have 
its Boolean variables ordered as follows: C1(0,2) < C1(0,1) < D2(0,2) < D2(0,1) < A(0,2) < A(0,1) < B(0,2) < 
B(0,1). 
The BDD is then built using the non-repairable method developed in Chapter 4. For the Boolean operations 
between nodes, the rules from Table 4.1 are used except when both nodes have variables belonging to repairable 
components. In that case, the Boolean operations that assume variable independence are instead used, as 
described in section 2.5.4.3.  
6.4.1.2 BDD Evaluation through Implicant Tree 
The probability evaluation process that gives the probability of the BDD is described in this section. The BDD is 
first converted into an Implicant Tree data structure and the probability evaluation is then performed on this.  
As with the Implicant Tree data structures for a non-repairable BDD described in section 4.2.2.2 and a 
repairable BDD described in section 6.3.1, the Implicant Tree consists of a single root node, a single terminal 
node and a set of intermediate nodes. In this case the intermediate nodes consist of both the types described in 
section 4.2.2.2 and those described in section 6.3.1.1. Nodes in the BDD belonging to non-repairable and 
repairable components are converted into their Implicant Tree equivalents using the construction methods given 
in sections 4.2.2.2. and 6.3.1.2 respectively and evaluated through the rules given in sections 4.2.2.2 and 6.3.1.3 
respectively. 
6.4.1.3 Computational Advantage 
Compared to using the BDD method from Wang and Trivedi to analyse the mission reliability of a system 
containing both repairable and non-repairable components, the method described above has much lower 
computational expense. The two sources of the computational advantage are described in this section. 
6.4.1.4 Smaller and optimised BDD 
The upper parts of the BDD, consisting of nodes with variables belonging to non-repairable components, are 
minimised using the BDD construction algorithm developed for non-repairable systems that was described in 
Chapter 4. In contrast, the lower parts of the BDD, consisting of nodes with variables belonging to repairable 
components, are constructed assuming variable independence since the dependencies from repair prevent the 
minimisations from being applied. If the repairable method from Wang and Trivedi were used, the complete 
BDD would be constructed assuming variable independence resulting in a far larger BDD when many of the 
components in the system modelled are non-repairable. To demonstrate this, the BDDs for the phased mission 
shown in Figure 6.3, which contains both a repairable and a non-repairable component, produced from each of 
the methods are shown in Figure 6.4. Figure 6.4a shows the BDD produced from the method for repairable 
systems by Wang and Trivedi, and contains 8 ite nodes. Figure 6.4b shows the BDD produced from the method 
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introduced in this section which contains just 3 ite nodes, a reduction of over 60%. These reductions in size 
contribute to the increased computational efficiency. 
 
Figure 6.3 – Three phased mission for system with non-repairable component A and repairable 
component B. 
 
 
Figure 6.4 - a) BDD from Wang and Trivedi method. b) BDD from method optimised for systems 
containing both repairable and non-repairable components. 
Faster evaluation 
Unlike the Markov based methods that model system states, the Markov modelling of components in Wang and 
Trivedi‟s method does not suffer from the same huge computational expense caused by large transition rate 
matrices that was discussed in section 5.3, since the state spaces are generally far smaller. However, the use of 
the Markov technique to model any non-repairable components still adds unnecessary expense to the evaluation 
of the path probabilities compared to finding their failure probabilities directly from their failure distribution 
equations. In comparison, the new method, by modelling both repairable and non-repairable components in their 
optimal ways, considerably reduces the computational expense involved in evaluation when the system contains 
non-repairable components. For example, consider the evaluation of the parts of the paths containing non-
repairable component A within the BDDs shown in Figure 6.4. The evaluation of the BDD shown in Figure 6.4a 
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with Wang and Trivedi‟s method involves the evaluation of 8 matrix exponentials and several matrix products, 
whereas the evaluation of the BDD in Figure 6.4b with the new method requires only the solution of a single 
simple equation for the exponential probability distribution. 
6.4.1.5 Summary 
A new method for the analysis of phased mission systems with both repairable and non-repairable components 
has been introduced. This new method has two advantages over the BDD method for repairable systems by 
Wang and Trivedi when systems containing both repairable and non-repairable components are analysed. The 
first advantage is that it has far lower computational expense, the magnitude of which becomes greater with 
higher proportions of non-repairable components. The second advantage is that it allows multiple failure mode 
components to be modelled at the system level for the non-repairable components, thus broadening the range of 
systems that can be analysed. Compared to the purely Markov modelling based methods, such as the method by 
Kim and Park [45], this BDD based method has far greater efficiency although it assumes that repaired 
components are integrated back into the system at the end of the phase rather than immediately. 
6.4.2 Method for repairable components with multiple failure modes 
The method introduced in this section is again suited to the analysis of the mission reliability of a phased 
mission system that has both non-repairable and repairable components. Unlike the method described in the 
previous section, it can model multiple component failure modes at the system level for both component types. 
It also differs in that it assumes that repaired components are integrated back into the system immediately rather 
than at the end of the phase in which their repair is completed. The method gives an upper bound for the mission 
unreliability and is therefore best suited to analysis where both: 
a. The system is too large to model using one of the techniques that give exact results. 
b. A conservative estimate of the mission reliability is all that is needed, e.g. to determine whether the 
mission is within certain unreliability constraints. 
6.4.2.1 BDD Construction 
The phased mission fault tree to be analysed, which for this method is limited to the mission fault tree 
describing failure at any point in the mission (i.e. an OR top gate with inputs of the phase fault trees), is first 
converted into a BDD like structure.  
Node Types 
A non-repairable ite BDD node has a failure child, a success child and a variable belonging to a component, 
failure mode and phase. A repairable ite BDD node has a failure child, a success child and a variable belonging 
to a component and failure mode. In addition to these standard non-repairable and repairable ite nodes, the 
structure also contains a special type of node named the Repairable Transition node. This is used to mark the 
transition in the structure between nodes with variables belonging to non-repairable and repairable components. 
The edges out of a Repairable Transition node, of which there can be 1 to m, where m is the number of phases in 
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the mission, are labelled with a phase number. The presence of this node type means that the structure is not 
strictly a BDD as some non-terminal nodes do not represent a binary decision. 
Phase Fault Tree Basic Event to BDD node Conversion 
A basic event for failure mode j of component I in the phase k fault tree is converted into the ite node shown in 
Figure 6.5a if component I is non-repairable or as shown in Figure 6.5b if it is repairable. As shown in Figure 
6.5b, a basic event for a repairable component is represented by a Repairable Transition node with an ite node 
child, whose variable belongs to the failure mode and component of the basic event, linked by an edge labelled 
with the phase of the basic event.  
 
Figure 6.5 – BDD representations of basic events for non-repairable and repairable components. 
Node Ordering Scheme 
In this method the ordering scheme first orders nodes with variables belonging to non-repairable components < 
Repairable Transition nodes. There are then separate ordering schemes for ordering between node variables 
belonging to non-repairable components and between variables belonging to repairable components. Variables 
belonging to non-repairable components are ordered through the scheme given in section 4.2.1.1 whilst 
variables belonging to repairable components are ordered by component and then by failure mode (the 
difference is therefore that the phase of a variable belonging to a repairable component is not used). 
Boolean computations between nodes 
The computation of the result from a Boolean operation between two non-terminal nodes can be classified into 
one of the four cases listed below: 
1. Between two non-repairable ite nodes.  
2. Between non-repairable node and Repairable Transition node. 
3. Between two Repairable Transition nodes. 
4. Between two ite repairable nodes. 
The rules given in section 4.2.1.2 are used to determine the result of the computation in cases 1 and 2.  
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Case 3, can be split into two sub cases:  
a. Computation between Repairable Transition nodes that each has a single child node linked with an 
edge belonging to the same phase.  
b. Computation between Repairable Transition nodes with child nodes linked with edges belonging to 
distinct phases. This is always a Boolean OR due to the restriction on only analysing phased mission 
fault trees representing mission failure.  
For case 3a, the computation results in a new Repairable Transition node that has a child node, linked by an 
edge with the same phase as the edges from the input nodes, formed from the result of the Boolean operation 
between the child repairable ite nodes of the input nodes (see case 4 below). In case 3b the computation results 
in a new Repairable Transition node whose children are the union of the children from the two input nodes.  
For case 4, the result is computed using the rules given in section 6.2.2.1. 
For systems containing both repairable and non-repairable components this will result in a BDD like structure 
where the higher nodes are composed like a non-repairable BDD and then may make the transition, through a 
Repairable Transition node, into a set of phase repairable BDDs before the terminal nodes are reached.  
BDD Minimisation 
The set of mutually exclusive event combinations for non-repairable components represented by the paths from 
the top node to a Repairable Transition node, are a set of combinations for which the repairable component 
states that cause system failure in each phase are the same. These repairable component states are represented, 
for each phase, by the phase BDDs under the Repairable Transition node. Each of those phase BDDs contains 
only nodes with variables from repairable components whose states can affect the outcome of the mission, given 
that one of the mutually exclusive non-repairable event combinations occurs. This also means that a BDD for a 
certain phase will not be present under the repairable transition node if, based on the occurrence of one of the 
non-repairable component event combinations, failure cannot occur in that phase. The number of repairable 
transition nodes and the size of the phase by phase BDDs under each of them are therefore minimised by 
accounting for the relationship between the phase states of the non-repairable components, the phase states of 
the repairable components and the outcome of the mission. 
Example BDD 
The BDD for the example phased mission fault tree from Figure 4.10 is shown and annotated in Figure 6.6. In 
this mission components D, E and F are repairable. The BDD in Figure 6.6 was formed using an ordering 
scheme that ordered components as B < A < C < D < E < F and ordered failure modes as 2 < 1. 
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Figure 6.6 – BDD for phased mission fault tree from Figure 4.10 constructed through method given in 
section 6.4.2.1. 
 
6.4.2.2 BDD Probability Evaluation 
The BDD evaluation procedure used in this method gives an upper bound for the unreliability of the phased 
mission. 
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The first step in the probability evaluation is to evaluate the probability for each of the Repairable Transition 
nodes in the BDD. The probability of a Repairable Transition node is calculated through steps a, b and c given 
below: 
a. A state transition rate matrix is formed, using the method described in section 6.2.1, for the 
components that appear in the variables of any of its child node BDDs. 
b. For each of its child nodes, form a reduced state transition rate matrix for the phase indicated by the 
label of the connecting edge. This is formed from the full matrix obtained in step a and the child node 
BDD using the method described in section 6.2.2. 
c. Evaluate the probability that the mission fails, given that one of the non-repairable event combinations 
represented by a path to the node occurs, through the method described in section 6.2.1. In that method, 
the reduced state transition rate matrices derived in step b are used for the phases with a phase edge out 
of the node, the full state transition rate matrix derived in step a are used for any phases that do not 
have a phase edge out of the node but are earlier than the last phase for which a phase edge does exist, 
and an initial state probability vector is used that assumes that all components are working at the start 
of the mission.  
The terminal nodes and ite nodes with variables belonging to non-repairable components are then converted into 
an Implicant Tree data structure using the method described in section 4.2.2.2, with each Repairable Transition 
node that is a child of an Event Node in the Implicant Tree data structure given the probability calculated 
through the procedure outlined above. The probability evaluated for the top node of the Implicant Tree then 
gives the upper bound on the unreliability of the phased mission.  
Due to the manner in which the evaluation procedure links the non-repairable and repairable component events 
through the Repairable Transition nodes, it essentially treats all failures of the non-repairable components in a 
phase as occurring at the start of that phase when determining the mission outcomes for the repairable 
component events. This is because part of the evaluation procedure uses methods optimised for non-repairable 
systems and the time at which a failure occurs during a phase does not affect the outcome of a mission in non-
repairable systems – only the phase is important. Since earlier failure of a non-repairable component cannot 
decrease the probability of mission failure, but may increase it, this causes the method to give an upper bound 
on the mission unreliability. Due to the source of the estimation error, its size decreases with: 
 Increasing numbers of phases 
 Fewer phases fault trees containing both non-repairable and repairable components 
 In phases fault trees containing both non-repairable and repairable components – lower proportions 
of failure modes containing both non-repairable and repairable components 
 In phase failure modes containing both non-repairable and repairable components - lower 
proportions of non-repairable components 
 Fewer non-repairable components with failure rates that increase with age 
For most systems of the type and complexity found in the real world, the error will be small and since the 
estimate is conservative it may be used to show that a system‟s reliability is within a certain desired level. Three 
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phased missions containing both non-repairable and repairable components and whose component failure and 
repair rates are shown in Table 6.1 will now be used as examples. In the example phased mission shown in 
Figure 6.7, the method gives an estimated unreliability of 0.054 compared to the true value of 0.041 calculated 
through the method by Kim and Park, an overestimate of 32%. The source of the error can be seen in its BDD 
that is shown in Figure 6.8. In that BDD, the probability of system failure is the probability that component B is 
failed at some point during phase 1 and component A also fails in that phase (as shown by the path from the 
BDD root to terminal one node), whereas the exact probability is the probability that B is failed at some point in 
phase 1 after A has failed in that phase – i.e. the error is the probability that B is failed and repaired during phase 
1 and A fails after its last repair. In the example phased missions shown in Figure 6.9 and Figure 6.10, the 
method gives the exact answers. 
Table 6.1 - Failure and repair rates for the components in the phased mission shown in Figure 6.7, Figure 
6.9 and Figure 6.10. 
Component Failure Rate Repair Rate 
A 0.001 0 (non-repairable) 
B 0.01 0.01 
C 0.01 0.01 
 
Phase 1
BA
 
Figure 6.7 – Example phased mission for which method given mission unreliability upper bound. 
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Figure 6.8 – BDD for phased mission fault tree in Figure 6.7.  
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Figure 6.9 – Example phased mission for which method gives exact mission unreliability. 
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Figure 6.10 – Example phased mission for which method gives exact mission unreliability. 
6.4.2.3 Software implementation and a worked example 
A software tool has been developed that implements the method described above. The inputs to the tool are the 
phase fault trees and the failure and repair models for each component failure mode. This tool has been used to 
Repairable 
A(0,1) 
1 
B 
0 
1 
1 
0 
0 
1 
126 
 
analyse the example phased mission that is represented by the phased mission fault tree shown in Figure 4.10, 
where components D, E and F are repairable and each have a repair rate of 0.01 repairs per hour.  
The BDD generated by the software is shown in Figure 6.6. It contains a total of 3 Repairable Transition nodes 
and its evaluation therefore requires the solution of 3 Markov models. Each of these Markov models is small, 
the largest consisting of three components (D, F and E) over two phases (2 and 3).  
A worked example of the evaluation of the BDD paths that include the Repairable Transition node on the right 
in Figure 6.6, will now be described. As shown in Figure 6.6, the Repairable Transition node on the right 
describes the conditions in phase 2 for the two failure modes, D1 and F1, which determine whether the mission 
fails in that phase given the states of the non-repairable components indicated by the paths to that node. 
Following the procedure given in section 6.4.2.2, the first step in evaluating the probability for that node is to 
determine the full state transition rate matrix that includes components D and F, the components present in the 
variables of its child BDDs. The system states to be represented in that matrix are shown in Table 6.2, the 
Markov model showing the possible transitions between those states is shown in Figure 6.11 and the state 
indexes for the set of system states in each of the mission phases are given in Table 6.3. 
Table 6.2 – System states for the repairable components from the BDD on the right in Figure 6.6. 
 Failure Modes (1=Present, 0=Absent) 
State IDs D1 D2 F1 F2 
1 0 0 0 0 
2 1 0 0 0 
3 0 1 0 0 
4 0 0 1 0 
5 0 0 0 1 
6 1 0 1 0 
7 1 0 0 1 
8 0 1 1 0 
9 0 1 0 1 
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State Label Present Failure Modes 
1 None 
2 D1 
3 D2 
4 F1 
5 F2 
6 D1, F1 
7 D1, F2 
8 D2, F1 
9 D2, F2 
 
 
Figure 6.11 – Markov model for the repairable BDD on the right in Figure 6.6. 
Table 6.3 – State indexes for each system state from Table 6.2 in the state transition matrices for phases 1 
and 2 of the mission. 
State IDs Phase 1 State Index Phase 2 State Index 
1 1 1 
2 2 System Failed State 
3 3 2 
4 4 System Failed State 
5 5 3 
6 6 System Failed State 
7 7 System Failed State 
8 8 System Failed State 
9 9 4 
 
1 
2 6 
5 
3 
4 
9 
7 
8 
A B = transition from 
state A to state B 
where 
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At the start of the mission it is assumed that all components are in the working state, thus the probability of the 
system residing in state 1 from Table 6.2 at that time is 1 and the probability of the system residing in any other 
state is 0. This results in the state probability vector for the start of phase 1 shown in Equation 6.7, where the ith 
element represents the probability of being in the ith state. 
 TP 000000001)0(1   6.7 
The Repairable Transition node has no edge labelled for phase 1 and therefore the full transition matrix is used 
to find the state probability vector at the end of phase 1. This matrix is shown in Equation 6.8, where element 
(i,j), ji  , represents the transition rate from state j to state i, and element (i,i) represents the transition rate out 
of the state i . 
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


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

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02.0000001.00001.000
002.0000001.0001.000
0002.00001.000001.00
00002.00001.00001.00
01.0001.00012.0000001.0
001.0001.00012.000001.0
01.001.00000012.00001.0
0001.001.0000012.0001.0
000001.001.001.001.0004.0
1  
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Substituting the initial state probability vector and state transition rate matrix for phase 1 into Equation 5.4, 
along with the phase duration of 100 hours, gives the state probability vector for the end of phase 1 shown in 
Equation 6.9, where the ith element represents the probability of being in the ith state. 
 
 
6.9 
 
For phase 2, the BDD for the phase 2 edge out of the Repairable Transition node shows that the system fails if 
component D is failed in failure mode 1 or component F is failed in failure mode 1. Thus, only states 1, 3, 5 and 
9 from Table 6.2 represent system working states in phase 2. Only the elements representing these working 
states from the end of the phase 1 state probability vector are used to form the initial state probability vector for 
phase 2, as shown in Equation 6.10, where the ith element represents the probability of being in the ith state. 
 TP 003391.005145.005145.07806.0)0(2   6.10 
The elements from the end of phase 1 state probability vector that represent system failure states in phase 2, i.e. 
states 2, 4, 6, 7 and 8, are summed to give the probability of failure on transition to phase 2 of 0.1131. The 
reduced state transition rate matrix is then formed by removing from the full state transition rate matrix, 
05145.005145.005145.07806.0[)100(1 P
]003391.0003391.0003391.0003391.005145.0
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Equation 6.8, all elements that represent transitions from, and to, phase 2 system failure states. The resultant 
reduced state transition rate matrix is shown in Equation  6.11 and the indexes for those states are given in Table 
6.3.  
















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02.0001.0001.00
01.0012.00001.0
01.00012.0001.0
0.001.001.0004.0
2  
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Substituting the initial state probability vector and state transition rate matrix for phase 2 into Equation 5.4, 
along with the phase duration of 100 hours, gives the state probability vector for the end of phase 2 shown in 
Equation 6.12.  
 TP 005399.005769.005769.06164.0)100(2   6.12 
Since no further phases have edges out of the Repairable Transition node, deducting the sum of the elements in 
this state probability vector from 1 gives the probability value for this node as 0.2628. 
 
Figure 6.12 – Part of Implicant Tree data structure from BDD shown in Figure 6.6. 
 
The BDD in Figure 6.6 shows that there are two possible paths from the top node to the Repairable Transition 
node shown on the right of Figure 6.6. The Implicant Tree data structure representation of these paths is shown 
in Figure 6.12. The probability of the Implicant Tree data structure if the probability for the Repairable 
Transition node were to have a value of 1, using the Implicant Tree evaluation procedure given in section 
6.4.2.2, is 0.03244. Multiplying this with the probability of the Repairable Transition node that was calculated 
earlier gives the total contribution to mission unreliability from the Implicant Tree structure shown in Figure 
6.12 as 0.00853. 
C1(0,3)=0∧C2(0,3)=0
A2(0,2)=1
B1(0,1)=1 B1(0,1)=0∧B2(0,2)=0
+
Rightmost Repairable 
Transition node from 
Figure 9.10
Summing 
Node
Event
Node
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6.4.2.4 Lower computation expense than alternatives 
The exact mission unreliability for a repairable phased mission can be calculated through the method extended 
from Kim and Park given in section 6.2, assuming no computational errors are introduced in the evaluation of 
the matrix exponentials. The difference in computational expense between calculating the mission unreliability 
through that method and the upper bound value given by this new method, using the example mission to 
demonstrate, will now be discussed. The system in the example has 6 components, each with two failure modes, 
therefore the order of the full state transition rate matrix for the example mission, calculated through Equation 
6.1, is 729. From this the three reduced state phase transition rate matrices are formed by removing the states 
that represent system failure. The largest of the resultant reduced state transition rate matrices, those for phases 1 
and 3, are of order 675 since 54 of the states from the full matrix in each of these phases represent system failed 
states and can be removed. For example, in phase 1, the system failure states are all system states where 
component A is failed in failure mode 1, component B is failed in failure mode 1 and component C is failed in 
any failure mode. In comparison, the approximate solution requires the calculation of the exponential of 8 much 
smaller matrices, between order 4 and order 27. Since evaluating a matrix exponential is typically an O(n^3) 
calculation, evaluating the matrix exponential of 8 matrices where      is far more efficient than the solution 
of 3 matrices where      . The greater number of states in the exact method also means greater 
computational expense in evaluating the Markov states representing system failure, e.g. using the method given 
in section 6.2.2. 
The approximate method does however require the calculation of the values of the nodes in the non-repairable 
parts of the Implicant Tree, consisting of exponential cumulative distribution function calculations which are 
then multiplied and summed. However, the computational expense of this is negligible in comparison to the 
solution of the matrix exponentials. 
6.4.2.5 Summary 
A new method for the analysis of phased mission reliability of systems with both non-repairable and repairable 
multiple failure mode components, where repairable components are integrated back into the system 
immediately upon repair, has been developed. The method results in much smaller Markov state spaces and 
therefore faster analysis than when the method for systems with repairable components from Kim and Park is 
used. The mission unreliability value given is an estimate and not an exact value, although it is an upper bound 
and its accuracy increases with higher numbers of phases, corresponding to the type of phased mission for 
which the method gives the greatest improvement in computational efficiency over alternatives. 
6.5 Summary and Conclusions 
The literature review of methods for the analysis of repairable phased missions showed that whilst a large 
number of methods had been developed, each was constrained to the analysis of systems with particular 
features, such as where component repairs are integrated back into the system only at the end of phases. It also 
showed that they were, in comparison to the non-repairable system methods, limited to the analysis of small 
systems due to having much lower computational efficiency. This motivated research into the development of 
improvements to those methods for increased computational efficiency and applicability to a wider range of 
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systems. The absence of any method developed specifically for the analysis of systems containing both 
repairable and non-repairable components was also noted, despite such systems being prevalent in the real 
world. This led to research into the development of such methods with the aim of producing methods that 
combined the higher efficiency of the non-repairable system methods with the ability of the repairable methods 
to deal with the dependencies introduced by repair. The Markov modelling technique by Kim and Park was 
extended to the analysis of a phased mission system with multiple failure mode components  and a  BDD based 
method introduced that allows the evaluation of system state during the phase by phase state transition rate 
matrix reductions to be performed in an efficient manner. The improvements to the method by Kim and Park 
therefore extend the range of systems to which it can be applied and enable them to be analysed efficiently. An 
alternative method for the evaluation of the BDD in the method from Wang and Trivedi has also been developed 
that removes the inefficiencies present in their algorithm, offering a slight performance advantage particularly in 
applications such as real time analysis. Two new methods for the analysis of a phased mission system 
containing both repairable and non-repairable components have been introduced. Each of these is suited to the 
analysis of different system types, the first for systems where repairable components are integrated back into the 
system at the end of a phase and the second where they are integrated immediately and have multiple failure 
modes at the system level. Both methods offer a performance advantage over the methods for the analysis of 
repairable components. The significance of that advantage grows with increasing proportions of non-repairable 
components. 
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7 Literature Review of Reliability Importance Measures 
7.1 Introduction 
Importance measures are used to determine the contribution of each component in a system to a particular aspect 
of the overall reliability of the system. They can highlight the weak links in the system, show the potential for 
system reliability improvement and indicate the optimum strategy for improving the systems reliability. Typical 
tasks that utilise importance measures include finding the optimum component to improve in order to achieve a 
certain reduction in system risk and showing areas of the system where added redundancy would be most 
beneficial. 
The majority of research into importance measures has focused on the measurement of the importance of 
components in non-phased missions. The most widely known and used importance measures are the risk 
achievement worth (RAW), the risk reduction worth (RRW), the Birnbaum importance measure and the 
Criticality importance measure. The differential importance measure (DIM) is a relatively new importance 
measure which has a number of useful properties.  A number of importance measures focusing on measuring the 
importance of groups of components and the relationship between the importance of a component and the 
unreliability of another have also been developed. Another significant development is the recent introduction of 
conditional importance measures. With real time systems reliability analysis becoming more feasible, due to 
advances in available computing power and the introduction of new methods such as binary decision diagrams, 
the ability for importance measures to reflect the current status of a system is desirable. Recently, phased 
mission importance measures, based on the non-phased Birnbaum and Criticality importance measures, have 
been developed. 
For each importance measure in this literature review, the defining equation is given, followed by demonstrative 
calculations for the components from an example system or phased mission. The importance measures discussed 
in this literature review are easily calculated from the definition given by their equation, provided that the 
reliability structure and component reliabilities are known. However, it can be difficult to visualise what each 
importance measure measures and defines as component importance from this alone. For this reason, the 
contributing event combinations for each component from an example system and their common properties are 
given for each importance measure. The characteristics of each importance measure, i.e. what each defines as 
component importance to system reliability, are determined by the types of event combinations that it assigns as 
contributing to the importance of each component. The relative importance given to each component by an 
importance measure depends on the sum of the probabilities from its contributing event combinations relative to 
those of the other components. The higher the likelihood of the event combinations that contribute to a certain 
component occur compared to those of another component, for a certain importance measure, the higher its 
relative importance. The absolute importance measure values for each component can be determined from a 
importance measure dependant function of this sum and some component independent value such as the system 
unreliability.  
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7.2 Non-Phased Missions 
In this section, the existing research on importance measures developed for non-phased missions are discussed. 
7.2.1 Example System  
The system shown in Figure 7.1 will be used as an example to demonstrate and explain the importance measures 
discussed here. 
 
Figure 7.1 - Example System Fault Tree 
The two cut sets for this system are shown in Equations 7.1 and 7.2. 
BAC 1  7.1 
CAC 2  7.2 
 
The probabilities of component failure, for each component in the example system, are given in Table 7.1.  
Table 7.1 - Example System Failure Probabilities. 
Component Failure Event Probability 
A 0.01 
B 0.02 
C 0.01 
 
Through the inclusion-exclusion expansion the system unreliability can be determined in terms of the 
component failure component probabilities as shown in Equation 7.3, where iq  represents the probability that 
component i fails.  
System Fails 
A 
B C 
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     CBACABASYS qqqqqqqCABAPQ   7.3 
 
Using the failure event probabilities from Table 7.1 and Equation 7.3 the probability of system failure for the 
example system, QSYS, is calculated as shown below: 
000298.001.002.001.001.001.002.001.0  CBACABASYS qqqqqqqQ  
The exhaustive mutually exclusive event combinations that can occur in the example system, along with their 
respective probabilities of occurrence, are shown in Table 7.2, where A is the failure event and A  is the success 
event for component A for example.  
For each importance measure discussed in section 7.2, the event combinations from Table 7.2 that contribute 
towards the importance of each component in the example system will be shown to help explain what each is 
measuring. 
Table 7.2 – Probabilities for each mutually exclusive event combination in the example system. 
Event combination Probability 
CBA  0.960498 
CBA  0.009702 
CBA  0.019602 
CBA  0.009702 
CAB  0.000198 
CBA  0.000098 
BCA  0.000198 
ABC  0.000002 
7.2.2 Single Event Importance Measures 
7.2.2.1 Risk Achievement Worth 
The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) [54] measures the „worth‟ of a component in achieving the current level 
of system reliability, i.e. how much better the system reliability is than it would be if the component‟s reliability 
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were at its lowest. It therefore indicates the importance of maintaining the component‟s reliability by showing 
the magnitude of the maximum potential deterioration in system reliability if it were not. The value of the RAW 
for a component signifies the ratio between the system unreliability if the component were to always fail and the 
current system unreliability, i.e. the multiple of the current system unreliability that would be seen if the 
component were replaced by a component that maximised system unreliability. 
The RAW for component i, 
ia , is defined as the system unreliability with component i failed, )1( iSYS qQ , 
normalised by the base system unreliability, SYSQ , as shown in Equation 7.4. Its range is 1 to 
 
    
 for coherent 
systems, with a value of  
 
    
 signifying maximum importance. A RAW value of 5 for a component means that 
its current reliability maintains the system unreliability at a level that is 5 times lower than the level that would 
occur if it were replaced by a component whose reliability maximised system unreliability.   
SYS
iSYS
i
Q
qQ
a
)1( 
  7.4  
 
The RAW for each component in the example system is calculated through Equation 7.4 as:  
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Component A therefore has the highest worth in achieving the current level of system risk with a RAW value of 
100 and it is therefore more important to maintain the reliability of this component in comparison to the 
others.Table 7.3 shows the failure combinations that contribute to the RAW for each component in the example 
system. It shows that event combinations that do not cause system failure but cause system failure when the 
component‟s event is replaced with its failure event, contribute to its RAW importance. 
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Table 7.3 – Event combinations that contribute to RAW for each component in the example system. 
Event combination Component A Component B Component C  
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No Yes Yes 
CBA  Yes No No 
CBA  Yes No No 
CAB  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
BCA  Yes No No 
ABC  No No No 
 
The relationship between 
ia and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities,
ia
CECP , is shown in 
Equation 7.5. 
SYS
CECSYS
i
Q
PQ
a i
a

  
7.5 
7.2.2.2 Risk Reduction Worth 
The Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) [54] measures the level of improvement in system reliability that would be 
achieved if a component were made perfectly reliable. Ranking components with this measure indicates the 
component for which reliability improvement can potentially achieve the greatest improvement in the system‟s 
reliability. 
The RRW for component i, 
ir , is defined as the ratio of the base system unreliability, SYSQ , to the system 
unreliability with component i working, )0( iSYS qQ , as shown in Equation 7.6. Its range is 1 to  for coherent 
systems, with a value of   signifying maximum importance. A RRW value of 2 for a component means that 
the current system unreliability is 2 times higher than it would be if it were replaced by a component whose 
reliability minimised the system unreliability. 
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The RRW for the components in the example system are calculated through Equation 7.6 as: 
)1(
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r SYSA 
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Q
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The system is therefore perfectly reliable when component A is perfectly reliable, and an improvement in the 
reliability by a factor of almost 3 is achieved if component B were perfectly reliable.  
Table 7.4 shows the event combinations that contribute to the RRW of each component in the example mission. 
It shows that event combinations that cause system failure but do not cause system failure when the 
component‟s event is replaced with its success event, contribute to the component‟s RRW.  
Table 7.4 - Event combinations that contribute to RRW for each component in the example system. 
Event combination Component A Component B Component C  
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CAB  Yes Yes No 
CBA  Yes No Yes 
BCA  No No No 
ABC  Yes No No 
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The relationship between 
ir and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities,
ir
CECP , is shown in 
Equation 7.7. 
   
    
           
 7.7 
Both RAW and RRW indicate system performance at the limits of component performance, due to this they are 
often less useful than the importance measures discussed later. Assuming the base system unreliability is known 
then the calculation of the RAW or RRW for a component requires a single additional system unreliability 
calculation and is therefore computationally inexpensive to calculate. 
7.2.2.3 Birnbaum Importance Measure 
The Birnbaum importance measure [55] for component i, 
iIB , is defined as the partial derivative of the system 
failure probability, 
SYSQ , with respect to the probability of component i failure, iq , as shown in Equation 7.8. 
The value of the Birnbaum importance for a component signifies the ratio between the change in the 
unreliability of the component and the system, i.e. the gearing between them. Its range is 0 to 1 for coherent 
systems, with a value of 1 signifying maximum importance. A Birnbaum importance value of 0.6 for a 
component means that reducing its unreliability by a value of 0.1 leads to a 0.06 reduction in the system 
unreliability. 
i
SYS
i
q
Q
IB


  
7.8 
It can be interpreted as a measure of the influence a change in the component unreliability has on system 
unreliability, with those with a high correlation ranked most important. Where it is possible to improve 
(increase) the reliability of any component by the same amount for the same cost, then the improvement should 
be applied to the component ranked highest by this measure.  
A criticism of the Birnbaum importance measure is that it doesn‟t account for the probability of the failure of the 
component itself. If the base system unreliability is known, the calculation of Birnbaum importance measure 
requires two system unreliability calculations to be performed. The expense of a Birnbaum importance measure 
calculation is therefore approximately twice that of the RAW or RRW importance measures. 
The Birnbaum importance for each component in the example system is calculated through Equation 7.8 as 
follows: 
)1(0298.0 stqqqqIB CBCBA   
)2(0099.0 ndqqqIB CAAB   
)3(0098.0 rdqqqIB BAAC   
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As shown, component A has the greatest BI importance whilst component C has the lowest.  
Table 7.5 shows the event combinations that contribute to the Birnbaum importance of each component from the 
example system. It shows that combinations that cause system failure when the component‟s event is replaced 
with its failure event but not when replaced with its success event contribute to the component‟s Birnbaum 
importance, i.e. where the combination does not cause system failure without failure of the component, given 
the events for the other components. 
Table 7.5 - Event combinations that contribute to Birnbaum importance for each component in the 
example system. 
Event combination Component A Component B Component C  
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No Yes Yes 
CBA  Yes No No 
CBA  Yes No No 
CAB  Yes Yes No 
CBA  Yes No Yes 
BCA  Yes No No 
ABC  Yes No No 
 
The relationship between 
iIB and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities, 
iIB
CECP , is shown 
in Equation 7.9. 
iIB
CECi PIB   7.9 
7.2.2.4 Criticality importance measure 
The Criticality importance measure, which accounts for the component‟s probability of failure, is often cited as 
an improvement over the Birnbaum importance measure as it accounts for the component‟s reliability. The 
Criticality importance measures the influence of a component on the system unreliability and gives the 
proportion of the system failure probability caused by its failure probability. The components ranked highest by 
this importance measure are those for which a proportional reduction in failure probability results in the highest 
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reduction in system failure probability. Another advantage over the Birnbaum importance is that it is normalised 
by the overall system unreliability making comparisons between the importances of components from different 
systems more relevant. 
The Criticality importance measure for component i, 
iIC , is defined as the Birnbaum importance measure, iIB , 
multiplied by the failure probability of component i, 
iq , normalised by the system failure probability, SYSQ , as 
shown in Equation 7.10. Its range is 0 to 1 for coherent systems, with a value of 1 signifying maximum 
importance. A Criticality value of 0.4 for a component means that replacing it with a perfectly reliable 
alternative would result in a 40% reduction in the probability of system failure. 
SYS
i
ii
Q
q
IBIC   7.10 
Where it is less expensive to improve the reliability of components with high unreliability by a given amount 
then the components ranked highest by this measure should be improved first. Dutuit and Rauzy [56] argue that 
components ranked higher by the Criticality importance should always be improved first, based on the reasoning 
that it is more difficult and costly to improve the more reliable components than to improve the less reliable 
ones. However this justification is not always valid. For example, a complex electronically controlled valve may 
be far less reliable than a pipe in a system, but it may still not be easier and cheaper to improve its reliability.  
The Criticality importance for each component in the example system is calculated through Equation 7.10 as 
follows: 
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This shows that component A is most important, with the greatest influence on system unreliability, whilst C is 
the least important with a third of the influence of A. 
Table 7.6 shows the event combinations that contribute to the Criticality importance of each component from 
the example system. It shows that combinations that cause system failure but don‟t cause system failure when 
the component‟s event is replaced by its success event contribute to the component‟s Criticality importance, i.e. 
where the system fails due to the failure of the component but would not have otherwise, given the events for 
the other components. 
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Table 7.6 – Event combinations that contribute to Criticality importance for each component in the 
example system. 
Event combination Component A Component B Component C  
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CAB  Yes Yes No 
CBA  Yes No Yes 
BCA  No No No 
ABC  Yes No No 
 
The relationship between 
iIC and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities,
iIC
CECP , is shown 
in Equation 7.11. 
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7.2.2.5 Fussell-Vesely Importance Measure 
The Fussell-Vesely importance measure differs from the Birnbaum and Criticality importance measures by 
utilising minimal cut sets to determine the contribution from component reliability to system reliability. Its value 
can be interpreted as the probability that a cut-set including the component has occurred given that the system is 
failed. 
The Fussell-Vesely importance for component i, 
iFV , is defined as the probability of the union of all minimal 
cut sets that contain component i, 










iCc
cP , where iC  is the set of minimal cut sets that contain component i (
}:{ xiCxCi   where C is the set of all minimal cut sets), normalised by the system failure probability, 
SYSQ , as shown in Equation 7.12. Its range is 0 to 1, with a value of 1 signifying maximum importance. A 
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Fussell-Vesely importance value of 0.2 for a component means that if the system has failed then there is a 0.2 
probability that a cut-set containing that component has occurred. 
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7.12 
The Fussell-Vesely importance for each component from the example system is calculated through Equation 
7.12 as shown below: 
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This shows that component A is the most important and component C the least important according to this 
importance measure. The Fussell-Vesely importance for component B shows that the probability of component 
B being failed given that the system is failed is 0.671. 
Table 7.7 shows the event combinations that contribute to the Fussell-Vesely importance of each component 
from the example mission. It shows that event combinations that both cause system failure and contain the 
component‟s failure event contribute to the component‟s Fussell-Vesely importance. The relationship between 
iFV and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities,
iFV
CECP , is shown in Equation 7.13. 
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7.13 
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Table 7.7 - Event combinations that contribute to Fussell-Vesely importance for each component in the 
example system. 
Event combination Component A Component B Component C  
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CAB  Yes Yes No 
CBA  Yes No Yes 
BCA  No No No 
ABC  Yes Yes Yes 
7.2.2.6 Differential Importance Measure 
The Differential importance measure (DIM) was developed by Borgonovo and Apostolakis [57] and gives the 
same importance rankings as either the Birnbaum or Criticality importance measure depending on the 
calculation method. A useful property of the DIM is that the importance of a group of components can be found 
by summing their individual importance values (see section 7.2.4). 
The total variation of the system unreliability, SYSQ , due to a small variation in the unreliability of its 
components is expressed by the differential of the system unreliability function, as shown in Equation 7.14, 
where iq is the variation in the unreliability of component i and n is the number of components in the system. 
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The DIM for component i, 
iDIM ,  is defined as the fraction of the total change in the system unreliability due 
to a change in the unreliability of component i, as shown in Equation 7.15. It has a range of 0 to 1 for coherent 
systems, with a value of 1 signifying maximum importance. 
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Equation 7.15 can be calculated with either a uniform or identical proportion variation in component 
unreliability. Where iq  is uniform for each component, DIM gives the same rankings as the Birnbaum 
importance. Where iq  represents an identical proportional variation to the original component reliability, DIM 
gives the same rankings as the Criticality importance. The DIM also enables the importance of groups of 
components to be calculated very easily, see section 7.2.4.1 for the Group DIM. 
The DIM importance values for each component in the example system, calculated through Equation 7.15, and 
using uniform 0.01 changes to the component reliabilities, are as follows: 
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This shows that component A has the highest importance by a significant margin, whereas component B has the 
second highest importance, closely followed by component C. The values are proportional to those given by the 
Birnbaum importance measure.   
The DIM importance values for each component in the example system, calculated through Equation 7.15, and 
using uniform 1% changes to the component reliabilities, are as follows: 
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This shows that component A has an importance approximately three times greater than component C, which 
itself has approximately half the importance of component B according to this importance measure. The values 
are proportional to those given by the Criticality importance measure.   
The event combinations that contribute to the DIM importance, for uniform and proportional variations in 
component reliability, are the same as for the Birnbaum and Criticality importance, shown in Table 7.5 and 
Table 7.6 respectively. 
7.2.3 Relationships between the importance measures 
The relationship between the RAW, RRW, Birnbaums and Criticality importance measures, are shown in Table 
7.8, where each row gives an importance measure in terms of the others (reproduced from Borgonovo [58]). 
Table 7.8 - Relationships between importance measures. 
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7.2.4 First Order Group Importance Measures 
The previous section discussed importance measures for individual components, but sometimes it is useful to 
determine the importance of groups of components instead. For example, the comparison of the relative 
importance of different subsystems, each containing numerous components, may be desired. The Group DIM, 
introduced below, is a first order group importance measure meaning that it does not account for the interactions 
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between components that cause the importance of components to change with the variation in the reliability of 
others. For this reason, it is best suited to measuring the importance of groups of components when only small 
variations in the reliability of the components are envisaged. Due to the possible presence of higher order 
interactions, it may not be optimal to improve the reliability of the components from a group that is ranked most 
important by a first order group importance measure if that improvement is large. In such cases, the higher order 
importance measures that are introduced later should be used instead. 
7.2.4.1 Group DIM 
The Group DIM, for the measurement of the importance of a group of components, was derived from the DIM 
by Borgonovo and Apostolakis [57]. One of the key advantages of DIM over importance measures such as 
Birnbaum importance is that it is additive for groups of components. This means that the DIM for a group of 
components is simply the sum of their individual DIM, calculated from Equation 7.15, as shown in Equation 
7.16. The Group DIM for any combination of components therefore requires only minimal calculation once the 
individual component DIMs have been calculated.  
kjikji DIMDIMDIMDIM  ...,...,,  7.16 
The Group DIM for each component pair from the example system is calculated through Equation 7.16, using 
the individual DIM values for a uniform component reliability variation that were calculated in section 7.2.2.6, 
as follows: 
)1(802.0200.0602.0, stDIMDIMDIM BABA   
)2(800.0198.0602.0, ndDIMDIMDIM CACA   
)3(398.0198.0200.0, rdDIMDIMDIM CBCB   
This shows that, according to the Group DIM, components A and B are the most important pair of components, 
with marginally higher importance than components A and C. 
Although DIM indicates the importance of a group of components it can only be used to calculate the change in 
the system reliability for a small change in the group‟s component reliabilities. This is due to interaction terms 
that may be significant for larger changes and importance measures that address the impact of these interactions 
are discussed in the following section. 
Table 7.9 shows the event combinations that contribute to the Group DIM for each pair of components from the 
example system, using uniform variation in component reliability. Where an event combination has a double 
contribution, this is indicated by „ 2 ‟ in the table. The table shows that combinations that cause system failure 
when either component‟s event is replaced with its failure event but not when it is replaced with its success 
event contribute to the component‟s Birnbaum importance, i.e. where the system would not have failed unless 
the component failed, given the events for the other components. A double contribution occurs when this is the 
case for both components in the pair. 
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Table 7.9 - Event combinations that contribute to Group DIM importance for each component in the 
example system. 
Event combination Component  Group A,B Component  Group A,C Component  Group B,C 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  Yes Yes Yes ( 2 ) 
CBA  Yes Yes No 
CBA  Yes Yes No 
CAB  Yes ( 2 ) Yes Yes 
CBA  Yes Yes ( 2 ) Yes 
BCA  Yes Yes No 
ABC  Yes Yes No 
7.2.5 Higher Order Group Importance Measures 
The Group DIM does not take into account the higher order interactions between components that cause a 
change in the reliability of one component to result in changes to the importance of others. Where components 
appear in the same cut set, modifying the reliability of one component causes a change in the importance of 
other components from the same cut set. These dependencies therefore exist in any system which contains one 
or more cut sets that are greater than first order (i.e. contain more than a single component). Most real world 
systems have failure modes involving the failure of multiple components and therefore have these dependencies 
present.   
There are many cases when it is necessary to investigate the affect on system reliability of modifying the 
reliability of multiple components. For example, increasing the reliability of one component will often require a 
sacrifice in the reliability of another due to budget constraints. For example with a fixed budget, replacing one 
component with a more expensive, more reliable alternative may mean using a cheaper, lower reliability 
alternative for another. The dependencies mean that, to achieve improvements in system reliability with 
maximum efficiency, it is not sufficient to rank the importance of components in a system using an individual 
component importance measure and then improve the reliability of each component in turn, beginning with the 
highest ranked and moving down the list. Changes to the reliability of a component may affect the order of 
importance of the other components from the same system. 
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Where the proposed reliability changes to components are small it may suffice to use the Group DIM since the 
higher order component interactions are also likely to be small and it has the advantage of being comparably 
inexpensive to calculate. Where larger component reliability changes are proposed it is better to use the higher 
order importance measures discussed in this section. 
7.2.5.1 Joint Reliability Importance Measure 
Hong and Lie [59] introduced the Joint Reliability Importance Measure (JRI) to measure the interaction between 
two components.  The JRI for components i and j, jiJRI , , is defined as the partial derivative of the Birnbaum 
importance for component i with respect to the unreliability of component j, as shown in Equation 7.17. Its 
range is -1 to 1. From Equation 7.17 it can be shown that when 0
,

jiB
I , the importance of component i 
increases as the reliability of component j decreases. Where 0
,

jiB
I , the importance of component i decreases 
as the reliability of component j decreases. 
j
i
ji
SYS
ji
q
IB
qq
Q
JRI






2
,  
7.17  
 
The JRI for each pair of components from the example system, calculated through Equation 7.17, are as follows: 
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Two examples of information gained from these JRI values are that component A becomes more important as 
the reliability of B is decreased, whereas component B becomes less important as the reliability of C is 
decreased. Equation 7.18 from Zio and Podofillini [60] can be used to calculate the change to the system 
unreliability due to a change in the unreliability of any two components for which the Birnbaums and Joint 
Reliability importance measures are known. 
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Gao, Cui and Li [61] extended the JRI to multiple components. The definition for the JRI for three components 
i, j and k, kjiJRI ,, , is shown in Equation 7.19.  
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7.2.5.2 Group RAW 
The Group RAW [54] measures the „worth‟ of a group of components in achieving the current level of system 
reliability, indicating the importance of maintaining the reliability of each component in the group. The Group 
RAW for components i,  j and k, kjia ,, , is defined as the system unreliability with components i,  j and k failed, 
)1,1,1(  kjiSYS qqqQ , normalised by the base system unreliability, SYSQ , as shown in Equation 7.20. Its 
range is 1 to 
SYSQ
1
for coherent systems, with a value of 
SYSQ
1
 signifying maximum importance. A Group 
RAW value of 4 for a component group means that their current reliability maintains the system unreliability at 
a level that is 4 times lower than the level that would occur if they were replaced by components whose 
reliability maximised the system unreliability. 
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As shown by Cheok et al [54] the RAW for a group of components cannot be derived from the sum of the 
individual component RAW. Cheok et al also show that setting each of the group component‟s failure 
probabilities to unity in the cut sets, analogous to the method for the single component RAW, also gives an 
incorrect result. In this assessment Cheok is, however, making the unstated assumption that the cut sets have not 
been fully expanded through the inclusion-exclusion expansion, such as the common case where the rare event 
approximation is being used. If the fully inclusion-exclusion expanded cut sets are used then the method where 
each of the group‟s component failure probability is given the value of unity gives the correct result without any 
need for renaming and minimisation. 
An example of the error in the Group RAW calculation when using the rare event approximation is shown in the 
incorrect calculation given below, where the group of components for which the Group RAW is calculated are 
X
1
, X
2
, X
3
 and X
4
: 
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It can be seen that the probability equation that results from the event unreliabilities being set to 1 is not correct, 
for example the probability of ABX
1
 or ABX
2
 occurring is represented by 2qAqB, instead of the correct qAqB. 
Cheok shows that correct results may be obtained from the non fully expanded cut sets by first renaming each of 
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the group‟s components with the same identifier, re-minimising the resultant cut sets and then setting the 
group‟s components failure probability to unity. This is shown below: 
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Note that above result is an approximation as the higher order cut sets from the inclusion-exclusion expansion 
are ignored. 
The Group RAW for each pair of components in the example system are calculated through Equation 7.20 as 
follows: 
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As shown groups of components „A,B’ and „A,C’ have an extremely high Group RAW of 3356 since the failure 
of the components completes a minimal cut set, whereas the failure of „B,C‟ does not, increasing system failure 
probability by a far smaller factor of 39. 
Table 7.10 shows the event combinations that contribute to the Group RAW for each pair of components from 
the example system. It shows that event combinations that do not cause system failure but cause system failure 
when the events for the group‟s components are all replaced with failure events, contribute to the group‟s Group 
RAW. The relationship between 
kjia ,,  and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities,          
, 
is shown in Equation 7.21, i.e. the same form of relationship as the single component RAW, Equation 7.5. 
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Table 7.10 - Event combinations that contribute to the Group RAW for each component in the example 
system. 
Event combination Component  Group A,B Component  Group A,C Component  Group B,C 
CBA  Yes Yes No 
CBA  Yes Yes Yes 
CBA  Yes Yes No 
CBA  Yes Yes No 
CAB  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
BCA  Yes Yes No 
ABC  No No No 
 
7.2.5.3 Group RRW 
The Group RRW [54] measures the level of improvement in system reliability that would be achieved if all 
components in the group were made perfectly reliable. The Group RRW for components i, j and k, kjir ,, , is 
defined as the ratio of the base system unreliability, 
SYSQ , to the system unreliability with components i, j and k 
working, )0(  kjiSYS qqqQ , as shown in Equation 7.22. This effectively removes all cut sets that contain 
any of the group‟s components from the numerator and hence re-minimisation is not required as it often is with 
the group RAW when using cut sets with the rare event approximation. Its range is 1 to  for coherent systems, 
with a value of   signifying maximum importance. A Group RRW value of 2 for a group of components means 
that the current system unreliability is 2 times higher than it would be if they were replaced by components 
whose reliability minimised the system unreliability. 
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The Group RRW for each pair of components in the example system are calculated through Equation 7.22 as 
follows: 
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As shown, all component groups have the same, infinite, Group RAW since making both events in any group 
perfectly reliable results in perfect system reliability. 
Table 7.11 shows the event combinations that contribute to the Group RRW for each pair of components from 
the example system. It shows that event combinations that cause system failure but do not cause system failure 
when the events for the group‟s components are all replaced with success events, contribute to the group‟s 
Group RRW. The relationship between 
kjir ,, and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities, 
kjir
CECP
,,
, is shown in Equation 7.23, i.e. the same form of relationship as the single component RRW, Equation 
7.7. 
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Table 7.11 - Event combinations that contribute to Group RRW for each component in the example 
system. 
Event combination Component  Group A,B Component  Group A,C Component  Group B,C 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CBA  No No No 
CAB  Yes Yes Yes 
CBA  Yes Yes Yes 
BCA  No No  No 
ABC  Yes Yes Yes 
7.2.5.4 Differential Importance Measure II 
Zio and Podofillini [60] introduced a second order differential importance measure known as the DIM
II
 that 
gives the relative influence that a variation in the reliability of a pair of components has on the system reliability 
compared to all component pairs in the system. The DIM
II 
for components i and j,       
  ,  is defined as the ratio 
of the change in the system unreliability due to a change in the reliability of components i and j, 
iq  and jq  
respectively, to the sum of the changes in the system unreliability due to a change in the failure probability of 
each component pair in the system, where the component reliability variations are all of either a fixed proportion 
or of a uniform amount. This
 
definition is shown in Equation 7.24, where 
jiSYS
Q
,
  is defined by Equation 7.25. 
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7.2.6 Conditional Importance Measures 
Conditional importance measures can be used to determine the importance of components in a system when the 
state (failed or working) of other components are known. This can be useful in the real time reliability analysis 
of systems, where the reliability metrics reflect the current state of the system. If a certain system component 
changes from the working to failed state, the conditional importance measures can be used to determine the 
updated importance of the system‟s components. This has many practical applications, for example those 
components with increased importance, due to the failure of others, could be given additional protection from 
failure. 
7.2.6.1 Conditional Birnbaum Importance Measure 
The conditional Birnbaum importance [61]  for component i for the case where component j is known to have 
failed, )1( ji qIB , is defined as the partial derivative of the system unreliability with component j failed, 
)1( jSYS qQ , with respect to the unreliability of component i. This definition is given by Equation 7.26, whilst 
the equivalent definition for the case where component j is known to have worked,          , is given by 
Equation 7.27. 
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The calculations for the Birnbaum importance for component A and the conditional Birnbaum importance when 
component B is failed and working, for the example system, are calculated below: 
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This shows that component A has the maximum importance possible when component B is known to fail and 
has an importance of almost one third of its non-conditional value when component B is known to work, 
according to the Birnbaum importance measure. 
The relationship between JRI, Equation 7.17, and the conditional Birnbaum importance, Equation 7.26, is given 
by Equation 7.28. 
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The conditional importance measure shown is not limited to the case where the status of a single component is 
known, it may easily be extended to measure the importance of a component when the status of any number of 
components is known. 
7.3 Phased Missions 
In this section, the importance measures that were developed by Andrews [2] for phased missions are discussed. 
The importance measures presented here are suitable for the analysis of any phased mission system with 
coherent phase fault trees. 
7.3.1 Example Missions 
Two simple two phased missions, phased mission A and phased mission B, whose phase fault trees are shown in 
Figure 7.2a and Figure 7.2b respectively, will be used as an example to demonstrate the phased mission 
importance measures. These two example missions were chosen as, although very simple, together they contain 
all types of failures that occur in complex phased missions: 
 In-phase mission failure caused by component failures in the same phase. 
 In-phase mission failure caused by a combination of component failures in the same phase and 
earlier phases. 
 Mission failure on transition to a phase caused by component failures in an earlier phase. 
 
Figure 7.2 – Phase fault trees for example phased missions. 
The probabilities of component failure in phases 1 and 2 are given in Table 7.12. The exhaustive mutually 
exclusive event combinations that can occur in the example missions, along with their respective probabilities of 
occurrence, are shown in Table 7.13, where ),( jiA is the event that component A fails between the ends of 
phases i and j and ),0( jA is the event that component A does not fail before the end of phase j. For each 
importance measure discussed in section 7.3, the event combinations from Table 7.2 that contribute towards the 
importance of each component in each example mission will be shown to help explain what each is measuring. 
 
Phase 1 
A B 
Phase 2 
A 
Phase 1 
A B 
Phase 2 
A 
a) b) 
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Table 7.12 – Component phase failure probabilities. 
Component Failure Event Probability 
)1,0(A  0.25 
)2,1(A  0.50 
)1,0(B  0.30 
)2,1(B  0.20 
 
Table 7.13 – Probabilities for each mutually exclusive event combination in the example mission. 
Event combination Probability 
)2,0()2,0( BA  0.125 
)2,0()1,0( BA  0.125 
)2,0()2,1( BA  0.250 
)1,0()2,0( BA  0.075 
)2,1()2,0( BA  0.050 
)1,0()1,0( BA  0.075 
)2,1()1,0( BA  0.050 
)1,0()2,1( BA  0.150 
)2,1()2,1( BA  0.100 
7.3.1.1 Phased Mission A 
Phased mission A will be analysed in this section. The phase one fault tree has the minimal cut sets {A} in phase 
1 and {A}{B} in phase 2 as shown in Equations 7.29, 7.30 and 7.31, where 
i
jC is the ith cut set in phase j and 
the event times given correspond to the end of phases. 
157 
 
)1,0(11 AC   7.29 
)2,0(12 AC   7.30 
)2,0(22 BC   7.31 
 
The prime implicants for phase one failure, phase two failure, phase two transitional failure and mission failure 
are shown in Equations 7.32 to 7.35. 
)1,0(1 AT   7.32 
 )2,0()1,0()2,1(2 BAAT   7.33 
)1,0()1,0(2 BAT
T   7.34 
)2,0()2,0( BATMiss   7.35 
 
The equations for the probability of phase one, phase two, phase two transitional, phase two in-phase and 
mission failure are derived from Equations 7.33 to 7.34 using the inclusion-exclusion expansion, Equation 2.23, 
as shown in Equations 7.36 to 7.40. These equations are in the Henley and Inagaki form [62]. 
 
1
)1,0(11 A
P qAPQQ   7.36 
  
2,122,112
)2,0()1,0()2,1(2 BABAA qqqpqBAAPQ   7.37 
 
11
)1,0()1,0(2 BA
T qpBAPQ   7.38 
2,12212112,122,1122 BABAABABABAA
P qqqpqqpqqqpqQ   7.39 
 
2,12,12,12,1
)2,0()2,0( BABAMiss qqqqBAPQ   7.40 
 
Using the failure event probabilities from Table 7.12 together with Equations 7.36 to 7.40, the probability of 
failure in each period of the example mission are calculated as shown below: 
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7.3.1.2 Phased Mission B 
Phased mission B will now be analysed. The phase one fault tree has the minimal cut set shown in Equation 
7.41, whilst the phase two fault tree has the minimal cut sets shown in 7.42, where 
i
jC is the ith cut set in phase j 
and the event times given correspond to the end of phases. 
)1,0(11 AC   7.41 
)2,0()2,1(12 BAC   7.42 
 
The prime implicants for phase one failure, phase two failure, phase two transitional failure and mission failure 
are shown in Equations 7.43 to 7.46. 
)1,0(1 AT   7.43 
)2,0()2,1(2 BAT   7.44 
02 
TT  7.45 
                             7.46 
 
The equations for the probability of phase one, phase two, phase two transitional, phase two in-phase and 
mission failure are derived from Equations 7.43 to 7.46 using the inclusion-exclusion expansion, Equation 2.23, 
as shown in Equations 7.47 to 7.50. Again, these equations are in the Henley and Inagaki form. 
 
1
)1,0(11 A
P qAPQQ   7.47 
 
2,12
)2,0()2,1(22 BA
P qqBAPQQ   7.48 
02 
TQ  7.49 
                                             7.50 
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Using the failure event probabilities from Table 7.12 together with Equations 7.47 to 7.50, the probability of 
failure in each period of the example mission are calculated as shown below: 
25.0
111
 A
P qQQ  
25.05.05.0
2,1222
 BA
P qqQQ  
02 
TQ  
5.05.05.025.0
2,121
 BAAMiss qqqQ  
7.3.2 Component and system time periods in phased mission 
importance measures 
Within a phased mission the effect of component failure on the system can vary significantly depending on the 
time at which the component fails whilst the consequence of system failure can vary significantly depending on 
the time at which the system fails. Precise knowledge of the component importance with regard to these time 
periods allows the correct decisions to be made on how to best improve the reliability of a phased mission. For 
this reason, a phased mission importance measure value for a component must specify the time periods for the 
component and system for which it was measured. Both the definitions for the phased mission importance 
measures from the literature review that are shown in this chapter and the new phased mission importance 
measures introduced in the next chapter refer to these time periods. This section therefore introduces some 
terminology and contains an in depth explanation of the significance of these time periods. 
Each phased mission importance measure has a specified component failure period, which will be referred to as 
the „cause‟ period. Each also has a specified system failure period, which will be referred to as the „effect‟ 
period. The phased mission importance measures are measures of the contribution of failure of the component in 
the „cause‟ period to system failure in the „effect‟ period. Figure 7.3 gives an example where component failure 
in the „cause‟ period consisting of the first half of phase 2 leads to an increased probability of system failure in 
the „effect‟ period consisting of the second half of phase 3. 
The ability to measure the importance of component failure from any time period to system failure in that or any 
other time period of the mission has many practical uses. For example, it allows the influence of component 
failure in each phase on the mission reliability to be compared, highlighting phases in which the components 
failure should be avoided. Similarly, measuring the importance of components to system failure in a specific 
period is useful in certain situations. Often system failure during a particular period (for example, the final two 
phases) may have greater consequence (for example, higher risk of fatalities) than at other times and therefore 
be of greater interest. In other cases, the failure of the system in a certain period may be of greater interest due to 
other external factors. For example, the probability of system failure in a particular period may be unacceptably 
high whilst being acceptable at other times (perhaps determined by industry regulations), thus the engineer who 
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wishes to improve mission performance in the unacceptable period will be interested in component importance 
to that period in particular.  
Phase 1 End
Mission Start
Phase 2 End
Phase 3 End
Phase 1 End
Mission Start
Phase 2 End
Phase 3 End
Increases Probability
Mission Time
‘Cause’ Period ‘Effect Period’
System 
Fails
Component 
Fails
 
Figure 7.3 - Example of 'cause' and 'effect' periods for phased mission importance measures. 
 
Some of the possible component and system failure period combinations that could be of interest to an analyst 
are the importance of the failure of a particular component in a particular phase to: 
1. System failure in a particular phase. 
2. System failure on transition to a particular phase. 
3. In-phase system failure in a particular phase. 
4. System failure during the complete phased mission. 
and the overall contribution of the failure of a particular component to: 
5. System failure in a particular phase. 
6. System failure on transition to a particular phase. 
7. In-phase system failure in a particular phase. 
8. System failure during the complete phased mission. 
7.3.3 Phased Birnbaum Importance Measure 
7.3.3.1 In-Phase Birnbaum Importance Measure 
Andrews [2] introduced the In-Phase Birnbaum importance measure for measuring the importance of a 
component to in-phase mission failure in a particular phase. The phase j in-phase „effect‟ period Birnbaum 
importance measure for component i, Pi jIB , is defined as the partial derivative of the probability of in-phase 
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system failure in phase  j , 
P
jQ , with respect to the probability the component fails in phase j, jiq , as shown in 
Equation 7.51, where the derivative  
ji
P
j
q
Q


 must be evaluated in a specific way. 
P
jQ must be formed as 
described by Henley and Inagaki [62] and then differentiated with the assumption that component success terms 
in 
P
jQ are independent of jiq , i.e. 
0


j
j
i
i
q
p
. It has a range of 0 to 1, with a value of 1 signifying maximum 
importance. 
j
j
i
P
jP
i
q
Q
IB


  
7.51 
 
The phase 1 in-phase „effect‟ period Birnbaum importance measure values for each component from example 
mission A, calculated through Equation 7.51, are shown below: 
)1(1
1
1
1
1
1 st
q
q
q
Q
IB
A
A
A
P
P
A 






 
)2(0
1
1
1
1
1 nd
q
q
q
Q
IB
B
A
B
P
P
B 





  
This shows that component A has the maximum importance to phase 1 in-phase mission failure according to this 
importance measure, whilst component B has the minimum importance. 
Table 7.14 shows the event combinations that contribute to the phase 1 in-phase „effect‟ period Birnbaum 
importance measure value of each component in both example missions A and B, since the in-phase 1 mission 
failure conditions are the same for both missions. 
The phase 2 in-phase „effect‟ period Birnbaum importance measure values for each component from example 
mission A, calculated through Equation 7.51, are shown below: 
 
)1(5.01
2,1
2
2,12212
2
2
2 stq
q
qqqpq
q
Q
IB B
A
BABAA
A
P
P
A 





  
 
)2(25.0
21
2
2,12212
2
2
2 ndqp
q
qqqpq
q
Q
IB AA
B
BABAA
B
P
P
B 





  
This shows that component A is most important to in-phase 2 mission failure according to this importance 
measure and has twice the importance of component B. 
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Table 7.14 – Event combinations that contribute to the phase 1 in-phase ‘effect’ period Birnbaum 
importance measure value of each component in example missions A and B. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()2,0( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()2,1( BA  Yes No 
 
Table 7.15 and Table 7.16 show the event combinations that contribute to the phase 2 in-phase „effect‟ period 
Birnbaum importance measure value of each component in example mission A and B respectively. Table 7.14, 
Table 7.15 and Table 7.16 show that the event combinations that contribute to a component‟s phase j in-phase 
„effect‟ period Birnbaum importance measure value are those that cause phase j in-phase system failure when 
the component‟s event is replaced by its phase j failure event but not when replaced by its phase j success event, 
i.e. where the events for the other components are such that phase j in-phase system failure would occur if the 
component failed in that phase but not if it were successful through the mission. 
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Table 7.15 - Event combinations that contribute to the in-phase ‘effect’ period Birnbaum importance for 
each component in example mission A. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  Yes Yes 
)2,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No Yes 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No Yes 
)1,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,1( BA  No No 
 
The relationship between 
P
i j
IB and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities,     
    
 
, is 
shown in Equation 7.52.      
P
ji
IBj
CEC
P
i PIB   7.52 
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Table 7.16 - Event combinations that contribute to the in-phase ‘effect’ period Birnbaum importance for 
each component in example mission B. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  No Yes 
)1,0()2,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()2,0( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  Yes Yes 
)2,1()2,1( BA  Yes Yes 
7.3.3.2 Transitional Birnbaum Importance Measure 
Andrews [2] also presented the Transitional Birnbaum importance measure for measuring the importance of a 
component to the probability of mission failure on transition to a particular phase. The phase j  transition „effect‟ 
period Birnbaum importance measure with a phase k „cause‟ period for component i,
T
i kj
IB
,
, is defined as the 
partial derivative of the probability of system failure on transition to phase j,    
 , with respect to the probability 
the component fails in phase k,    , as shown in Equation 7.53, where   
  is in the Henley and Inagaki form and 
it is assumed that 0


k
k
i
i
q
p
. It has a range of 0 to 1, with a value of 1 signifying maximum importance. 
k
kj
i
T
jT
i
q
Q
IB



,
 
7.53 
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The calculations of the phase 2 transition „effect‟ period Birnbaum importance measure with phase 1 „cause‟ 
period  values are given below for each component from example mission A: 
 
)2(0
1
11
1
1,2
2 nd
q
qp
q
Q
IB
A
BA
A
T
T
A 





 , where 
1
1
A
A
q
p


is assumed to be 0. 
 
)1(25.0
1
1
11
1
1,2
2 stp
q
qp
q
Q
IB A
B
BA
B
T
T
B 





  
This shows that the failure of component A in phase 1 has no importance to system failure on transition to phase 
2, whilst component B has the highest importance, according to this importance measure. 
Table 7.17 - Event combinations that contribute to the value of the phase 2 transition ‘effect’ period  
Birnbaum importance measure with a phase 1 ‘cause’ period for each component in example mission A. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  No Yes 
)2,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  No Yes 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No Yes 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No Yes 
)1,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  No Yes 
)2,1()2,1( BA  No Yes 
 
Table 7.17 and Table 7.18 show the event combinations that contribute to the value of the phase 2 transition 
„effect‟ period Birnbaum importance measure with phase 1  „cause‟ period for each component from example 
mission A and B respectively. They show that the event combinations that contribute to a component‟s phase j 
transition „effect‟ period Birnbaum importance measure with a phase k „cause‟  period are those that cause 
system failure on transition to phase j when the component‟s event is replaced by its phase k failure event, but 
not when replaced by its mission success event, i.e. where the events for the other components are such that 
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system failure on transition to phase j would occur if the component failed in phase k but not if it were 
successful through the mission. 
Table 7.18 - Event combinations that contribute to the value of the phase 2 transition ‘effect’ period 
Birnbaum importance with a phase 1 ‘cause’ period for each component in example mission B. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,1( BA  No No 
 
The relationship between 
T
i kj
IB
,
and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities, 
T
kji
IB
CECP
,
, is 
shown in Equation 7.54. 
T
kji
IBkj
CEC
T
i PIB
,
,
  7.54 
7.3.4 Phased Criticality Importance Measure 
7.3.4.1 In-Phase Criticality Importance Measure 
Andrews [2] presented the In-Phase Criticality importance measure to measure the importance of a component 
to the probability of in-phase mission failure in a particular phase. Unlike the In-Phase Birnbaum importance, 
Equation 7.51, this importance measure accounts for the reliability of the component and is normalised. The in-
phase phase j  „effect‟ period Criticality importance measure for component i, 
P
i j
IC , is defined as its phase j In-
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Phase Birnbaum importance, 
P
i j
IB , multiplied by its probability of failure in phase j, 
ji
q , and normalised by the 
probability of system failure in phase j, 
jQ , as shown in Equation 7.55. It has a range of 0 to 
j
P
j
Q
Q
, with a value 
of 
j
P
j
Q
Q
 signifying maximum importance (therefore being a maximum of 1 if all failures in phase j are in-phase 
failures). 
j
i
P
iP
i
Q
qIB
IC jj
j
  
7.55 
 
The values for the in-phase phase 1 „effect‟ period Criticality importance measure for each component from 
example mission A, calculated through Equation 7.55, are shown below: 
)1(1
25.0
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st
Q
qIB
IC
A
P
AP
A 
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)2(0
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1
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Q
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B 

  
Component A therefore has the maximum importance to in-phase 1 mission failure according to this importance 
measure, whilst component B has the minimum importance. 
Table 7.19 shows the event combinations that contribute to the in-phase phase 1 „effect‟ period Criticality 
importance measure value for each component in both example missions A and B, since the in-phase 1 mission 
failure conditions are the same for both missions.  
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Table 7.19 - Event combinations that contribute to the in-phase phase 1 ‘effect’ period Criticality 
importance measure value for each component in example missions A and B. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,1( BA  No No 
 
The in-phase phase 2 „effect‟ period Criticality importance measure values for each component in example 
mission A, calculated through Equation 7.55, are shown below: 
)1(4.0
625.0
50.05.0
2
22
2
st
Q
qIB
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A
P
AP
A 

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)2(08.0
625.0
20.025.0
2
22
2
nd
Q
qIB
IC
B
P
BP
B 


 
This shows that component A has 5 times greater importance than component B to in-phase failure in phase 2 of 
the example mission. 
Table 7.20 and Table 7.21 show the event combinations that contribute to the value of the in-phase phase 2 
„effect‟ period Criticality importance measure for each component in example mission A and B respectively. 
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Table 7.20 - Event combinations that contribute to the in-phase phase 2 ‘effect’ period Criticality 
importance  measure value of each component in example mission A. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No Yes 
)1,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,1( BA  No No 
 
Together, Table 7.19, Table 7.20 and Table 7.21 show that an event combination contributes to a component‟s 
in-phase phase j „effect‟ period Criticality importance if it includes the phase j component failure event and 
causes phase j in-phase system failure but not if the component‟s event were replaced with its mission success 
event; i.e. where the component‟s phase j failure event is present and the events for the other components are 
such that this causes phase j in-phase system failure that would not occur if the component were instead 
successful through the mission. 
The relationship between 
P
i j
IC and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities,
P
ji
IC
CECP , is 
shown in Equation 7.56. 
j
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Table 7.21 - Event combinations that contribute to the in-phase phase 2 ‘effect’ period Criticality 
importance measure value of each component in example mission B. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()2,1( BA  Yes Yes 
 
7.3.4.2 Transitional Criticality Importance Measure 
Andrews [2] introduced the Transitional Criticality importance measure to measure the importance of a 
component to the probability of mission failure on transition to a particular phase. Unlike the In-Phase 
Birnbaum importance, Equation 7.53, this importance measure accounts for the reliability of the component, 
includes its influence from all earlier phases and is normalised. The phase j transition „effect‟ period Criticality 
importance measure for component i, 
T
i j
IC , is defined as the sum of the products of the phase j transition 
„effect‟ period Birnbaum importance measures with phase k ‘cause‟ period, 
T
i kj
IB
,
, and the probability the 
component fails in phase k, 
ki
q ,  for all values of k, normalised by the probability of system failure in phase j, 
jQ ,  as shown in Equation 7.57. It has a range of 0 to 
j
T
j
Q
Q
, with a value of 
j
T
j
Q
Q
 signifying maximum 
importance (therefore being a maximum of 1 if all failures in phase j are transitional failures). 
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The values of the phase 2 transition „effect‟ period Criticality importance values for each component in example 
mission A, calculated through Equation 7.57, are shown below: 
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This shows that component B has the highest importance for failure on transition to phase 2, with component A 
having zero importance. 
Table 7.22 and Table 7.23 show the event combinations that contribute to the value of the phase 2 transition 
„effect‟ period Criticality importance measure for each component in example mission A and B respectively. 
They show that an event combination contributes to a component‟s phase j transition „effect‟ period Criticality 
importance measure value if it includes a failure event for the component from an earlier phase and causes 
system failure on transition to phase j but not if the component‟s event were replaced with its mission success 
event; i.e. where the component‟s failure event for an earlier phase is present and the events for the other 
components are such that this causes system failure to occur on transition to phase j  that would not occur if the 
component were instead successful through the mission. 
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Table 7.22 - Event combinations that contribute to the phase 2 transition ‘effect’ period Criticality 
importance measure value of each component in example mission A. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No Yes 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  No Yes 
)2,1()2,1( BA  No No 
 
The relationship between 
T
i j
IC and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities, 
T
ji
IC
CECP , is 
shown in Equation 7.58. 
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Table 7.23 - Event combinations that contribute to the phase 2 transition ‘effect’ period Criticality 
importance measure value of each component in example mission B. 
Event combination Component A Component B 
)2,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()1,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,1( BA  No No 
 
7.3.4.3 Mission Criticality Importance Measure  
Andrews [2] also presented an importance measure to measure the importance of a component to a complete 
phased mission. The Phased Mission Criticality importance measure for component i, 
M
iI , is defined as the 
sum of the non-normalised In-Phase and Transitional Criticality importance measures (whose normalised 
definitions are given in Equations 7.55 and 7.57 respectively) for component i in each of the m phases of the 
mission, normalised by the probability of system failure over the complete mission, 
MissQ . This definition is 
shown in Equation 7.59. It has a range of 0 to 1, with a value of 1 signifying maximum importance. 
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The Mission Criticality importance measure values for each component in example mission A, calculated 
through Equation 7.59, are shown below: 
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Table 7.24 - Event combinations that contribute to the Mission Criticality importance measure value for 
each component in example mission A. 
Event combination Component A (failure phase) Component B (failure phase) 
)2,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No Yes 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No Yes 
)1,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  No Yes 
)2,1()2,1( BA  No No 
 
This shows that component A has the highest importance to the mission, whilst component B has a much lower 
importance. Table 7.24 and Table 7.25 show the event combinations that contribute to the Mission Criticality 
importance measure value of each component in example mission A and B respectively. They show that the 
event combinations that contribute to a component‟s Mission Criticality importance measure value are those that 
contribute to its Transitional or In-Phase Criticality importance in any phase of the mission. 
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Table 7.25 - Event combinations that contribute to the Mission Criticality importance measure value for 
each component in example mission B. 
Event combination Component A  Component B  
)2,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,0()2,1( BA  No No 
)1,0()2,0( BA  No No 
)2,1()2,0( BA  No No 
)1,0()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()1,0( BA  Yes No 
)1,0()2,1( BA  Yes No 
)2,1()2,1( BA  Yes Yes 
 
The relationship between 
M
iIC and the sum of its contributing event combination probabilities, M
iIC
CECP , is 
shown in Equation 7.60. 
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7.4 Summary and Conclusions 
The literature review found that a vast number of importance measures have been developed for non-phased 
mission systems.  Each definition was found to have been developed to show the contribution of a component to 
some particular aspect of system reliability. Each of the importance measures was analysed in detail, including 
application to components from a simple example system, to show exactly what it measures and how it defines a 
component as important. It was shown that some, such as the Criticality importance measure, give a good 
indication of the overall importance of a component to the system reliability, whilst others, such as the RAW 
importance measure, are useful tools for very specific types of analysis. In addition to those developed for 
measuring the contribution of individual components, importance measures developed to show the importance 
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of groups of components and the influence of component reliability on the importance of others were also found 
and discussed. For phased missions, only two importance measures were found to have been developed. These 
were interpretations of the Birnbaum and Criticality importance measures that had been previously developed, 
and are widely used, for the analysis of non-phased mission systems. The component and system failure time 
periods used in the phased mission importance measure definitions were discussed and explained. Each 
importance measure was then analysed and demonstrated through an application to components from an 
example phased mission system. 
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8 Phased Mission Importance Measures 
8.1 Introduction 
The literature review showed that six individual and five group component importance measures have been 
developed and are commonly used in the analysis of non-phased missions whereas only two individual 
component importance measures are available for phased missions. In addition, as will be shown later, the 
values assigned to components by the phased mission importance measures that have been developed lack the 
property of giving the precise influence the component has on system reliability. This situation is summarised in 
Table 8.1. 
Table 8.1- Comparison between the development of importance measures for non-phased mission and 
phased mission systems. 
 Non-phased missions Phased Missions 
Number of individual component importance measures 
found in the literature review 
6 2 
Number of group component importance measures 
found in the literature review 
5 0 
Do importance values show the precise influence a 
component has on system reliability? 
Yes No 
 
A range of importance measures, similar to those available for non-phased mission systems, would be helpful to 
provide different perspectives on component importance since a particular importance measure may be the best 
choice for a particular analysis objective. The RRW importance measure, for example, can be used to find the 
component that provides the greatest scope for improving the reliability of the system. It is also a common 
practice when dealing with non-phased mission systems to average the importance values from multiple 
importance measures, for example from the Criticality and Fussell-Vesely importance measures, in order to 
gauge the overall relative importance of components. The current imbalance between the availability of 
importance measures for non-phased and phased mission systems therefore makes the optimisation of the 
reliability of a system more difficult if it operates in a phased mission. The development of phased mission 
definitions for each importance measure covered in the literature review, retaining the same interpretations, 
rectifies this situation.  
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The new importance measures introduced in this chapter are: 
 Phased Birnbaum II 
 Phased Criticality II 
 Phased DIM 
 Phased Risk Achievement Worth (Phased RAW) 
 Phased Risk Reduction Worth (Phased RRW) 
 Phased Fussell-Vesely 
 Phased Criticality III 
The first six of these are extensions to existing non-phased importance measures that were covered in the 
literature review. Of those, only the Birnbaum and Criticality importance measures have had phased mission 
definitions previously developed [2]. The new phased mission definitions of those provide alternatives with the 
advantage of giving values that show the precise influence a component has on the system reliability and can be 
used in predicting the outcome of component reliability alterations. Definitions to measure the importance of 
groups of, as well as individual, components are given and these are helpful in the common case of investigating 
optimisations to phased mission reliability that involve more than one component.  
During the development of these importance measures it became clear that it would be useful if they could 
measure importance not only from component reliability in specific phases or a complete mission to system 
reliability in specific phases or a complete mission, but from and to any periods of the mission. Each importance 
measure has therefore been developed to allow this to the extent possible, since not all importance measures can 
be fully extended in this way due to limitations inherent to their definitions, and with the Phased Criticality III 
allowing full flexibility. 
An analysis of the computational complexity of the Criticality importance measure interpretations for phased 
missions systems is included, showing that those presented in this chapter have lower computational expense 
than the definition covered in the literature review. The new definitions are therefore advantageous in 
applications such as real time analysis, the analysis of components in phased missions of many phases and for 
extension to the measurement of the importance of groups of components. 
Finally, since it is often not the unreliability of the phased mission that is to be minimised but instead the 
reliability costs, a method that uses one of the newly developed importance measures to determine the reliability 
improvement to a component that minimises these costs is also presented. 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 8.2 discusses the time periods used in the 
importance measure definitions, section 8.3 introduces the newly developed single component importance 
measures, sections 8.4 and 8.5 introduce the first and higher order component group importance measures 
respectively, section 8.6 covers the use of the importance measures in conditional analysis and the chapter 
finishes with section 8.7 that presents a method that can be used to minimise the reliability costs of a phased 
mission.   
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8.2 Component and system time periods in phased mission 
importance measures 
The time periods for phased mission importance measures were described in [section 7.2.2]. As listed in that 
section, the possible component and system failure period combinations are importance of the failure of a 
particular component in a particular phase to: 
1. System failure in a particular phase. 
2. System failure on transition to a particular phase. 
3. In-phase system failure in a particular phase. 
4. System failure during the complete phased mission. 
and the overall contribution of the failure of a particular component to: 
5. System failure in a particular phase. 
6. System failure on transition to a particular phase. 
7. In-phase system failure in a particular phase. 
8. System failure during the complete phased mission. 
Combinations 2, 6, 7 and 8 can be measured by the existing phased mission importance measures introduced by 
Andrews [2]. However, there are no importance measure definitions for the measurement of the remaining 4 
combinations and these also have practical uses. For example, an importance measure to measure combination 4 
would be useful in the following scenario: 
An engineer wishes to determine the component to which adding a heat shield will produce the greatest 
improvement in mission failures in a system that is exposed to heat stresses solely in phase 2. In such a case, the 
importance of the components failing in phase 2 to the mission reliability is of interest. 
One of the developments to phased mission importance measures introduced in this chapter is therefore to 
expand their flexibility with regard to the phase periods that can be measured. The phased mission extensions to 
the importance measures that are introduced in this chapter have the following benefits with regard to time 
periods: 
 They are able to measure importance from all 8 of the component phase importance periods listed 
above where such a definition has meaning. For some importance measures the measurement of 
certain time period combinations has no meaning due to the way in which the measure defines 
importance. 
 A single form for the definition for measuring component importance to phase, in-phase and 
transitional system failure unlike the existing phased mission importance measures. 
There are also situations that require importance measure analysis where the periods do not consist of a series of 
phases that begin and end at a phase boundary. For example, the consequences of aircraft engine failure within 
the climb phase are reduced during the latter stages when sufficient altitude has been obtained to render a 
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successful emergency landing highly probable. Another example would be a spacecraft that had the objective of 
releasing an exploration robot midway through the cruise phase of the mission. Thus the phases from an 
objective viewpoint, such as robot release, do not coincide with the reliability phases, such as cruise. In this case 
the analysis might concentrate on finding component importance to the mission up to that mid-phase point. 
Importance measures that allow the engineer to determine the importance of component failure to mission 
failure in the precise phases and periods of interest without restriction are therefore advantageous. The phased 
mission importance measures extended from non-phased mission definitions, both those by Andrews and those 
introduced in this chapter, are only able to analyse „cause‟ periods that start and end at the phase boundaries. 
One solution might be to define more phases in the mission to create phase boundaries at the start and end of the 
time period of interest. However, that approach has the following drawbacks: 
a. Adding additional phases increases the complexity of the model, for example, the number of 
nodes in a BDD model would increase substantially. 
b. If multiple time periods are to be analysed then either multiple models with the appropriate 
phase boundaries for each or a single model with multiple additional phases would need to be 
formed. 
Each of those drawbacks adds significantly to the computational expense of the analysis. The Phased Criticality 
III Importance Measure introduced in this chapter has the ability to measure importance over precise time 
periods whilst avoiding the need to change the system reliability model.  Its advantages over other importance 
measure definitions with regard to time periods, in addition to the lower computational expense required for 
calculation, can be summarised as its: 
 Ability to measure the importance of component failure in any period to system failure in any 
period of the mission - including those that do not coincide with phase boundaries. 
 Single definition – i.e. it doesn‟t have separate definitions for in-phase, transitional and overall 
mission system failure. It therefore simplifies the analysis as there is no need to choose the 
appropriate definition of the importance measure for the analysis of specific time periods. 
This flexibility will, for example, benefit the analysis of phased missions where the consequence of system 
failure varies within phases of the mission. 
8.3 Importance Measure Definitions 
In this section each of the new importance measures are introduced. 
8.3.1 Introduction 
The importance measures given in this chapter use the symbol x to denote the „effect‟ period of the importance 
measure, where x is to be replaced by the time period of interest such as those from Table 2.2. For example, x is 
replaced by   
  for the phase j in-phase failure period. 
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8.3.2 Phased Birnbaum II Importance Measure 
A new phased mission definition of the Birnbaum importance measure is introduced in this chapter. Non-phased 
mission and phased mission definitions of this importance measures were covered in Section 7.2.2.3 and Section 
7.3.3 of the literature review respectively. It is named the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure to distinguish 
it from the Phased Birnbaum importance measure introduced by Andrews [2] that was discussed in the previous 
chapter.  
8.3.2.1 Motivation 
The motivation for this definition was to provide an importance measure with the following two properties: 
1. Its value always shows the ratio of the change in the system failure probability in a particular 
period to the change in the component failure probability in a particular period.  
2. Its value does not depend on the system failure equation being in a certain form (e.g. Henley 
and Inagaki form). 
Having property 1 is advantageous as it means that the exact reduction or increase in the system failure 
probability can be predicted for a given improvement or change in the failure probability of a component. It also 
means that reducing the probability of failure for a component ranked higher than another is certain to result in a 
larger reduction in the probability of system failure, thus helping with decisions aimed at increasing system 
reliability. The non-phased mission definition also has this property since for a non-phased mission the „cause‟ 
and „effect‟ periods are simply the operating time of the system used for the analysis. Whilst the Phased 
Birnbaum importance measures from Andrews will often give values close or the same as this property, it is not 
guaranteed and is sometimes significantly different.  Property 2, which is again shared by the non-phased 
mission definition, is desirable since it means that the importance values measures can be calculated from any 
representation, for example the BDD technique which does not retain the Henley and Inagaki form.  
8.3.2.2 Definition 
 In this section the Phased Mission Birnbaum II importance measure is defined for a component failure period 
that consists of a specific phase. 
The period x „effect‟ period Phased Birnbaum II importance measure with a phase k „cause‟ period for 
component i,      
 , is defined as the partial derivative of the probability of system failure in period x,    , with 
respect to the failure probability of component i during phase k,    , as shown by Equation 8.1. Note that  
 can 
be in any form and the derivative, 
   
    
, is calculated exactly. It therefore measures the influence of failure of the 
component i in phase k on system failure in period x of the mission. 
     
  
   
    
 8.1 
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8.3.2.3 Interpretation of importance values 
The importance value given by the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure gives the ratio of the change in the 
failure probability of the component in the „cause‟ period to the change in the system failure probability in the 
„effect‟ period. Whereas the valid values for the Birnbaum importance measures introduced in the literature 
review range from 0 to 1, the values for the phased mission interpretation introduced in this chapter range from -
1 to 1 with higher values signifying greater importance.  This section explains why they have this range and the 
interpretation of a negative value. 
In non-phased coherent systems the survival of a component can have one of two effects on the probability of 
system failure: 
1. Decrease the probability of system failure 
2. No effect on the probability of system failure 
For the Birnbaum importance measure, a component with effect 1 will have a positive importance and a 
component with effect 2 will have an importance of zero. This gives the Birnbaum importance measure its 
useful property of giving higher importance to components whose reliability has the greatest ability to influence 
the reliability of the system, and therefore lead to greater improvements in system reliability for a certain 
improvement in their own reliability. 
In phased missions, the survival of a component through a certain period can have one of three effects on the 
probability of system failure in a certain period: 
1. Decrease the probability of system failure in the time period of interest 
2. No effect on the probability of system failure in the time period of interest. 
3. Increase the probability of system failure in the time period of interest. 
For example, consider the phased mission shown in Figure 8.1 and assume that each component has a 
probability of 0.1 of failing in each phase, which gives a probability of system failure in phase 2 of 0.18, from 
                         . 
 
 
Figure 8.1 - A simple three phased mission. 
Table 8.2 shows the effect that replacing each component with an alternative that is perfectly reliable in phase 1 
has on the probability of the system failing in phase 2. 
A 
Phase 1 
B 
Phase 2 
C 
Phase 3 
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Table 8.2 – Effect of failure of a component in phase 1 on the probability of system failure in phase 2 for 
the example system described in Figure 8.1. 
Component Probability of system failure in phase 2. Effect of increasing component reliability 
in phase 1 on probability of system failure 
in phase 2. 
A 0.2 (an increase of 0.02). Increases probability of system failure in 
phase 2. 
B 0.09 (a decrease of 0.09 ). Decreases probability of system failure in 
phase 2. 
C 0.18 (no change). Has no effect on probability of system failure 
in phase 2. 
 
Reducing the failure probability of a component both reduces the probability of system failure due to failure 
modes including that component whilst simultaneously increasing the probability from those that do not include 
it. Intuitively this is due to the fact that reducing the probability of the system failure modes that include the 
component increases its exposure to the other system failure modes. Thus the reduction in the probability of 
system failure modes that include the component is always greater than or equal to the increase in the 
probability of the other failure modes since the increase in the latter is caused by the increased survival of the 
former. However, the net change in the probability of the system failure modes in the „effect‟ period may be 
negative. When the net change in the probability of the system failure modes in the „effect‟ period is negative 
we see effect 1, when it is 0 we see effect 2 and when it is positive we see effect 3. 
In coherent systems, whether or not they operate in a phased mission, reducing the probability always leads to 
an overall reduction in the probability of system failure when measured over the entire operating period of the 
system. For this reason, the values given by the non-phased mission Birnbaum importance measure to 
components in a coherent system are always non-negative. However it can lead to increases in the system failure 
probability in fractional time periods of the system operation, such as when measuring the impact of a 
component failure probability change on the system failure probability in a particular period. This is why 
reducing the failure probability of a component in a particular time period can lead to increased system failure 
probability in another time period such as in the example shown by Figure 8.1 and Table 8.2. The Phased 
Birnbaum II importance measure therefore gives a negative importance measure value when the net influence of 
decreasing the component‟s failure probability in the „cause‟ period is an increase in the net probability of the 
system failure modes in the effect period. 
8.3.2.4 Help in Decision Making 
This section explains how the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure facilitates improved decision making 
compared to the Phased Birnbaum importance measure by accounting for the net influence a component‟s 
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„cause‟ period failure probability has on the probability of all system failure modes in the „effect‟ period. An 
example of a decision often made by comparing Birnbaum importance measure values is deciding which 
component in a system should be replaced by a more reliable alternative to gain the maximum reduction in the 
system failure probability. The importance measure values given by the two phased mission definitions of the 
Birnbaum importance measure will be compared for two example phased missions to analyse their affect on the 
decision making process. 
Table 8.3 shows, for example phased mission that is shown in Figure 8.2, the importance measure values for 
each component and „effect‟ period with a „cause‟ period of phase 1. The Phased Birnbaum importance measure 
gives the components equal importance values for the phase 1 in-phase „effect‟ period whilst it does not define 
an importance value for the phase 2 in-phase „effect‟ period. The decision maker might therefore assume that a 
reduction in the phase 1 failure probability of either component would have equal effect on the system reliability 
through the mission since the components are given equal importance by this importance measure for the 
„effect‟ periods for which it is defined. 
 
 
Component failure probabilities 
Component Phase 1 Phase 2 
A 0.1 0.1 
B 0.1 0.8 
Figure 8.2 – Example phased mission used to demonstrate the improved decision making abilities of the 
Phased Birnbaum II importance measure.  
Table 8.3 - The importance measure values measuring the influence of phase 1 failure for each of the 
components in the phased mission shown in Figure 8.2. 
 Component A Component B 
 Phase 1 In-Phase Phase 2 In-Phase Phase 1 In-Phase Phase 2 In-Phase 
Phased Birnbaum 0.9 N/A 0.9 N/A 
Phased Birnbaum II 0.9 -0.8 0.9 0 
 
The Phased Birnbaum II importance measure also gives equal importance values to each component for the 
phase 1 in-phase „effect‟ period, but for the phase 2 in-phase „effect‟ period it gives a negative value to 
BA
Phase 1
B
Phase 2
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component A and a value of zero to component B. This tells the decision maker that whilst both have an equal 
effect on the probability of system failure in phase 1, the improvement for component A is offset by a significant 
increase in the probability of system failure in phase 2. They would therefore be able to determine that reducing 
component B‟s phase 1 failure probability would lead to the best overall improvement in mission reliability. 
This is confirmed by the fact that reducing the failure probability of component A in the „cause‟ period, phase 1, 
by 0.05 results in a mission failure probability of 0.905 whereas the same reduction for component B results in a 
much lower mission failure probability of 0.865.  
In the second example phased mission, shown in Figure 8.3, the second phase is instantaneous. This allows a 
full phase by phase comparison of the values given by the two Phased Birnbaum importance measure definitions 
as there are no phase 2 in-phase system failures and therefore the importance of a component with a phase 2 in-
phase „effect‟ period and phase 1 „cause‟ period, that is not defined by the Phased Birnbaum importance 
measure, can be ignored.  
 
 
 
Component failure probabilities 
Component Phase 1 
A 0.1 
B 0.7 
Figure 8.3 – Another example phased mission used to demonstrate the improved decision making abilities 
of the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure. 
Table 8.4 – The Phased Birnbaum and Phased Birnbaum II importance measure values for a phase 1 
‘cause’ period for each of the components in the phased mission shown in Figure 8.3. 
 Component A Component B 
 Phase 1 In-Phase Phase 2 
Transition 
Phase 1 In-Phase Phase 2 
Transition 
Phased Birnbaum 1 0 0 0.9 
Phased Birnbaum II 1 -0.7 0 0.9 
 
The values given by the two phased mission interpretations of the Birnbaum importance measure are shown in 
Table 8.4. In this example, the Phased Birnbaum importance measure gives values of 1 and 0 to component A 
and values of 0 and 0.9 to component B. These values suggest that the influence of the two components is 
A
Phase 1
B
Phase 2
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similar, with a slightly greater overall importance given to component A. The values given by the Phased 
Birnbaum II importance measure however instead give a much higher overall importance to component B. The 
mission reliabilities after reductions of 0.05 in the phase 1 failure probabilities of components A and B are 0.715 
and 0.685 respectively, confirming the higher relative influence of component B. The Phased Birnbaum 
importance measure has, for some situations, given importance values of 0 where the corresponding Phased 
Birnbaum II importance measure has given a negative value, such as the values for system failure on transition 
to phase 2 in the example shown in fig. 4. As discussed earlier, the non-phased Birnbaum importance measure 
gives an importance of 0 only in cases where the component‟s failure probability has no influence on the 
probability of system failure. This highlights another advantage of using the Phased Birnbaum II importance 
measure as it shows the decision maker the precise affects that changes to a component‟s reliability will have on 
the system reliability in each period of the system, whether that be an increase or decrease. For example, if 
component A in the system shown in Figure 8.3 were replaced with an alternative with better phase 1 reliability, 
the decision maker would know to expect and could plan for decreased system failures during phase 1 but 
increased failures in phase 2. 
In summary the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure, in common with the widely used non-phased version, 
helps decision making by prioritising the components for which a given reduction in failure probability leads to 
the greatest reduction in the system failure probability and by showing the exact influence of the component in 
the „cause‟ period to the system in the „effect‟ period. 
8.3.2.5 Practical Example 
In this section a practical example of the use of the Phased Mission Birnbaum II is given. 
The Scenario 
A manufacturer is considering implementing a new burn-in process for the components in a safety system that 
will reduce infant mortalities (failures that occur early in the life of the component due to latent defects). The 
safety system contains three components and operates over three phases. The burn-in process is expensive and 
will only be applied to one of the components. An engineer wants to determine which component should be 
chosen based on the following: 
1. It should not increase the probability of system failure in phase 2 as failures in that phase are 
hazardous and already at the maximum level specified by regulation.  
2. Amongst those complying with rule 1 above, the component for which the burn-in process 
leads to the maximum reduction in phase 3 system failure probability should be chosen. 
The phase failure probabilities for the three components are given in Table 8.5 which shows that the burn-in 
process reduces each component‟s phase 1 failure probability by 0.05. The phase fault trees for the system‟s 
mission are shown in Figure 8.4. 
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Table 8.5 – Safety system component phase failure probabilities. 
Component Phase 1 (with burn-in) Phase 2 Phase 3 
A 0.20 (0.15) 0.15 0.05 
B 0.25 (0.20) 0.20 0.05 
C 0.20 (0.15) 0.25 0.10 
 
 
Figure 8.4 – Safety system phased mission fault trees. 
The Solution 
The engineer can easily find the solution to this problem using the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure. The 
first task is to determine those components for which applying the burn-in procedure will not lead to an increase 
in phase 2 system failure probability. Since the burn-in procedure reduces each component‟s phase 1 failure 
probability, it will lead to an increase in the probability of phase 2 system failure for any component with a 
negative Phased Birnbaum II importance for phase 2 „effect‟ and phase 1 „cause‟ periods. Only component A is 
assigned a negative importance by this and therefore only components B and C are suitable for the application of 
the burn-in process. 
Table 8.6 – The phase 2 and phase 3 ‘effect’ period Phased Birnbaum II importance measure values for 
phase 1 ‘cause’ period for each component. 
Component Phase 2 ‘effect’ period Phased 
Birnbaum II importance measure 
for phase 1 ‘cause’ period 
Phase 3 ‘effect’ period Phased Birnbaum 
II importance measure for phase 1 
‘cause’ period 
A -0.4500 -0.0275 
B 0.8000 0.0000 
C 0.0000 0.4400 
 
Phase 1 
A 
Phase 2 
B 
Phase 3 
B
A 
C
A 
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The most suitable component from the remaining options, components B and C, is whichever leads to the 
greatest reduction in the probability of system failure in phase 3.  This is the component with the highest phase 3 
„effect‟ period Phased Birnbaum II importance measure for phase 1 „cause‟ period, since: 
 That importance measure gives the ratio of the change in the phase 3 system failure 
probability to the change in the phase 1 component failure probability. 
 The application of the burn-in process results in an identical change in the phase 1 failure 
probability for both components B and C. 
The phase 3 „effect‟ period Phased Birnbaum II importance measure values for phase 1 „cause‟ period are 0 for 
component B and 0.44 for component C, as shown in column three of Table 8.6. The engineer should therefore 
choose to apply the burn-in procedure to component C. 
The Birnbaum importance values for each component can be calculated when the design of a system is frozen, 
since they depend only on the system‟s reliability structure and are independent of any changes to the reliability 
of its components. These importance measure values could then be published with the system‟s design 
documentation and used in future reliability decisions such as in the example given here. 
8.3.3 Phased Criticality II Importance Measure 
This section introduces an extension to phased missions for the Criticality importance measure that was covered 
in Section 7.2.2.4 and Section 7.3.4 of the literature review. It is named the Phased Criticality II importance 
measure to distinguish it from the Phased Criticality importance measure that was introduced by Andrews [2] 
and because it is based on the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure that was introduced in the previous 
section. 
8.3.3.1 Motivation 
The main motivation for this new definition was to provide an importance measure that gives the precise 
influence of the failure probability of a component on the system failure probability, such that the system failure 
probability in the „effect‟ period would be proportionally reduced by precisely the Criticality II importance 
measure value of the component when it is replaced by an alternative that is perfectly reliable in the „cause‟ 
period (i.e. has no influence on the system failure).  This is a useful property of the non-phased Criticality 
importance measure definition that the Phased Criticality importance measure lacks. A further motivation was to 
find a definition that requires the computation of fewer Birnbaum importance measures than the Phased Mission 
Criticality importance measure when the calculation of the overall Criticality of a component to a phased 
mission is required. This is a problem because the calculation of many Birnbaum importance measures has high 
computation expense.  
8.3.3.2 Definition 
The period x „effect‟ period Phased Criticality II importance measure with a phase k „cause‟ period for 
component i,      
 , is defined as the product of the corresponding Phased Birnbaum II importance measure, 
     
 , and the probability that component i fails in phase k,    , divided by the probability of system failure in 
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period x, as shown in Equation 8.2. The overall period x „effect‟ period Phased Criticality II importance measure 
for component i,     
 , is defined by Equation 8.3. These importance measures give the influence of failure of 
component i in phase k on the system failure in period x. Therefore the reduction in the system failure 
probability in period x resulting from an elimination of component i failures in phase k (assuming its failure 
probability in other phases remains unchanged) and over the whole mission can be found by multiplying    by 
the Phased Criticality II importance measure value. For example, a value of 0.25 indicates that the probability of 
system failure in period x would be reduced by 25% from its current value if component i failures in phase k or 
over the complete mission were eliminated for the definitions given in Equations 8.2 and 8.3 respectively. A 
value of -0.25, in contrast, indicates that the probability of system failure in period x would increase by 25% if 
the component i failures were eliminated. 
     
  
     
    
  
 8.2 
    
  
      
    
 
   
  
 8.3 
From Equation 8.3 it is apparent that the mission Phased Criticality II importance measure calculation for a 
component requires the calculation of n Birnbaum importance measures, whereas the number required by the 
equivalent Andrews Phased Criticality that is defined by Equation 7.59 is given by Equation 8.4. Since the 
Birnbaum importance measures involves the calculation of the change in the system failure probability for a 
change in a component reliability, it is clearly the most expensive operation in the Criticality importance 
calculations – the expense of the multiplication by the component failure probability and division by the system 
failure probability are insignificant in comparison.  Since this is the most expensive operation in the Phased 
Criticality calculations, the new Phased Criticality definition represents a reduction in the complexity from 
quadratic,      , to linear,     , in the number of mission phases. For example, the calculation of the mission 
Phased Criticality II importance for a given component in a 10 phase mission would require the calculation of 
10 Birnbaum importance measures compared to the 55 required by the Phased Criticality importance, a 
significant reduction. 
       
      
 
 8.4 
8.3.3.3 Interpretation of importance values 
As with the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure, the range of this importance measure is -1 to 1, with 
higher values signifying greater importance. The value has the same interpretation as the non-phased definition, 
i.e. the influence of the component on the system failure probability. Therefore the system probability would 
reduce by the importance measure value (or increase for a negative importance value) if the component failures 
were eliminated.  
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8.3.3.4 Help in Decision Making 
The Phased Criticality II importance measure has the advantage over the Phased Criticality importance measure 
that its value gives the precise influence of the component on the system failure probability. For example,  
Table 8.8 shows the importance values assigned to the components by the two definitions for the components 
from the phased mission with the phase fault trees shown in Figure 8.4 and with component phase failure 
probabilities shown in Table 8.7. 
Table 8.7 – Component phase failure probabilities for example phased mission. 
Component Phase 1 (with burn-in) Phase 2 Phase 3 
A 0.40 0.05 0.30 
B 0.15 0.20 0.30 
C 0.05 0.30 0.05 
 
Since the importance value given to a component by the Phased Criticality II importance measure shows the 
change in the system failure probability in the „cause‟ period due to the elimination of component failures in the 
„effect‟ period, it is clear from the Phased Criticality II importance shown in  
Table 8.8 that the probability of mission failure would be reduced by 18% if component C did not fail during the 
mission, a significant reduction. 
Table 8.8 – Mission Phased Criticality importance measure values assigned to each component by the two 
Criticality importance measure definitions for phased missions. 
Component Mission Phased Criticality 
Importance 
Mission Phased Criticality II 
Importance 
A 0.600 0.33 
B 0.400 0.40 
C 0.013 0.18 
 
Thus, it would be apparent to a decision maker analysing the Phased Criticality II importance values that 
component C, whilst not as influential as components B and A which are ranked as most and second most 
important respectively, has a large contribution to the current mission reliability. They would also see the exact 
influence each component has without the need for any additional calculations in the same way that they would 
with the non-phased Criticality definition.  The Phased Criticality importance measure, however, assigns highest 
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importance to component A and assigns very little importance to component C. With the non-phased definition, 
removing the contribution to system failure of the highest ranked component results in the largest decrease in 
the probability of system failure, however this is not the case with the Phased Criticality, as if that were the case 
component B would be ranked highest as it is with the Phased Criticality II definition.  The importance values 
assigned by the Phased Criticality definition also do not reflect the precise influence of the component on the 
system reliability as illustrated by the fact that it assigns an importance to component C that is around 2% of the 
value it assigns to component A when the relative reduction in mission unreliability that would result from 
removing the contribution of component C compared to that of component A is actually around 50%. 
8.3.3.5 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
During the development of a new unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), it is found that the initial prototype of its 
surveillance system often fails during the third phase of its test mission. Due to the nature of the intended 
operations for the UAV, it is critical that failures in that period are avoided. If the system fails earlier then the 
mission can be aborted without compromising the UAV and if it fails later then the most important surveillance 
data will have already been captured. The development team want to determine the influence that the phase 2 
reliability of each component has on the phase 3 in-phase system failure probability. 
The Solution 
The team could calculate the phase 3 „effect‟ period in-phase Phased Criticality II importance measure with a 
phase 2 „cause‟ period for each component in the system. The importance value for each component would then 
correspond to the precise proportional reduction (or increase if negative) in the phase 3 in-phase system failure 
probability that would result from eliminating the possibility of it failing during phase 2. Ranking the 
components from highest importance to lowest would show the components with greatest influence and this 
information could be useful if they wanted to improve the in-phase 3 reliability of the system. 
8.3.4 Phased DIM 
The differential importance measure (DIM) that was developed by Borgonovo and Apostolakis [57] for 
measuring the importance of components from non-phased mission systems, gives the same rankings as the 
Birnbaum or Criticality importance measure dependant on the calculation method used. In this section, an 
equivalent definition is given for the measurement of the importance of components from phased mission 
systems. 
8.3.4.1 Definition 
The definition for the period x „effect‟ period Phased DIM with a phase k „cause‟ period for component i, 
     
 , is given by Equation 8.5, where      represents a variation in the phase k failure probability of 
component i and    is the total number of components in the system. The overall period x „effect‟ period 
Phased DIM for component i,     
 , is defined by Equation 8.6. 
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Calculating the Phased DIM with      as a uniform fixed quantity for all components gives absolute importance 
values that are proportional to those from the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure.  Alternatively, 
calculating the phased DIM with      as an identical proportion of the phase k failure probability of each 
component gives absolute importance values that are proportional to those from the Phased Criticality II 
importance measure. It therefore follows that the fixed and proportional quantity calculation methods result in 
identical component importance rankings as the Phased Birnbaum II and Phased Criticality II importance 
measures respectively. Since there are two ways to calculate the Phased DIM and each gives different absolute 
and relative importance values, it is important to state which method was used when presenting its results. 
8.3.4.2 Interpretation of importance values 
The value of the Phased DIM ranges from -1 to 1, with higher values signifying greater importance. As with the 
non-phased mission definition, the importance value assigned to a component by the Phased DIM gives its 
importance relative to that of all components from the same system. Since it gives relative importance and has 
no precise predictive qualities, the use of the Phased Birnbaum II or Phased Criticality II importance measures 
are advantageous when analysing the importance of single components. However, the Phased DIM does provide 
a basis for a useful group importance measure definition and this motivates its inclusion here.  
8.3.5 Phased Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) 
The Risk Achievement Worth (RAW) [54], discussed in Section 7.2.2.1, gives a measure of the achievement of 
the component in attaining the current system failure probability. A component given high importance by this 
measure is a key contributor in limiting the system failure probability to its current level and, for example, 
shows that replacing this component with a less reliable alternative would lead to a significant increase in the 
probability of system failure. This importance measure is extended to phased missions in this section with 
definitions for both the importance of the component in a particular phase and the importance of the component 
over the complete phased mission. 
8.3.5.1 Definitions 
The overall period x „effect‟ period Phased RAW for component i,   
 , is defined by Equation 8.7. 
  
      
         
  
          
8.7 
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8.3.5.2 Interpretation of importance values 
This importance measure has the same range as its non-phased counterpart, i.e. 0 to 1, with higher values 
indicating higher achievement. The importance value given to a component by this importance measure signifies 
the current achievement of the component as the ratio of the value of    to    if the component were to always 
fail at the point during the mission that maximised   . It is therefore an indicator of the achievement, with 
respect to the „effect‟ period system reliability, of the actual reliability compared to worse case reliability of the 
component. Thus a component with high importance through this measure is suppressing system failures during 
the „effect‟ period compared to a component with worst case reliability. 
8.3.5.3 Practical Example 
A practical example of a situation in which this new importance measure would prove useful is given below. 
The Scenario 
A manufacturer needs to reduce the production cost of an electronic pump that operates in cycles of three phases 
(start-up, forward flow, reverse flow) so that it remains competitive in the market. The design team have 
produced new lower cost designs for two different components in the system, however since these parts are new 
and untested their reliability is unknown. Due to the nature of the application of the system it is critical that it 
does not fail and the manufacturer has decided that just one of the newly designed components will be 
introduced initially, thus minimising risk compared to introducing both simultaneously. The manufacturer 
wishes to determine which of the newly designed components should be chosen for introduction based on the 
requirement of avoiding system failures during the critical phase. 
The Solution 
 By measuring the overall reverse flow phase „effect‟ period RAW for the two components that are currently in 
the system and candidates for replacement by the new design, the manufacturer can determine which is 
achieving the least with respect to system failure probability in that phase (i.e. has the lowest RAW value) and 
should be replaced. In this way the manufacturer can avoid risking replacing a component that is performing 
well in keeping the probability of system failure at a low value during the reverse flow phase (i.e. that has a high 
RAW value). If, however, the manufacturer were able to determine the reliability of the newly designed 
components prior to replacement then they would be able to use the Phased Birnbaum II importance measure 
instead and determine the exact changes in the system failure probability during the reverse flow phase when 
either of the components were replaced, thereby eliminating the risk altogether. 
8.3.6 Phased Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) 
The Risk Reduction Worth (RRW) [54], discussed in Section 7.2.2.2, defines the importance of a component as 
its potential to reduce the probability of system failure. It therefore gives components with both high structural 
influence and high probability of failure the highest importance, since reducing their failure probability leads to 
large reductions in the system failure probability and they can also, potentially, be improved the most. Its 
extension to phased missions that is given in this section retains the same interpretation. 
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8.3.7 Definitions 
The period x „effect‟ period Phased RRW for component i,    
 , is defined by Equation 8.8, where          is 
defined as the probability of system failure in period x conditional on component i being perfectly reliable 
through the mission.  
  
  
  
        
 8.8 
8.3.7.1 Interpretation of importance values 
As with the non-phased RRW, the range of the Phased RRW is 1 to  , with higher values signifying greater 
importance. The importance value assigned to a component gives the factor by which the probability of system 
failure in the „effect‟ period would be reduced if the component were replaced by an alternative that were 
perfectly reliable. For example, a value of 3 indicates that the probability of system failure in the „effect‟ period 
would fall to 33% of its current value if failures of the component were eliminated. 
8.3.7.2 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
A chemical processing plant operator wishes to improve the reliability of a system that performs a two phase 
distillation process and currently has a higher than desired probability of failure in the final phase. The operator 
wants to improve the reliability of the system in that phase by improving the reliability of a component in the 
system. However, due to the costs involved with improving component reliability, the operator only wishes to 
proceed if the probability of system failure in the final phase can potentially be reduced by a factor of 1.5 
through an improvement in the reliability of a single component. 
The Solution 
The phase 2 „effect‟ period Phased RRW importance values can be calculated for each component in the system 
and the operator can then proceed with the component reliability improvement plan if any has a value of greater 
than 1.5. For example, if the phased mission for the distillation process is represented by the phase fault trees 
and component failure probabilities shown in Figure 8.5, then the resulting phase 2 „effect‟ period Phased RRW 
importance values for components A, B and C are given by Equations 8.9 to 8.11. In this case, component C 
with an importance of 1.92 is the only component with an importance greater than 1.5 and therefore the only 
suitable candidate for reliability improvement due to the requirements of the operator. The value of 1.92 
indicates that if component C were made perfectly reliability, the probability that the system fails during the 
second phase would be reduced by a factor of 1.92 from its current value. 
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Component failure probabilities 
Component Phase 1 Phase 2 
A 0.2 0.2 
B 0.3 0.3 
C 0.1 0.3 
Figure 8.5 – Example phased mission for a distillation process. 
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8.3.8 Phased Fussell-Vesely Importance Measure 
The non-phased definition Fussell-Vesely, given in Section 7.2.2.5, is a widely used importance measure and 
this provides an analogous definition for phased missions. 
8.3.8.1 Definitions 
The definition for the period x „effect‟ Phased Fussell-Vesely importance measure for component i,    
 , is 
given by Equation 8.12, where   
  is the set of minimal implicants for period x that include the failure of 
component i  and    is the probability of mission failure in period x. 
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8.3.8.2 Interpretation of importance values 
The Phased Fussell-Vesely importance measure has a range of 0 to 1, with higher values signifying greater 
importance, the same as the non-phased definition. The importance value assigned to a component indicates the 
probability that an implicant containing the failure of the component will occur during the „effect‟ system failure 
period. 
Phase 1
A B
Phase 2
A C
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8.3.8.3 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
A pump control system that operates in a two phased mission with the phase fault trees shown in Figure 8.6 and 
component phase failure probabilities shown in Table 8.9, fails during the final phase. An engineer has been 
tasked with determining which components are most likely to have failed and caused an implicant to occur so 
that they can prioritise the testing and repairing of them.  
 
Figure 8.6 – Fault trees for pump control system mission. 
 
Table 8.9 - Component failure probabilities for each phase of pump control system mission. 
Component Phase 1 Phase 2 
A  0.05 0.1 
B 0.2 0.1 
C 0.1 0.1 
The Solution 
By calculating the phase 2 „effect‟ period Phased Fussell-Vesely importance measure for each component in the 
system and then ranking them from highest to lowest importance, the engineering team can test the highest 
importance components first, since these are the most likely to have failed and caused a phase 2 mission 
implicant to occur.  From the phase fault trees and component failure probabilities for the pump control system 
phased mission, the phase 2 implicants are                    and the probability of system failure in that phase 
is 0.16. The phase 2 „effect‟ period Phased Fussell-Vesely importance value for each component in the system 
are given in  
Phase 1
A B
Phase 2
BA
C
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Table 8.10, showing that if the system fails in phase 2 then an implicant including the failure of component C is 
far more likely to have occurred than an implicant including the failure of component B or C. 
Table 8.10 - Phase 2 Phased Fussell-Vesely importance for each component in the pump control system. 
Component Phase 2 Phased Fussell-Vesely 
A 0.0625 
B 0.0625 
C 0.9500 
8.3.9 Phased Criticality III Importance Measure 
The Phased Criticality III Importance Measure is an entirely new importance measure definition that gives the 
same component rankings as the Phased Criticality II importance measure but has some useful advantages. 
8.3.9.1 Motivation 
The motivation for the development of this importance measure was the requirement for an importance measure 
that is able to measure component importance from a „cause‟ period that does not coincide with a phase 
boundary. For example, consider a space craft that during its descent to earth experiences a period of extreme 
heat exposure for a short period on re-entry to the atmosphere of the earth whilst the reliability structure of many 
of its sub systems remains the same.  In this case, measuring the importance for a „cause‟ period consisting of 
only this re-entry period to a „effect‟ period of the mission might be of interest in identifying components for 
which adding a heat shield would lead to the greatest improvement in mission reliability. 
It also has a computational advantage when measuring component importance from a „cause‟ period spanning 
multiple phases, such as when measuring overall importance to a phased mission, compared to the Phased 
Criticality II importance measure. This is beneficial when fast calculations are required or when analysing 
systems that operate in phased missions with high phase counts. 
8.3.9.2 Definition 
The previous Criticality importance measure definitions utilise the Birnbaum importance measure in their 
definitions, which is itself normally calculated by taking extreme values for the component failure probability (0 
and 1). The Phased Criticality III instead uses a different and unique approach involving the modification of the 
component failure distribution so that its probability of failure over the „cause‟ period is reduced by 1%. This 
not only allows any „cause‟ period to be measured but also avoids the need to separately calculate and sum 
contributions from individual phase periods when a „cause‟ period spans multiple phases as is necessary with 
the Phased Criticality and Phased Criticality II definitions. The probability that component i is failed at time t if 
its probability of failure between times    and    is reduced by 1% compared to its baseline distribution, denoted 
  
          , is given by Equation 8.13 where       is its failure probability density function. The first integral 
term in Equation 8.13 represents the probability of failure before the 1% reduction period is reached, the second 
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term represents the probability of failure during that period and the third term represents the probability of 
failure after the period. 
  
                                             
         
  
                 
  
         
 
 
where        
8.13 
The period x „effect‟ period Phased Criticality III importance measure with „cause‟ period    to   ,  for 
component i,          
 , can then be defined as the change in the system failure probability during period x caused 
by a 1% reduction in the probability of component i failing during the „cause‟ period, weighted by the 
probability of system failure during period x, multiplied by 100, as shown by Equation 8.14. 
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Equation 8.14 shows that the Phased Criticality II importance measure requires only one calculation of a system 
failure change for a change in the failure probability of the component. This means that the algorithmic 
complexity of the overall importance of a component to the mission calculation is constant with the number of 
mission phases for the Phased Criticality III importance measure,     , whereas it is quadratic,       and 
linear,     , for the Phased Criticality and Phased Criticality II importance measures. The computational 
performance of the Criticality III importance measure is therefore far better than the other Phased Criticality 
importance measure definitions for systems that operate in phase missions consisting of high numbers of phases. 
8.3.9.3 Interpretation of importance values 
The range of this importance measure is -1 to 1, with higher values signifying greater importance. The values 
given by this importance measure have exactly the same meaning as those given by the Phased Criticality II 
importance measure, i.e. the influence of the component on the system failure probability, but the Phased 
Criticality III has the advantage that the measured „cause‟ period can be any period in the mission and does not 
have to start and end at a phase boundary. 
8.3.9.4 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
A certain rocket launching system has three components (A, B and C) and performs a three phased mission 
during the launch of a rocket. Each phase in the mission lasts 30 seconds and the reliability structure of the 
system in each phase is given by the phase fault trees shown in Figure 8.7.  
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Figure 8.7 – Phase fault trees for the rocket launcher system. 
 
The three components have the identical Weibull failure distribution given by Equation 8.15, where t is the 
component mission age in seconds. The hazard function for the components is plotted in Figure 8.8 and shows 
that the components suffer from a high hazard rate over the first 20 seconds of the mission due to infant 
mortality (e.g. failures due to defects in the manufacture of the components), after which the hazard rate is 
approximately constant. 
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Figure 8.8 – Plot of hazard rate against time for components in the rocket launching system. 
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The designers of the system want to find out: 
1. The influence the infant mortality of each component has on the mission reliability so that 
they can predict the reliability benefits that would result from the implementation of a burn-in 
program. 
2. The overall influence of each component on the mission reliability. 
The Solution 
Since the ends of the infant mortality periods for the components do not coincide with a phase boundary, the 
Phased Criticality and Phased Criticality II cannot be used for the first analysis. The Phased Criticality III, 
however, is able to determine the precise contributions on the mission reliability from failures due to infant 
mortality alone. The mission „effect‟ period Phased Criticality III importance measures for a „cause‟ period from 
0 to 20 seconds for components A, B and C are given by Equations 8.16 to 8.18. The importance values show 
that the infant mortality failures of component A has the greatest influence on the mission reliability since 
eliminating infant mortalities for that component would result in a 46.8% reduction in mission failures, 
compared to 17.3% and 31.2% reductions for component B and C respectively . The large importance values, 
particularly for component A and B, also show that infant mortalities are a significant contributor to the overall 
mission failure probability. 
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For the second part of the analysis, finding the overall influence of each component on the mission unreliability, 
the Phased Criticality III importance measure can also be used. The importance value calculations are given by 
Equations 8.19 to 8.21. This shows that component A has the highest and component C the lowest overall 
influence on the mission unreliability, with the failure of component A influential in all mission failures. 
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Note that the equivalent calculations for the second analysis using the Phased Criticality importance measure 
instead would require the system reliability equations for in-phase and transitional failure for each phase and the 
calculation of 6 separate system to component reliability differentials – a significant increase in complexity. The 
reduction in computational expense realised by using the Phased Criticality III compared to the alternative 
criticality definitions is even more substantial when analysing systems operating in phased missions with higher 
phase counts. 
8.4 First Order Group Importance Measures 
Group importance measures give the importance of a group of components and can be used, for example, to 
compare the importance of different subsystems. They are very useful since the importance of a group of 
components does not necessarily correspond with the importance of the individual components in that group, i.e. 
a set of components may have higher importance as a group than another set of components that have higher 
importance individually. This section introduces a first order group importance measure that does not, therefore, 
account for the higher order interactions between components that lead to changes in the importance of 
components with the change in the reliability of others. It is therefore only suitable for ranking the importance of 
a group of components if those higher order interactions are likely to be small, such as when the purpose of the 
ranking is to determine which group of components is optimum for a small improvement in each of their 
reliabilities, with respect to improving the system reliability. 
8.4.1 Phased Group DIM 
The Group DIM that was discussed in Section 7.2.4.1 gives the importance of a group of components operating 
in a non-phased mission and is extended in this section to components from phased mission systems. The 
Phased Group DIM has the advantage that, like its non-phased mission counterpart, the calculation of the 
importance of a group of components is found directly from the sum of their individual DIM values. 
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8.4.1.1 Definition 
The definition for the period x „effect‟ period Phased Group DIM with a phase m „cause‟ period for components 
i, j and k,         
 
 , is given by Equation 8.22.  
        
 
       
       
       
  
8.22 
The overall period x „effect‟ period Phased Group DIM for components i, j and k,         
 , is defined by 
Equation 8.23. As the definitions show, the Phased Group DIM value for a group of components is the sum of 
their equivalent individual Phased DIM values and, therefore, little additional computation is required. 
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8.4.1.2 Interpretation of importance values 
The range of this importance measure is -1 to 1, with higher values signifying greater importance. This 
importance value it assigns to a group of components signifies the relative importance of the components in that 
group compared to all components from the same system. Note that, since the Group Phased DIM is a first order 
group importance measure, the importance rankings are only valid for small variations in the „cause‟ period 
failure probability of the components in each group. For example, when the individual component Phased DIM 
values are calculated for uniform variations to give individual component rankings that match those from the 
Phased Birnbaum II, reducing the „effect‟ period failure probability of the components from a group ranked as 
most important by the Phased Group DIM may not lead to the maximal reduction in the „effect‟ period system 
failure reliability, compared to the same action for lower ranked groups, if the component failure probability 
improvements is large. 
8.4.1.3 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
A certain system involved in the refinement of petroleum operates in a phased mission. The Phased DIM values 
for the individual components in the system have already been calculated and the operator wants to quickly 
compare the relative importance of several of its subsystems to the final phase of the mission. The operator will 
use the information to determine which subsystem will be subjected to increased preventive maintenance, which 
is expected to result in a small decrease in the failure probability of its components. 
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The Solution 
The operator can quickly find the overall final phase „effect‟ period Group Phased DIM for each subsystem by 
summing the individual overall final phase „effect‟ period Phased DIMs of its constituent components. The 
subsystems can therefore be ranked and their relative importance compared with minimal calculations necessary 
and, since the expected reliability improvement for the components in the selected subsystem is small, these 
rankings are likely to be accurate and unaffected by any higher order component interactions.  
8.5 Higher Order Group Importance Measures 
Higher order group importance measures account for the interactions between components within the group to 
give precise values for their importance and provide information that is very useful for optimising the reliability 
of a phased mission when the reliability of multiple components is to be varied. The disadvantage compared to 
the Group DIM is that they have a comparatively higher computational expense. The higher order group 
importance measures that have been developed for non-phased missions and were discussed in Section 7.2.5, 
namely the Group RAW, Group RRW, Joint Importance Measure and Differential Importance Measure II are all 
extended to phased missions in this section. In addition, an extension to the Phased Criticality III importance 
measure for component groups is introduced.  
8.5.1 Phased Group RAW 
The Group RAW for non-phased mission systems, discussed in Section 7.2.5.2, measures the achievement of a 
group of components in attaining the current system unreliability. An equivalent definition for the analysis of 
components from phased mission systems is introduced in this section. 
8.5.1.1 Definitions 
The period x „effect‟ period Phased Group RAW for the group of components i, j and k,       
 , is defined by 
Equation 8.24, where                       is the system failure probability in period x when 
components i, j and k are failed in phased l, m and n respectively. 
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8.5.1.2 Interpretation of importance values 
The values for the Phased Group RAW range from 0 to 1, with higher values indicating higher achievement. 
The value assigned to a component group by the period x Phased Group RAW is the ratio of    if the 
components in the group were to fail in the set of phases that maximised it, to the current   . It therefore gives 
the achievement of the group, with respect to   , in comparison to their worst case reliability. 
  
204 
 
8.5.1.3 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
An emergency sprinkler system performs a three phased mission in response to a fire alert. The system is 
constructed by the manufacturer by integrating three subsystems, each of which contains a number of 
components and is procured from a separate supplier. The manufacturer wishes to evaluate the achievement of 
each subsystem in achieving the current mission reliability, so that any found to have a poor achievement can be 
investigated and an alternative equivalent subsystem, perhaps from a different supplier, considered. 
The Solution 
The manufacturer can apply the Phased Group RAW to the group of components from each subsystem and then 
analyse the achievement values allocated. If a low achievement value is assigned to the group of components 
from a particular subsystem then this indicates that it has close to the worst case reliability with respect to the 
three phased mission and should be investigated. There would be little risk of increasing the mission 
unreliability by replacing a subsystem with low achievement with an alternative subsystem. 
8.5.2 Phased Group RRW 
In this section, an extension of the non-phased mission Group RRW, discussed in Section 7.2.5.3, to a definition 
for the analysis of components from phased mission systems is introduced. This definition gives a measure of 
the maximum possible improvement in system failure probability that could be achieved through improving the 
reliability of a group of components. 
8.5.2.1 Definition 
The period x „effect‟ period Phased RRW for the group of components i, j and k,       
 , is defined by Equation 
8.25 where                    is the probability of system failure in period x if all three components 
were perfectly reliable. 
      
  
  
                  
 8.25 
8.5.2.2 Interpretation of importance values 
The values assigned to a group of components by this importance measure range from 0 to  , with higher 
values indicating greater importance. The value assigned to a group is the ratio of the current    value to the 
value of    if the group of components were perfectly reliable. It therefore gives the maximum improvement in 
   that can be attained through the reliability of the components in that group. 
  
205 
 
8.5.2.3 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
A company is looking for a supplier of a de-icing system that meets a specified reliability requirement over the 
five phased mission in which it will operate. A manufacturer is interested in supplying their system but its 
current design has a mission reliability that is 80% of the required value. The manufacturer has identified 
several subsystems within the system that contribute to mission failures and wishes to determine if improving 
the reliability of one of those subsystems could result in a system that meets the mission reliability requirement 
of the supplier. 
The Solution 
The manufacturer could apply the mission „effect‟ period Phased Group RRW to each of the subsystem 
component groups and then rank those groups by importance. Each of those with a value of 1.25 or greater 
would indicate that sufficient improvement to the reliability of that subsystem would result in a system that 
meets the mission reliability requirement. 
8.5.3 Phased Joint Birnbaum II Importance Measure 
The Phased Joint Birnbaum II importance measure gives the impact of the reliability of one component on the 
Phased Birnbaum II importance of the other in a pair of components. This can help to determine which 
components to improve the reliability of when the goal is to improve the reliability of the system. A pair of 
components with negative joint importance indicates that improving the reliability of one component would 
result in a greater system reliability improvement from the reliability improvement of the other and they should, 
therefore, be improved simultaneously if possible. On the contrary, improving the reliability of one component 
from a pair with positive joint importance would result in reduced impact on the system reliability from the 
improvement of the other and therefore their simultaneous improvement will have a lesser influence on the 
system reliability than if the component reliability interactions were absent. 
8.5.3.1 Definition 
The period x „effect‟ period Phased Joint Birnbaum II importance with a phase m „cause‟ period for components 
i and j,        
 
 , is given by Equation 8.26. It therefore shows the change in the period x „effect‟ period Phased 
Birnbaum II importance with phase m „cause‟ period for a component when the phase m reliability of another is 
changed. 
       
 
  
    
        
 8.26 
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8.5.3.2 Interpretation of importance values 
The range of values for this importance measure is -1 to 1 with higher values indicating a stronger correlation 
between the Phased Birnbaum II and reliability of the components in the pair. The value indicates the rate of 
change in the importance of one component with the change in the reliability of the other, with a positive value 
indicating that the correlation is positive (i.e. reducing the reliability of one reduces the importance of the other 
and vice versa) and a negative value indicating a negative correlation. 
8.5.3.3 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
A certain aircraft landing gear actuator system operates in a phased mission over a flight consisting of two 60 
second phases, stowaway and extension, for which the fault trees are shown in Figure 8.9. The components in 
the system have the exponential failure distributions given by Equations  8.27 to 8.29, where t is the component 
mission age in seconds. 
 
Figure 8.9 – Phase fault tree for aircraft landing gear actuator system example. 
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The system currently has a high probability of failure in phase 2 and a reliability engineer wishes to determine 
how to reduce this by improving the phase 2 reliability of its components. 
The Solution 
In order to determine which components the reliability engineer should improve the phase 2 reliability of in 
order to increase the phase 2 reliability of the system, the first step is to calculate the phase 2 „effect‟ period 
Phased Birnbaum II importance with a phase 2 „cause‟ period for each component, as shown by Equations 8.30 
to 8.32. These importance values show that a given reduction in the phase 2 failure probability of either 
Phase 1 Phase 2 
A B C
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component B or C will result in an improvement in the system reliability of approximately half that amount, e.g. 
a reduction of 0.05 in the phase 2 failure probability for component B will result in a 0.025 reduction in the 
system failure probability in the same phase. 
     
  
   
    
   8.30 
     
  
   
    
 0.499 8.31 
     
  
   
    
       8.32 
 
However, if the simultaneous improvement of multiple components is being considered then it is important to 
also determine how the importance of each component varies with the reliability of others. The reliability 
engineer could therefore also calculate the phase 2 „effect‟ period Phased Joint Birnbaum II importance with a 
phase 2 „cause‟ period for each component pair, as shown by Equations 8.33 to 8.35. The values of 0 for the 
component pairs that include component A show that its phase 2 reliability is independent of the phase 2 Phased 
Birnbaum II importance of the other components (and, similarly, that its importance is independent of their 
reliability). However, the high negative value for component pair A and B shows that improving the phase 2 
reliability of either of those components increases the phase 2 Phased Birnbaum II importance of the other. This 
indicates that it would be beneficial to improve the phase 2 reliability of both components B and C in tandem, 
since each reduction in the phase 2 failure probability of one component not only reduces the phase 2 system 
failure probability but also increases the amount by which a reduction in the phase 2 failure probability of the 
other will reduce the phase 2 system failure probability. 
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8.5.4 Phased Group Criticality III Importance Measure 
The Phased Criticality III can also be extended to the measurement of the importance of groups of components 
and the definition for this, the Phased Group Criticality III importance measure, is given in this section. This is a 
very useful importance measure as it gives the precise influence that the failures of the group of components in a 
specified „cause‟ period have on the system reliability in a specified „effect‟ period. 
8.5.4.1 Definition 
The period x „effect‟ period Phased Group Criticality III importance with „cause‟ period    to    for components 
i, j and k,          
     
 , is defined by Equation 8.36, where         
                
              
  
            is the probability of system failure in period x when the probability of failure for each of the 
components is reduced by 1% in the „cause‟ period. 
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Note that if an equivalent importance measure were to be defined using the Phased Criticality or Phased 
Criticality II importance measure then it would require the summation of the contributions from all possible 
different „cause‟ failure phase combinations between the components in the group and would therefore entail 
significant computational expense if the component group were large or the „cause‟ period spanned multiple 
phases (such as when measuring overall contribution of a component group to phased mission reliability). The 
Phased Criticality III importance measure avoids this and allows the importance of a group of components to be 
calculated with approximately the same computational expense as for a single component. 
8.5.4.2 Interpretation of importance values 
The range of this importance measure is -1 to 1 with higher values indicating higher importance. The 
importance value assigned to a group of components indicates the influence that the group of components has on 
  , i.e. the proportional reduction (or increase if negative) in     that would occur if the components in the 
group were perfectly reliable during the „cause‟ period. 
8.5.4.3 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
An anti-aircraft cruise missile system operates in a phased mission that starts with launch and ends with impact 
at its target. The high g-forces experienced by the subsystems of the missile, caused by sharp manoeuvring in 
the last part of the final phase of the mission prior to impact, induce high component failure rates. The design 
team of the missile wish to determine the influence of the reliability of each subsystem during this final stage of 
the final phase on the overall mission reliability. 
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The Solution 
The design team could apply the mission „effect‟ period Phased Group Criticality III with the high g-force 
„cause‟ period for the group of components from each subsystem. The value assigned to each group would 
indicate the exact influence of the failures of the components in that group during the high g-force period have 
on the mission reliability. Ranking the subsystems by this importance measure would, for example, show which 
subsystems would benefit the mission reliability if their robustness to g-forces were improved. 
8.5.5 Phased DIM II 
The DIM
II
 importance measure, discussed in Section 7.2.5.4, defines the importance of a pair of components as 
the influence that a variation in their reliabilities has on the system reliability relative to that of all component 
pairs in the system. It accounts for both the first and second order component reliability interactions and can 
therefore be used, for example, to determine the pair of components in a system for which a reliability 
improvement would result in the maximal system reliability improvement. Definitions for the DIM
II 
for 
application to components in phased mission systems are introduced in this section. 
8.5.5.1 Definition 
The definition for the period x „effect‟ period Phased DIMII with a phase m „cause‟ period for components i and 
j,         
 
 
, is given by Equation 8.37, where      
 
  is defined by Equation 8.38 as the change in the probability 
of system failure during period x due to small variations,      and     , in the phase m failure probability of 
components i and j respectively.  
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Correspondingly, the definition for the overall period x „effect‟ period Phased DIMII importance measure for 
components i and j,         
 
, is given by Equation 8.39. 
        
 
 
      
 
  
   
         
 
      
  
     
  
   
 
8.39 
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8.5.5.2 Interpretation of importance values 
The range of this importance measure is -1 to 1 with higher values signifying greater importance. The 
importance value assigned to a pair of components signifies its relative importance in comparison to that of all 
component pairs from the same system. 
8.5.5.3 Practical Example 
The Scenario 
A manufacturer has been informed by a supplier that a recent batch of components are suspected of being faulty 
and have a failure rate that is potentially much greater than normal. Two of these parts have been used in a 
certain system the manufacturer produces and that operates in a phased mission. They want to know if the 
mission reliability of that system is likely to be strongly affected, in which case they will issue a recall. 
The Solution 
The manufacturer could calculate the overall mission period Phased DIM II importance of the pair of 
components to determine if that pair of components, relative to all pair in the system, have a strong influence on 
the mission reliability. A high importance value will indicate that the mission reliability could be greatly 
increased and a recall may therefore be necessary.  
8.6 Conditional Importance Measures 
The importance of components and groups of components, as measured by the importance measures that have 
been introduced in this chapter, can be updated as a phased mission progresses to account for:  
 The fact that the component failure combinations that signify mission failure up to the point 
reached cannot have occurred.  
 The known working or failed status of components with revealed failures. 
The updating of component importance as a mission progresses has many uses. For example, the monitoring of 
component importance through a phased mission could be used to determine which components should receive 
additional preventive maintenance at any point – a strategy that would maximise the mission reliability that can 
be achieved with limited maintenance resources.  
The conditional importance of a component or group of components can be found using any of the importance 
measures introduced in this chapter. This is achieved by replacing all occurrences of system failure in the 
„effect‟ period,   , that appear in the importance definition with its equivalent that is conditional on the point in 
the mission reached and the status of the components, working or failed, for those with revealed failures. For 
example, the period x „effect‟ period Phased Birnbaum II importance with a phase k „cause‟ period for 
component i conditional on the system surviving to the end of phase 3, component s working up to that point 
and component t having failed in phase 2,      
                   , would be given by Equation 8.40, 
where   is the mission failure time and                      is the period x system failure probability 
based on those conditions. 
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 8.40 
The Phased Criticality III importance measure is particularly well suited to use as a conditional importance 
measure where frequent updates of importance values are required due to its high computational efficiency. 
8.7 Reliability Cost Minimisation 
Often the optimisation of a phased mission system requires a minimisation of its reliability costs, influenced by 
both the probability and cost of failures. The importance measures discussed so far, both in this chapter and the 
literature review, are concerned solely with the reliability and do not account for costs. In this section, a method 
for using the Phased Criticality III importance measure to minimise reliability costs is presented. Using this 
method it is possible to find the exact amount by which the reliability of a component in a certain period should 
be improved to minimise the costs due to reliability over a complete phased mission. 
8.7.1 Reliability Costs 
The different costs associated with the reliability of a component and phased mission system are discussed in 
this section. 
8.7.1.1 Component costs 
Improving the reliability of a component may incur some one-off costs such as: 
 Investigating how the component can be improved. 
 Finding a supplier of a more reliable alternative to the current component. 
 Re-designing and testing the component. 
These costs are only incurred a single time and are independent of how many phased missions are carried out 
with the improved component in the system. The cost per mission is therefore the total one-off improvement 
costs divided by the number of times the system carries out the phased mission. In addition, these costs may not 
vary linearly with the magnitude of the reliability improvement. For example a 10% reduction in the failure 
probability of a component may involve one-off costs that are more than twice those necessary to attain a 5% 
reduction. The per mission one-off costs of achieving an x% reduction in the probability of component i failing 
in period    to    of the mission is denoted by    . 
There may also be a change in the costs directly associated with the failure of the component, not including 
those incurred at the system level. This includes the cost of repairing or replacing the component after a phased 
mission to restore it to the working state for the next phased mission undertaken by the system. For example, the 
direct costs of failure for a component might increase as its reliability is improved if this improvement is 
achieved by manufacturing it from higher quality but more expensive materials. As with the one-off costs, the 
increase in the cost of component failure may not vary linearly with the magnitude of the reliability 
improvement. The expected direct cost of failure for component i in a phased mission,       , is given by 
Equation 8.41, where     is the direct cost of component i failing.  
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The change in the expected direct costs of component i failure due to an x% reduction in the probability of it 
failing in period    to    of the mission,        ,is given by Equation 8.42, where         is the probability of 
component i failing between times    and    prior to the reliability improvement and            and           are 
the direct costs of component i failing prior and after the reliability improvement respectively. A positive and 
negative value for         indicate an increase and reduction in the expected direct cost of component failure 
over a phased mission respectively. 
                            
 
   
            , 
where          
8.42 
8.7.1.2 System Costs 
The system costs are the costs incurred from system failures during a phased mission and may be related to 
direct economic factors such as lost production as well as costs assigned to consequences such as loss of lives. 
Unique to phased missions is the possibility for a variation in the cost of system failure with the period in which 
it occurs. For example, the failure of an aircraft engine during the initial period of the climb phase would have 
much higher expected costs, such as catastrophic loss of the aircraft, than if the same failure were to occur 
during the final taxi phase where they may be limited to those related to the repair of the engine. The phased 
mission can therefore be split into a set of consecutive time periods,   to   , where m is the total number of 
periods, each of which is associated with the cost of mission failure in that period.  These costs are denoted 
   to    , where    is the cost of failure in period    and so on. Two special cases are worth noting: 
1. If the cost of mission failure depends only on the phase in which it occurs then these periods 
will coincide with the phases. 
2. If the cost of mission failure is independent of the phase in which failure occurs then there will 
be a single period that spans the complete mission. 
The expected cost due to system failure in a phased mission,        , is therefore given by Equation 8.43, 
where     is the probability of mission failure in period   . 
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The change in the expected in the costs due to system failure in a phased mission,         , due to an x% 
reduction in the probability of component i failing in period    to    of the mission, is given by Equation 8.44 
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where          
  is the    „effect‟ period Phased Criticality III importance measure with „cause‟ period    to    for 
component i. A positive value for          indicates an increase in the expected cost of system failure over a 
phased mission, whilst a negative value indicates a decrease. 
               
 
    
         
  
   
, 
where          
8.44 
8.7.2 Overall Reliability Costs 
The change in the expected total reliability cost of a phased mission,           , that results from a x% 
reduction in the probability of component i failing over the period    to    of the mission is given by Equation 
8.45. 
                                8.45 
 
A negative value for            indicates a reduction in the expected overall reliability costs whilst a positive 
value indicates an increase.  
8.7.3 Finding the optimum component reliability improvement 
Equation 8.45 allows the change in the expected overall expected reliability cost to be found for any percentage 
improvement in the reliability of a component, assuming the two cost functions that give     and     for a given 
x% reduction in the probability of component i failing over the period    to    of the mission have been 
estimated. The optimum component reliability improvement percentage, and its corresponding reduction in 
reliability cost, can therefore be found by plotting            against the percentage reliability improvement. 
The rocket launcher phased mission system from section 8.3.9.4 will be used to demonstrate the cost 
minimisation analysis. For this example, it will be assumed that failure in the second and third phases are twice 
and four times as costly, respectively, as failure in the first phase, since if the system fails in phases one or two 
the launch can be aborted with minimal consequences. If the system fails in the third phase of the mission, 
however, the rocket is lost and the consequences are far higher. 
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Table 8.11 – Cost of system failure during each phase of the phased mission. 
Phase Number Cost of system failure 
1 1 
2 2 
3 4 
 
Table 8.12 gives the one-off costs of reducing the probability of failure over the phased mission for each 
component by 1 to 8 percent. 
Table 8.12 – One-off costs of reducing probability of component failure over the phased mission. 
 Component 
% Reduction in Component Failure 
Probability over Phased Mission   
A B C 
1 0.01 0.01 0.001 
2 0.04 0.02 0.008 
3 0.09 0.03 0.027 
4 0.16 0.04 0.064 
5 0.25 0.08 0.125 
6 0.36 0.14 0.216 
7 0.49 0.22 0.343 
8 0.64 0.30 0.512 
 
Table 8.13 gives the direct costs of failure in the phased mission for each component at their current reliabilities 
and if they were improved by 1 to 8 percent. It shows that the direct cost of failure for components A and C 
increases if their reliability is improved, whilst it remains constant for component B. 
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Table 8.13 – Direct cost of failure for each component in the phased mission. 
 Component 
% Reduction in Component Failure 
Probability over Phased Mission   
A B C 
0 0.01 1 0.01 
1 0.01 1 0.02 
2 0.01 1 0.04 
3 0.08 1 0.08 
4 0.08 1 0.16 
5 0.08 1 0.32 
6 0.2 1 0.64 
7 0.2 1 1.28 
8 0.2 1 2.56 
 
Table 8.14 shows the change in the expected one-off improvement, direct component failure, mission failure 
and overall reliability costs over a phased mission for component A. From this table it is clear that, for 
component A, the maximum reduction in the overall reliability cost of a phased mission is achieved by reducing 
its mission unreliability by around 2%. Similar tables can be produced for components B and C but these are not 
shown here. 
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Table 8.14 – Change in the expected phased mission reliability costs for different percentage reductions in 
the phased mission failure probability of component A. 
% Reduction in Failure 
Probability of 
Component A over 
Phased Mission   
Change in 
expected one-off 
improvement 
costs 
Change in 
expected direct 
component 
failure costs 
Change in 
expected mission 
failure costs 
Change in 
expected overall 
reliability costs 
1 0.01000 -0.00006 -0.07000 -0.06006 
2 0.04000 -0.00012 -.014000 -0.10012 
3 0.09000 0.04064 -0.21000 -0.07936 
4 0.16000 0.04015 -0.28000 -0.07984 
5 0.25000 0.03968 -0.35000 -0.06032 
6 0.36000 0.10700 -0.42000 0.04700 
7 0.49000 0.10580 -0.49000 0.10580 
8 0.64000 0.10460 -0.56000 0.18460 
 
Figure 8.10 shows a plot of the change in the expected overall reliability cost of a phased mission against the 
percentage reduction in the phased mission failure probability for each component. This shows that the 
maximum expected cost reductions are achieved by reductions in the mission failure probability of around 2%, 
5% and 3% for components A, B and C respectively. Note that this analysis and Equation 8.45 are based on the 
assumption that only the mission failure probability of a single component is reduced. If more than one 
component is to have its mission failure probability changed then the optimum percentages may vary due to the 
presence of higher order interactions between components. 
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Figure 8.10 – Plot of the change in the expected overall reliability cost of a phased mission against 
percentage reduction in phased mission failure probability for each component. 
8.8 Summary and Conclusions 
The literature review found that phased mission interpretations had been developed for only two of the six 
commonly used non-phased mission system importance measures. Each importance measure is useful in certain 
situations and allows the aggregating of the importance values to give an average overall importance. 
Additionally, the two that had been extended do not share the same precise predictive qualities of their non-
phased mission system counterparts. Phased mission extensions for all six of the commonly used importance 
measures were therefore developed and these provide the same use cases and useful properties as the non-
phased mission system equivalents. 
The existing phased mission importance measures were defined for the measurement of component importance 
in a certain phase or over the whole mission to the system reliability in a certain phase or over the whole 
mission. It was realised that the phased mission importance measures would be even more useful if they were 
also able to measure component importance from any period of the mission to the system reliability in any 
period of the mission, such as periods that do not start or end at the phase boundaries. An example of where this 
is useful is measuring the influence of infant mortalities for a component, where the infant mortality period does 
not coincide with a specific phase or set of phases, on the mission reliability. The new importance measure 
definitions were therefore developed so that they could be used to measure importance for very precise 
component and system reliability periods. 
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Another area for improvement of the existing phased mission importance measures was reducing the 
computational expense of finding the component importance to the system reliability over a number of phases, 
such as a complete phased mission. The new Phased Criticality II importance measure, introduced in this 
chapter, has better performance but still involves extensive calculations for missions with many phases. This led 
to the development of the Phased Criticality III importance measure that gives the same rankings as the Phased 
Criticality II importance measure but with much lower computational expense. This is therefore well suited to 
use with phased missions with large phase counts or when the speed of analysis is important such as in real time 
analysis. 
The measurement of the importance of a group of components, rather than the individual importance of each, is 
essential in certain circumstances such as when investigating changes that will affect the reliability of multiple 
components in a system. However, whilst the literature review uncovered a selection of group importance 
measures for non-phased mission systems, none had been developed for phased mission systems. The group 
importance measures that were developed and presented in this chapter fill the gap in those available for phased 
mission systems and example scenarios of where they might be used are presented to demonstrate their practical 
use. 
Finally, a common goal for those concerned with the reliability of a phased mission system is to minimise its 
reliability costs, where these costs include those incurred due to the consequences of mission failure. A method 
has therefore been developed that shows the precise amount by which the reliability of a component should be 
improved to minimise these costs. The use of this method eliminates guesswork from a reliability improvement 
exercise to show how the phased mission system reliability costs can be optimised. 
In summary, the work presented in this chapter has established a set of methods for the optimisation of the 
reliability of a phased mission system that matches those available for non-phased mission systems. The 
availability of these means that it is now possible to approach the optimisation of the reliability and reliability 
costs of a phased mission system in the systematic and rigorous manner previously only possible for the non-
phased case. 
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9 Conclusions and Areas for Further Work 
The first part of this chapter contains a summary of the work and the conclusions that have been reached. The 
second part discusses some possible areas in which the work could be continued in the future. 
9.1 Summary and Conclusions 
It would be difficult to design phased mission systems to a desired reliability without methods capable of 
predicting the reliability of a particular system design from knowledge of its reliability structure and the 
reliability of its constituent components. For this reason, the development of these methods has received 
considerable research interest. The literature review covering methods developed for non-repairable phased 
mission systems showed that the earliest method, developed by Esary and Ziems [3], relied on transforming a 
phased mission into an equivalent non-phased mission. The method uses cut-set based techniques for the 
reliability evaluation and since the transformation process increases the number of basic events and therefore 
also the number of cut-sets, it results in significant computational expense. Later, researchers developed 
methods utilising specially developed algebras to deal with the dependencies between component failures in 
different phases thus removing the need for the transformation to a single phase. Amongst the research 
reviewed, was a method by Kohda et al [28] who formed a phased algebra intended for the analysis of accident 
sequences using event trees. A comparison between the various phased algebra based methods showed that all 
give correct results and that the method from Kohda et al results in the fewest terms in the final probability 
equation and lowest computational expense. The most recent analysis methods found in the literature make use 
of the BDD technique, the first of which was developed by Zang et al [31]. Its vastly better computational 
efficiency when deriving the exact reliability of a phased mission was discussed along with its limitation of only 
being able to model single failure mode components.  Tang and Dugan [36] extended this method to model 
multiple failure modes by integrating it with a multiple failure mode non-phased mission BDD model developed 
by Zang et al [34]. Problems with this method were identified that cause it to give incorrect reliability results 
when applied to certain phased mission systems, as was shown through its application to some simple examples. 
This finding provided the motivation for the development of a correct method for the analysis of such systems. 
Additionally, it was decided that the method should be designed for high computational efficiency during repeat 
analysis of the same reliability structure but with component reliability model changes – as this is required for 
real time and importance measure analysis which were identified as important use cases. This led to the 
development of a BDD based method that uses a new intermediate step, where a dependency resolved data 
structure is constructed prior to the reliability evaluation, to improve repeat reliability analysis performance. It 
makes uses of a new set of BDD construction rules to form the BDD, including a new rule that reduces BDD 
size, together with the application of a new phased algebra derived from that of Kohda et al to form the pre-
evaluation data structure. A substantial computer code has been created that implements this method, taking the 
phase fault trees and component models as inputs and outputting the probability of in-phase, transitional and 
overall mission failure as desired. It supports a number of common component failure models such as the 
exponential and Weibull distributions, and is easily extended to include further models. The code also includes 
an implementation of the method by Tang and Duggan and comparisons between the two in the analysis of a 
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variety of randomly generated phased missions showed that the new method results in smaller BDDs, faster 
repeat evaluations and much improved accuracy.  
For repairable phased mission systems, the literature review showed that the earliest known method for the 
analysis of repairable phased mission systems is a Markov model based method developed by Alam and Al-
Saggaf [44] that uses separate state transition matrixes for each phase. That method results in large state spaces 
even for relatively simple phased missions and to mitigate this problem Kim and Park [45] developed a method 
that reduces the state space by removing absorbing states from the transition matrices. The disadvantage of the 
absorbing state removal is that the method can only be used to find overall mission reliability and not that of 
individual phases, although it is sometimes only the former that is of interest to the analyst anyway. An 
alternative to the use of separate phase state transition matrixes is to use a single state transition matrix and 
phase varying transition rates, as in the method developed by Dugan [46]. This results in a state space that is the 
same as that from the method by Alam and Al-Saggaf. However, it has the disadvantages that phase by phase 
state space minimisation cannot be obtained and that numerical solution schemes, which are more 
computationally expensive than analytical solutions, must be used. Another Markov method, this time for the 
analysis of repairable phased missions with additional complications such as time dependant failure rates and 
random phase transition times has also been developed by Smotherman and Zemoudeh [47]. Despite the power 
of the method in dealing with many types of dependencies, it results in very large state spaces and therefore is 
only suitable for the analysis of relatively small systems compared to the other methods. The literature on the 
Markov based methods does not mention the computational expense of solving the transition matrices and this 
was found to increase as the cube of the matrix order, i.e. a matrix twice as big takes approximately eight times 
as long to compute, with modern computation techniques [49]. Due to the potential state space explosion 
problem associated with the Markov based methods, which can prevent large systems being analysed, Wang and 
Trivedi [48] developed a method that uses both Markov and BDD techniques. Although the computational 
expense of this method is much lower, it does make the assumption that a repaired component is only integrated 
back into the system at the end of the phase in which it is repaired. This means that it may not be accurately 
model cases where repaired components are integrated back into the system at the moment that repair 
completes. It is also only capable of modelling multiple failure modes at the component level, i.e. it cannot 
model the different effects of different failure modes on the system reliability. Monte Carlo simulation and Petri 
nets have also been used to analyse Phased Missions, such as the method by Chew et al [53] developed for 
modelling maintenance free operating periods. It was clear from the literature review that the major problem 
with the methods developed for repairable phased mission systems was that they had high computational 
expense due to the presence of repair dependencies that limits the size of the system they can analyse. The 
research therefore concentrated on how they could be made more efficient and this led to the development of 
three improvements to the existing methods. In addition, it was realised that although many real world systems 
contain components that can be repaired during a phased mission, often they represent only a small proportion 
of the total components in the system. This motivated the research into the development of methods specifically 
for the analysis of such systems that could deal with the repair dependencies, where present, whilst considerably 
reducing the computational expense. The first improvement was a simple extension to the Markov method by 
Kim and Park to the analysis of systems containing components with multiple failure modes, thus expanding its 
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application to a greater range of systems. The Kim and Park method requires the identification of the system 
failed states, for which they did not provide a method, and it was shown that even simple phased mission 
systems can have hundreds of thousands of system states. The second method developed was therefore an 
efficient method for performing this step with low computational expense by using the BDD technique in a 
novel way. The third method improved the efficiency of the evaluation scheme for the BDD based method from 
Wang and Trivedi as it avoids unnecessary repetition of probability evaluations when the same reliability 
structure is analysed more than once through the use of a new data structure. The fourth method developed is an 
efficient method for the analysis of systems containing both repairable and non-repairable components when 
repaired components are integrated back into the system at the end of the phase in which the repair completes. A 
simple example demonstrated that this method can result in significantly smaller BDDs than the method by 
Wang and Trivedi, over 60% smaller for the example given, if the system contains a large proportion of non-
repairable components. It also has the advantage of using a BDD rather than Markov evaluation scheme for the 
non-repairable parts of the system. Together these two factors result in the much lower computational expense 
for the analysis of partially non-repairable phased mission systems, which was demonstrated for an example 
phased mission system. It also has the advantage of being able to model multiple failure modes at the system 
level for the non-repairable components thus allowing it to be used for the analysis of a greater range of system 
types. For the case of systems with component repairs that are integrated back into the system immediately upon 
completion, an efficient BDD based method was presented that gives an upper bound on the unreliability of a 
phased mission. The upper bound reliability condition was discussed and the factors affecting the accuracy of 
the estimate given, such as its increased accuracy if the non-repairable components have failure rates that do not 
increase with time. The method has the added benefit of being able to model multiple failure modes at the 
component and system levels for both non-repairable and repairable components. A software implementation of 
this latter method has been created and was demonstrated by applying it to the analysis of an example phased 
mission system. The discussion of this includes a comparison between the computational expense of the new 
method and the method by Kim and Park. 
A thorough review of existing importance measures was carried out, uncovering that six for individual 
components and five for groups of components have been developed for non-phased mission systems compared 
to only two for individual components from phased mission systems. Each of the importance measures 
developed for non-phased missions is useful in a specific situation, for example the RRW importance measure 
[54] when the aim is to find the component with the possibility for increasing the system reliability by the 
greatest amount and the Criticality importance measure when the aim is to find the component with the greatest 
present influence on the system unreliability. This established the need for the development of a similar number 
of importance measures for the analysis of phased mission systems. It was also shown that those that do already 
exist lack some of the predictive qualities of their non-phased mission equivalents. Finally, the advantages of 
phased mission importance measures that are not restricted in the „cause‟ and „effect‟ time periods they measure 
were shown. Phased mission equivalents were therefore developed for each importance measure, including 
improvements to those already extended to phased missions. In total, seven new individual and six new group 
phased mission importance measures have been defined. They all have lesser restrictions on time periods 
compared to the existing phased mission importance measures and, where based on an existing non-phased 
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mission definition, have the same predictive qualities. For each new importance measures, the definition, the 
meaning of a specific importance value and the application to a realistic example scenario were explained. It 
was also shown that each of the new importance measure definitions retains the same interpretation as its non-
phased mission counterpart. For example, it was shown that the value of the new Birnbaum importance measure 
extension gives the ratio of a change in the failure probability of the component to that of the system and that the 
value of the new Criticality importance measure extension gives the influence that the component has on the 
system reliability. The computational expense was compared for the different phased mission Criticality 
importance measure definitions, both new and that found in the literature, and shown to be significantly lower 
for the new definitions – particularly when used in the analysis of high phase count phased missions. The new 
group importance measures should prove useful as often reliability improvement efforts involve multiple 
components and prior to their development no importance measures for groups of components in a phased 
mission system existed. The computer code for the analysis of non-repairable phased missions has been 
extended to include importance measures such as the Phased RAW and Phased Criticality III so that they are 
quickly and easily calculated even for complex phased missions. Since the optimum system design, from a 
reliability perspective, is often that which has minimum reliability costs and not necessarily unreliability itself, a 
method for determining the component for which a reliability improvement, and the level by which it should be 
improved, to achieve the optimum decrease in expected reliability costs over a phased mission was presented. 
The application of this method to the optimisation of a simple example phased mission system demonstrated the 
ease with which it can be used to find the optimal path to reliability cost minimisation through the improvement 
of a component. Overall, the increase in the number, predictive qualities, flexibility with regard to time periods, 
ability to measure importance of groups and computational efficiency of the developed phased mission 
importance measures represent a significant improvement in the tools available for the optimisation of phased 
mission systems. Whereas previously it was non-phased mission systems that were easier to optimise through 
the use of importance measures, the status is now at least equal. The situation for phased mission systems could 
even be considered better if, for example, the ability to optimise system reliability in particular time periods, 
which is not possible with non-phased mission importance measures, is taken into account. 
In conclusion, both of the objectives for the research have been met. The first research objective was to develop 
computationally efficient methods for the measurement of phase and mission reliability for both non-repairable 
and repairable systems. For non-repairable systems, specifically those with multiple component failure modes, 
the newly developed method has been shown to be more efficient than the existing alternatives. Comparatively 
smaller efficiency improvements were made to methods for systems containing only repairable components and 
some new techniques were introduced. However, the development of the first methods for those systems 
containing a mixture of repairable and non-repairable greatly improves the efficiency in the analysis of many 
real world phased mission systems that feature repair, since they often contain a majority of non-repairable 
components. The second research objective was to develop importance measures that can be used to guide 
phased mission system reliability improvement and optimisation actions. It has been shown that the set of newly 
developed phased mission importance measures are capable of identifying the areas of the system to target for a 
particular reliability improvement objective with greater precision and efficiently than was previously possible. 
They should prove useful to any engineer wishing to optimise the reliability of a phased mission system and this 
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research objective has therefore also been met. In addition to meeting the research objectives, a substantial 
computer code has been developed in parallel with the theoretical research and would provide a solid foundation 
on which to base any future implementation of the methods in industrial applications or as part of a commercial 
or open source software tool. 
9.2 Areas for Further Work 
Some areas for further work have been identified and are discussed in this section. 
9.2.1 Analysis Methods 
There are certain phenomena that can be modelled by certain methods found in the literature but not by the 
newly developed methods. These include common cause failures, uncovered failures and random phase 
transitions. The extension of the new methods to include them would be useful as they are sometimes present in 
real world systems and, in such cases, not including them in the modelling may lead to inaccurate results. 
An obvious area for further work is the application of the methods to the analysis of an actual real world system. 
Due to a lack of access to data on real world systems, the phased missions that the new methods have been 
tested against has been limited to either simple or large but randomly generated example phased mission 
systems. The application of the methods to a real world system would serve to demonstrate how they could be 
applied by industry to help create reliable phased mission systems. 
The methods introduced in chapter 6 are the first to have been specifically developed for systems containing 
both non-repairable and repairable components. Since many real world systems contain only a small proportion 
of components that are repairable during a phased mission and due to the computational overhead present in 
methods developed for repairable systems, this seems to be an interesting area for further study. 
9.2.2 Computer Code 
The computer code that has been developed, implementing many of the methods presented in this thesis, 
provides an analysis engine for phased mission analysis. This gives the potential for it to be used in a variety of 
ways, for example embedded within a hardware system or as part of a desktop application. It would be useful to 
develop a graphical user interface (GUI) that provides an easy to use means of interacting with this analysis 
engine and presents its output in an attractive and descriptive manner. Another, more specific, potential 
application that could be developed is a computer code for an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) that utilises real 
time analysis provided by the engine in mission reconfiguration decisions. For example, it could feed the 
analysis engine data about its current system status, such as known failed components, mission status and 
potential configurations to determine predicted reliabilities and then use this information to decide how to 
continue. A final example of an application that could be developed on top of the analysis engine would be an 
automated phased mission system reliability optimiser that takes inputs of the system reliability structure, 
component reliabilities, reliability costs and desired reliability goal (for example, 10% reduction in phase 2 
failures and 15% reduction in mission failures) and determines, through the calculation of component 
importance and other analysis, the best path to achieving that goal. 
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Due to technological limitations, the historical trend that the available CPU speed doubles every two years 
(sometimes referred to as Moore‟s law), has not continued in recent years. The recent trend has been toward 
increasing the number of CPUs on a single computer and the use of distributed computing, where multiple 
computers connected across a network are used for a single task, rather than increasing the CPU speed, which 
has remained relatively constant since 2003 [63]. However, unlike increases in CPU speed, increases in the 
number of CPUs will not lead to a significant improvement in the performance of a sequential computer code 
that executes one line of code at a time. It is therefore necessary to parallelise the code so that multiple 
instructions are performed concurrently and all the available processing power across multiple CPUs is put to 
use. Based on this, an interesting area for future work would be to investigate ways in which algorithms for the 
methods in this thesis or new methods could be developed to profit from this trend.  
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